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Ethical Issues, Helps, and Challenges: 
Perceptions of U.S. Actuaries 
Therese M. Vaughan, Robert W. Cooper, and Garry L. Frank* 
Abstract 
This paper reports the findings of a survey of Fellows of the Casualty Actuarial 
Society (FCAS) to determine their perceptions of the key ethical issues and dilemmas 
facing the industry today and the factors they view as most helpful and challenging 
in resolving these dilemmas. The responses are compared to a previous survey of 
Fellows of the Society of Actuaries (FSA). The study finds that FSAs and FCASs tend 
to rank key ethical issues similarly and that both groups of actuaries tend to look first 
to their own personal values, second to certain factors in their business environment, 
and last to professional factors when resolving ethical dilemmas. Finally, the paper 
contains some implications for the actuarial professional associations as they attempt 
to assist their members in resolving ethical dilemmas. 
Key words: ethics, professionalism 
1 Introduction 
Recent years have seen significant activity among American 
actuarial organizations focused on professionalism. Both the Society 
of Actuaries (SOA) and the Casualty Actuarial Society (CAS) have 
instituted admissions courses that include professionalism and 
ethics.1 More recently the organizations have cooperated through the 
American Academy of Actuaries (AAA) to create the Actuarial 
Board for Counseling and Discipline (ABCD), from which all actuar-
* Therese M. Vaughan, Ph.D., ASA, ACAS, CPCU, is director of the Insurance Center 
at Drake University where she teaches courses in insurance and actuarial science. 
Robert W. Coorer, Ph.D., is Employers Mutual Distinguished Professor of Insurance at 
Drake UniverSIty. He previously was dean at The American College where he was 
responsible for the CLU and ChFC designation programs. 
Garry L. Frank, Ph.D. is a professor of public administration at Drake University 
where he teaches a course in business ethics. 
1 In the case of the CAS, this course must be completed prior to associateship; the SOA 
course is required for admission to fellowship. 
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ies are encouraged to seek help in matters dealing with professional 
conduct. All three organizations have promulgated codes of profes-
sional conduct to encourage professionalism and ethical behavior by 
their members. 
This paper reports the findings of two surveys of Fellows of the 
Casualty Actuarial Society eliciting their views on the major ethical 
problems today in the property I liability insurance industry and the 
factors they find helpful and challenging personally in resolving the 
ethical dilemmas they face at work. The surveys replicate previous 
surveys of Fellows of the Society of Actuaries conducted by Cooper 
and Frank (1992a, 1992b) in February 1991. A comparison of the 
results across actuarial groups suggests that the most problematic 
ethical issues are similar, as are the factors viewed as most helpful 
and challenging. By focusing on the issues of greatest concern and the 
factors viewed as most helpful in resolving them, some insights can 
be gained into approaches that may be taken by actuarial organiza-
tions to assist their members. 
2 Methodology 
2.1 The Survey Forms 
Two survey instruments are used. One measures the perceptions of 
Fellows of the Casualty Actuarial Society with respect to ethical 
issues and dilemmas important in the property I liability insurance 
industry. The other measures the factors that are helpful and chal-
lenging in resolving ethical dilemmas. The first survey contains an 
itemized list of 34 potential ethical issues (dilemmas); they are pre-
sented in Table 1. Issues 8 and 9 are most directly related to the prob-
lems of selecting assumptions to use in pricing and reserving and those 
encountered when dealing with regulators. The remaining 28 of the 
first 30 issues reflect ethical issues and dilemmas facing businesses 
and their employees in general. Issues 31 through 34 deal with ethi-
cal dilemmas of particular concern to business professionals. Survey 
participants are asked to rate each of the 34 statements on a five 
point scale, where a 5.0 means that it is a major ethical problem in 
the property I liability insurance industry and a 1.0 means that it is 
not a problem. In addition to rating the 34 issues presented in Table 1, 
respondents are asked to indicate what they feel is the most impor-
tant specific ethics problem facing those who work in the industry 
today. Finally, survey participants are asked to provide some demo-
graphic information, including how many years they have been mem-
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TABLE 1 :; 
Issue Ratings-All Res[!ondents ~ 
FCAS- FCAS- FSA- FSA- S. 
Employees Consultants Employees Consultants » Mean Mean Mean Mean () 
Rating Rank Rating Rank Rating Rank Rating Rank 2 
~ 
Issue 1 Failure to provide products and ~ 
services of the highest quality in the IJ 
eyes of the customer 2.667 2 2.947 3 2.78 4 2.90 4 iil 
$l 
Issue 2 Failure to provide prompt, honest o· 
responses to customer inquiries and 
(J) 
requests 2.488 6 2.827- 5 2.68 6 2.72 7 
Issue 3 Making disparaging remarks about 
competitors, their products, or their 
employees or agents 1.940 16 1.987 21 2.63- 8 2.52# 10 
-...j 
Issue 4 Misuse of proprietary information 1.810 23 2.079-- 19 1.88 21 1.77 26 
Issue 5 Misuse of sensitive information 
belonging to others 1.786 24 2.053 20 1.76 Z1 1.85 24 
Issue 6 Improper methods of gathering 
competitors' information 1.643 Z1 1.882 25 1.83 22 1.75 28 
Issue 7 False or misleading representation of 
products or services in marketing, 
advertising, or sales efforts 2.309 10 2.553 9 3.61- 3.60# < 
Q. 
Issue 8 Responding to pressure from clients 
and/or management to change 
Z assumptions used in pricing or 
reserving 3.277 3.592- N/A N/A N/A N/A !J 
_1'0 
Issue 9 Misrepresenting information provided co to regulators 2.512 4 2.829 4 N/A N/A N/A N/A co 
w 
< 
III 
TABLE 1 (continued) c co 
Issue Ratings-All Respondents =r-
III 
FCAS- FCAS- FSA- FSA- ? 
Employees Consultants Employees Consultants () 
Mean Mean Mean Mean 0 0 
Rating Rank Rating Rank Rating Rank Rating Rank "0 
-~ 
Issue 10 Conflicts between opportunities for III 
:::l 
personal financial gain (or other c.. 
personal benefits) and proper "'Tl 
performance of one's responsibilities 2.250 11 2.671' 8 2.83' 3 3.16#,## 3 til 
:::l 
A 
Issue 11 Conflicts of interest involving 
business or financial relationships 
with customers, suppliers, or 
competitors that influence or appear 
to influence one's ability to perform 
OJ his or her responsibilities 1.929 17 2.453' 11 2.19- 14 2.48## 12 
Issue 12 Conflicts of interest involving the 
marketing of products or services 
competing with those of one's own 
company 1.560 3) 1.865' 'Zl 2.18- 15 2.48#,## 11 
Issue 13 Conflicts of interest that involve 
working for a competitor, customer, 
or supplier without approval 1.393 33 1.750- 32 1.78- 26 1.99 18 
Issue 14 Misuse of company assets/property 1.869 21 1.974 22 1.83 Z3 2.05## 16 
Issue 15 Insider trading/other security trading 
problems 1.714 25 1.836 28 1.69 3) 1.87 Z3 m g: 
Issue 16 Giving excessive gifts or o· III 
entertainment 1.643 'Zl 1.776 31 1.80 25 1.73 29 -
Cii 
Issue 17 Receiving excessive gifts or en c 
entertainment 1.607 29 1.671 33 1.69 29 1.65 3) CD en 
C-
o 
TABLE 1 (continued) c ..... 
Issue Ratings-All Respondents :::J 
~ 
FCAS- FCAS- FSA- FSA- 0 
Employees Consultants Employees Consultants .... 
Mean Mean Mean Mean » C) 
Rating Rank Rating Rank Rating Rank Rating Rank C-
Ol 
Issue 18 Offering or soliciting payments or ~ 
contributions for the purpose of "1J 
influencing customers or suppliers 1.464 32 1.790- 29 1.61 31 1.61 31 Dl 
@. 
Offering or soliciting payments or Issue 19 C) 
contributions for the purpose of 
CD 
influencing government officials 1.560 ro 1.787 ro 1.81- 24 1.76 27 
Issue 20 Offering or soliciting payments or 
contributions for the purpose of 
<D 
obtaininQ, QivinQ, or keepinQ business 
1.679 a3 1.947- 24 1.92- 2) 1.89 22 
Issue 21 Offering or soliciting payments or 
contributions for the purpose of 
persuading employees of another 
company to fail to perform or 
improperly perform their duties 1.214 34 1.250 34 1.24 32 1.26 32 
Issue 22 Offering or soliciting payments or 
contributions for the purpose of 
influencing legislation or regulations 1.821 22 2.171- 15 2.08- 17 2.05 15 
< 
Issue 23 Willful inaccuracy of books, records, Q. 
or reports 2.000 15 2.342- 12 2.26- 12 2.59## 9 ...... -
Issue 24 Abuse of expense accounts 2.048 14 2.227 14 2.30- 11 2.19 13 Z !:l 
Issue 25 Anti-trust issues 2.202 12 2.171 15 2.03 18 1.92 21 .!" ...... 
Issue 26 Relations with local communities 1.905 19 2.110 18 1.73 28 2.04## 17 
<D 
<D 
W 
< 
~ 
TABLE 1 (continued) c c.c 
Issue Ratings-All Respondents :::; ~ 
FCAS- FCAS- FSA- FSA- .=:J 
Employees Consultants Employees Consultants 0 
Mean Mean Mean Mean 0 0 
Rating Rank Rating Rank Rating Rank Rating Rank "0 
.~ 
Issue 27 Office/agency closings and layoffs 2.452 7 2.160 17 2.35 10 2.16 14 ~ =:J 
c.. 
Issue 28 Discrimination in the workplace 2.179 13 2.289 13 2.08 16 1.98 19 " til 
Issue 29 Drug and alcohol abuse 1.893 aJ 1.973 23 2.20',- 13 1.92 aJ =:J ;0;-
Issue 30 Employee theft 1.917 18 1.882 25 1.99- 19 1.77 25 
Issue 31 Lack of knowledge or skills to 
perform one's duties competently 2.512 4 2.789 6 2.65 7 2.78 6 .... 
0 Issue 32 Failure to identify the customer's 
needs and recommend products and 
services that meet these needs 2.578 3 2.960' 2 3.26' 2 3.40# 2 
Issue 33 Failure to be objective with others in 
one's business dealings 2.325 9 2.553 9 2.61' 9 2.70 8 
Issue 34 Misrepresenting or concealing 
limitations in one's abilities to provide 
services 2.441 8 2.790' 6 2.73' 5 2.80 5 
= siQnificantly Qreater than the FCAS-employee value at the 0.05 level Pearson correlation coefficients: 
All Issues-FCAS(Emp.)/FCAS(Cons.) = 0.9450 m - = siQnificantly Qreater than the FSA-consultant value at the 0.05 level Common issues-FCAS(Emp.)/FSA(Emp.) = 0.8187 5' FCAS(Cons.)/FSA(Cons.) = 0.8579 o· 
# = significantly greater than the FCAS-consultant value at the 0.05 level Spearman correlation coefficients: 8:. 
All Issues-FCAS(Emp.)/FCAS(Cons.) = 0.9372 en ## = significantly greater than the FSA-employee value at the 0.05 level Common issues-FCAS(Emp.)/FSA(Emp.) = 0.8552 (J) 
FCAS(Cons.)/FSA(Cons.) = 0.8579 c 
(!) 
(J) 
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bers of the CAS and their level within their company (senior man-
ager, middle manager, or nonmanagement). 
The second survey deals with potential helps and challenges in 
responding to ethical dilemmas. The survey lists the 16 potential 
helps and 18 potential challenges found in Tables 2 and 3, respec-
tively. Again, respondents are asked to rate these on a five point 
scale. For the helps, a 5.0 means the factor is extremely helpful and 
a 1.0 means it is not helpful. For the challenges, a 5.0 means it pre-
sents a significant challenge and a 1.0 means it does not present a 
challenge. Respondents also are permitted to indicate NA if the 
helps or challenges are not available or not applicable. Two open-
ended questions ask the respondents to indicate other factors they 
find helpful in resolving ethical dilemmas and other factors that 
present ethical challenges. Finally, the survey collects demographic 
information on the number of years the respondent had been a member 
of the CAS, how long he or she has worked for the current employer, 
and his or her level within the company. 
Both of these surveys are nearly identical to the surveys of FSAs 
conducted by Cooper and Frank in February 1991. (Minor changes are 
made to incorporate issues, helps, and challenges that are likely to 
be relevant for casualty actuaries.) This makes it possible to compare 
the FSA and FCAS group responses and draw conclusions about their 
similarities and differences. 
2.2 The Samples 
The Casualty Actuarial Society supplied two sets of mailing 
labels for actuaries practicing in the U.S.: 504 property I liability 
company employees and 248 consultants. It is possible that the ethi-
cal dilemmas viewed as important may differ between actuaries 
employed at insurance companies (which would tend to be larger 
companies) and those consulting (primarily to smaller companies); 
therefore, the issues survey was mailed to both company employees 
and consultants. The helps and challenges survey was mailed only to 
a sample of company employees.2 
2 Sending the helps and challenges survey only to company employees while sending 
the issues survey to both company employees and consultants was done for several rea -
sons. First, given the limited number of FCAS consultants available to survey, the 
design focused on identifying differences in perceptions of issues by employees and con-
sultants, which both intuition and previous ethics research suggest are more likely to 
differ for the two groups than are helps and challenges. Second, the design replicates 
the design of the earlier FSA studies (which reflects discussion with the staff of the 
SOA) and thus permits comparison between the two groufs of actuaries in this paper. 
The FCAS study split the company employee group-hal received the issues survey, 
and half received the helps and challenges survey. The consultant group only received 
11 
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Survey forms were mailed in July 1993. Responses were returned 
by 84 of the 252 company employees receiving the issues survey (33 
percent) and 76 of the 248 consultants (31 percent). The helps and 
challenges survey generated responses from 112 of the 252 company 
employees that received it (44 percent).3 
3 Findings 
3.1 FCAS Groups: Perception of Issues 
Table 1 provides the mean ratings for each of the 34 ethical 
issues based on the individual ratings given to each issue by all 
respondents, with separate results reported for employees and consul-
tants. The table also shows the rank of each issue based on the size 
of the issue's mean rating relative to the size of the other issue 
means for the same group of actuaries. For example, Issue 1 (failure to 
provide products and services of the highest quality in the eyes of 
the customer) is rated 2.667 on average by the respondents in the 
FCAS company employee group and has the second highest issue 
mean rating for that group. 
Only one issue received a mean rating of over 3.0-Issue 8, 
responding to pressure from clients and/or management to change 
assumptions used in pricing or reserving. This issue is ranked number 
one by both the company employees and consultants. While the other 
issues have mean ratings less than 3.0, the percentage of respondents 
indicating 3.0, 4.0, or 5.0 for an issue suggests that many of the issues 
present ethical problems for rather substantial percentages of those 
in the industry. 
The FCAS company employee and consultant groups rank the 
same six issues as the major ones facing the property/liability insur-
ance industry (although they are in slightly different order in each 
group). The consultants rate an additional issue (Issue 34) as tied for 
sixth place. These seven issues and their relative rankings for FCAS 
employees and consultants are: 
the issues survey. Each of the surveys was reviewed by representatives of the CAS or 
SOA. 
3 These response rates are somewhat lower than the FSA response rates. In that case, 
48 percent of company employees and 46 percent of consultants responded to the issues 
survey, and 41 percent responded to the helps and challenges survey. While there are 
no obvious explanations for the differences In response rates, it should be noted that 
the CAS had just conducted an extensive survey of its membership when the current 
survey was mailed. 
1? 
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a) Responding to pressure from clients and/ or management to change 
assumptions used in pricing or reserving (1, 1).4 
b) Failure to rrovide products and services of the highest quality in 
the eyes 0 the customer (2, 3). 
c) Failure to identify the customer's needs and recommend products 
and services that meet these needs (3, 2). 
d) Misrepresenting information provided to regulators (4, 4). 
e) Lack of knowledge or skills to competently perform one's duties 
(4, 6). 
f) Failure to provide prompt, honest responses to customer inquiries 
and requests (6, 5). 
g) Misrepresenting or concealing limitations in one's abilities to pro-
vide services (8, 6). 
Issue 27, office/agency closings and layoffs, ranks relatively high 
for company employees (and not for consultants). Recent restructuring 
in the property/liability industry and the effects of the soft market 
evidently are leaving their effects. 
Statistically significant differences5 between the company 
employee and consultant groups are reported for four of the seven top-
ranked issues (Issues 2, 8, 32, 34). For these four issues (which deal 
with consumer/client problems) the consultant mean ratings are 
higher than the employee ratings, perhaps reflecting the consultants' 
greater contact with clients and others outside the firm. The appar-
ent importance of these differences diminishes, however, when one 
examines the correlation coefficient for the mean ratings of the 34 
issues, 0.9450.6 This high correlation indicates that the order of the 
issues is similar for the two groups? 
4 For example, (2,3) means FCAS employees rank the issue second, while FCAS consul-
tants rank the same issue third. 
5 t-tests are used to test for differences in means throughout the paper. F statistics are 
calculated to test for equality in variances. In most cases the variances are not found to 
be different, so pooled variance t-tests are used in these cases. Where differences in 
the variances are found, a separate variance t-test is used. The possibility of response 
bias exists because of the somewhat small response rates (not atypical of this type of 
study). 
6 The numbers reported in the text of this paper are the Pearson product moment corre-
lation coefficients. Because the tables also include ranks, the Spearman rank order cor-
relation coefficients also are calculated and reported in the tables. 
7 Little difference is found among actuaries at different organization levels with 
respect to their order of the issues. All groups rank Issue 8 first. The correlation coeffi-
cient for the mean ratings is 0.9354 for senior manager and middle manager company 
employees and 0.9037 for senior manager and middle manager consultants. The order of 
issues is somewhat less similar, however, for nonmanagerial personnel and managers 
for the consultant survey. 
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As expected, the actuaries rate those issues most closely related 
to selecting assumptions in pricing and reserving and dealing with 
regulators among the highest (Issues 8 and 9).8 Evidence of the 
importance with which actuaries view these issues is found in the 
responses to the open-ended question asking for the most important 
ethical problem facing those working in the industry. Several 
responses deal with the current regulatory environment, which is con-
sidered, as one respondent termed it, "too political." Respondents 
raised concerns about dealing with consumer advocates and regulators 
who do not follow professional standards of practice. One respondent 
stated "Unethical rate suppression leads to unethical support for rate 
filings." 
The remaining five issues identified by the respondents as pre-
senting the greatest ethical problems to the industry combine business 
and professional ethics issues. Two are related to the ethical respon-
sibilities of businesses and their employees in general (Issues 1 and 
2). The other three are ethical issues of special relevance to profes-
sionals (Issues 31, 32, and 34). All four of the professional issues 
included in the survey form (Issues 31 through 34) are ranked in the 
top ten by both company employees and consultants. 
Three of the highest rated issues relate to providing proper ser-
vice to customers (Issues I, 2, and 32). While these may be viewed as 
ethics problems, they are also part of a much broader question of just 
how the industry does business. Much has been written about the 
industry's poor relations with consumers and the need to provide 
quality customer service.9 Customer service is a major focus of the 
total quality management (TQM) movement now fashionable with 
the insurance industry (and others). It is not surprising that these 
issues are rated highly. 
3.2 Comparison with FSA Study Findings: Perception of 
Issues 
Table 1 also shows the issue means and rankings for the earlier 
survey of company employee and consultant FSAs (Cooper and Frank 
1992b). FCAS Issues 8 and 9 are not in the FSA survey.10 The correla-
8 For a thorough discussion of the ethical dilemmas faced by actuaries in these areas, 
see Feldblum (1993). 
9 See, for example, Roberts (1993) who reports on the proposed creation of a fermanent 
quality insurance congress to address the problem of improving the quality 0 the insur-
ance industry, with particular emphasis on improving service. 
10 This is unfortunate because, as one reviewer noted, Issue 8 may be the principal issue 
for pension actuaries while Issue 9 is common to all actuaries. 
14 
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tion coefficient for the mean ratings of common issues for FCAS 
employees and FSA employees is 0.8187; for FCAS consultants and 
FSA consultants it is 0.8579. Not surprisingly (because these actuaries 
are in essentially different industries), these are lower than the 
FCAS employee/FCAS consultant correlation coefficient previously 
reported. 
The top issues, as rated by FSAs and FCASs, however, are simi-
lar. With the exception of Issues 8 and 9 (which are not included on 
the FSA survey), all of the top seven FCAS issues also are ranked in 
the top seven by both the FSA company employees and consultants. 
The FSAs (both employees and consultants) give the highest rat-
ing to Issue 7 (false or misleading representation of products and ser-
vices in marketing, advertising, or sales efforts), while the FCASs 
rank Issue 8 highest. The importance of Issue 7 in the life insurance 
industry likely is driven by a concern over misleading policy illustra-
tions,ll perhaps the life insurance equivalent to the 
property /liability problems with pricing and reserving. Both deal 
with the fundamental actuarial problem of selecting assumptions to 
illustrate or predict the future. Also, in both cases the information 
will be used by outside parties (consumers in the life case, regulators 
in the property / liabili ty case) .12 
The issues ranked second and third by the FCASs (Issues 1 and 
32) rank fourth and second for the FSAs. The next two highest rated 
issues (of those common to both studies) for the FCASs (Issues 31 and 
2) are also in the top seven FSA issues. These issues (two business-
related and two professional-related) reflect a high degree of concern 
about relations with customers and the industry's willingness/ ability 
to provide adequate and appropriate products and service. 
3.3 FCAS Survey: Helps 
Table 2 provides the mean ratings and ranks for the survey's 16 
potential helps and the percentage of respondents that indicate each 
help is not available or applicable. (NA responses are not included 
in the mean ratings.) The potential helps in the survey form are clas-
11 Cooper and Frank (1992b) report that the survey's 0r.en-ended question elicited 
responses focusing heavily on the use of misleading policy Illustrations. 
12 Issue 3 (making disparaging remarks about competitors, their products, or their 
employees or agents) is Significantly higher in importance for the FSA respondents 
than for FCAS respondents. This issue ranks in the top ten for both FSA company 
employees and consultants, but is ranked 16 and 21 for FCAS employees and consultants, 
respectively. The importance of this issue may reflect the general concern about 
marketing-related issues in the life insurance industry; for example, the problem with 
policy illustrations. 
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sHied into three groups: one's personal attributes/environment (H15 
and HI6), business environment (H5 through HI4), and professional 
environment (HI through H4). The results indicate that respondents 
find a number of these resources helpful in resolving ethical dilem-
mas encountered in work. Only four of the 16 potential helps have 
mean ratings below 3.0 (H2, H4, H6, and H7). 
The five factors ranked most helpful to the respondents for 
resolving ethical dilemmas encountered in their work are (from 
highest to lowest): 
a) Personal moral values and standards. 
b) The fact that your immediate boss does not pressure you into com-
promising your ethical standards. 
c) Ability to go to your boss for information and advice on ethical 
issues. 
d) A company environment/culture that does not encourage you to 
compromise your ethical values to achieve organizational goals. 
e) A company management philosophy that emphasizes ethics in 
business operations. 
Respondents rate their own personal moral values and standards 
most helpful. All of the remaining four major helps relate to the 
actuary's work environment. The actuary's immediate boss is a major 
source of help (second and third), and the company culture and man-
agement philosophy are close behind (fourth and fifth). Two of these 
most helpful factors (HID and H13) deal with merely the absence of 
pressure to compromise one's own ethical standards. This suggests 
that one way companies and managers can assist employees is by nei-
ther explicitly nor implicitly pressuring them to go against their 
ethical values. 
In spite of the fact that the company environment appears to be a 
major source of assistance in resolving ethical dilemmas, many 
respondents report formal company systems are not available to 
them. Thirty-eight percent of respondents report that a program or 
department in their company to which they could report unethical 
activity (H7) is either not available or not applicable, and 49 per-
cent report company ethics training (H6) as unavailable. Even when 
these resources are available, respondents tend to rate them among 
the least helpful factors; both have mean ratings below 3.0. 
Relatively more helpful is a company code of ethics, which earns a 
mean rating of 3.4 but is not available to 14 percent of respondents. 
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Potential Helps-All Respondents » 
FCASs FSAs 
(') 
2" 
Mean Mean ~ Rating Rank %NA Rating Rank %NA 8l 
H1 The codes of professional conduct of the Casualty Actuarial Society "'lJ iii [Society of Actuaries] and the American Academy of Actuaries 3.327 9 2 3.48 7 0.8 ~ 
H2 Materials on ethics published by the Casualty Actuarial Society [Society of 
o· 
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Actuaries] and the Academy of Actuaries 2.954 13 3 3.04 12 4.6 
H3 Professional meetings where ethical issues can be discussed with other 
actuaries 3.140 12 4 2.92 13 6.9 
--J 
H4 The Actuarial Board for Counseling and Discipline (ABCD) of the 
American Academy of Actuaries 2.510 15 4 N/A N/A N/A 
H5 Your company's code of ethics or similar policy on ethical conduct 3.438 8 14 3.35 9 14.4 
H6 Ethics training provided by your company 2.526 14 49 2.54 15 54.0 
H7 A program or department in your company to which you can report 
unethical activity 2.300 16 :E 2.56 14 47.1 
H8 A company management philosophy that emphasizes ethics in business 
operations 3.822 5 4 3.79 5 3.4 
< 
H9 Clear communication of appropriate ethical behavior by company Q. 
management 3.562 7 6 3.46 8 9.1 
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Potential Helps-All Respondents 
FCASs 
Mean Mean 
Rating Rank %NA Rating 
H10 A company environment/culture that does not encourage you to 
compromise your ethical values to achieve organizational goals 3.981 4 4 3.91 
H11 Ability to go to your boss for information and advice on ethical issues 4.055" 3 3 3.79 
H12 Ability to go beyond your boss to higher level managers for information 
and advice on ethical issues 3.258 10 13 3.21 
H13 The fact that your immediate boss does not pressure you into 
compromising your ethical standards 4.402" 2 4 4.16 
H14 Help from your co-workers in resolving your ethical dilemmas 3.248 11 3 3.23 
H15 Your own personal moral values and standards 4.795 0 4.80 
H16 Your family and friends who provide support and insight for you in 
resolving ethical conflicts 3.706 6 3 3.75 
" = significantly greater than the FSA value at the 0.05 level 
[1 = wording on the FSA survey form for these statements 
Pearson correlation coefficient: FCAS/FSA = 0.9838 
Spearman correlation coefficient: FCAS/FSA = 0.9736 
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Respondents tend to give relatively low ratings to resources pro-
vided by the professional societies. Two of the four helps related to 
professional resources (HI to H4) receive ratings below 3.0 (H2 and 
H4). The Actuarial Board for Counseling and Discipline ranks 15th 
out of the 16 helps, possibly because it is relatively new and respon-
dents have had little experience with it.13 Additional surveys are 
necessary to determine more precisely the reason for ABCD's rela-
tively low rank. 
To summarize, FCAS company employees tend to look first to per-
sonal values, second to certain factors in their business environment, 
and last to resources in their profession when resolving ethical 
dilemmas. Resources from their profession tend to be viewed as rea-
sonably helpful, but less helpful than most factors in the business 
environment. The responses also suggest that businesses should ensure 
that managers are equipped to deal with their own ethical dilem-
mas and those encountered by their subordinates in the course of 
work. One of the best things a business can do to encourage ethical 
behavior is to refrain from pressuring managers and employees to 
compromise their own personal values. 
3.4 Comparison with FSA Study Findings: Helps 
Table 2 also shows the helps ratings and ranks for the earlier 
survey of FSAs (Cooper and Frank 1992a). The five most important 
helps, as rated by respondents to the FSA survey, are identical to 
those found in the FCAS survey. Moreover, they are in virtually the 
same order of importance (the exception being HI0 and Hll, which 
are reversed in order). The correlation coefficient for mean ratings of 
the FCAS and FSA respondents is 0.9838, indicating a high degree of 
similarity in the ordering of their responses. The mean ratings of 
only two helps (Hll and H13, both of which relate to the respon-
dent's relationship with his or her immediate boss) are significantly 
different, with the FCAS ratings higher than the FSA ratings. 
3.5 FCAS Survey: Challenges 
Table 3 provides mean ratings by the FCAS company employees 
for each of the survey's 18 potential challenges and the percentages 
that report NA. (NA responses are not included when calculating the 
mean ratings.) All of the mean ratings are below 3.0, indicating that 
13 Following the comparison of the FSA and FeAS results, some suggestions for ways 
the professional societies can improve the helpfulness of professional factors are given. 
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Potential Challenges-All Respondents -() 
FCASs FSAs 0 
Mean Mean 0 "0 
Rating Rank %5 %NA Rating Rank %5 %NA ~ 
C1 Conflict between duty to your employer and duty to your 
III 
::l 
clients 2.120 4 4 55 2.37 3 5 28 c. 
." 
C2 Conflict between duty to your employer or clients and duty to iD ::l 
the regulators or public 2.660 3 7 2 NlA NlA N/A N/A 7' 
C3 Unethical behavior or demands by co-workers 2.019 8 5 1.98 11 2 8 
C4 Unethical demands made by your employer or clients [by your 
I\) clients or customers) 2.018 9 3 3 2.24 5 4 16 
0 
C5 Competition encountered in your business activities 2.708 2 8 5 2.90 2 10 8 
C6 Intense competition in the insurance indust~ that forces 
owners, managers, and others to focus on t e bottom line 
and not business ethics 2.820 7 0 3.10' 13 5 
C7 A company environment/culture that encourages you to 
compromise your ethical values to achieve organizational 
goals 1.774 14 5 5 1.81 14 3 14 
C8 A lack of ethics policy in your company 1.648 17 0 20 1.79 16 3 27 
C9 A lack of communication of ethics policy by your company 1.809 13 2 20 1.90 12 2 21 
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Q. 
» Potential Challenges-All Respondents U 
FCASs FSAs c 
Mean Mean $ll ::l. 
Rating Rank %5 %NA Rating Rank %5 %NA ~ 
""0 
C11 Your inability to disclose unethical activity because of fear of Ql 
management reprisal 1.755 15 3 7 1.81 15 3 11 U o· 
C12 Mid-level managers who are concerned only with their own 
CD 
personal gain and not ethics 1.907 11 4 4 2.00 9 3 8 
C13 Measuring employee performance on the basis of end results 
without also considering how ethical the means were to 
I\) 
achieve the results 2.029 6 2 5 2.15 8 3 6 
C14 Performance based on quotas such as amounts of insurance 
sold, cases underwritten, claims processed, or hours billed 2.012 10 3 23 2.28 4 5 29 
C15 Pressure from others compensated by commissions 
[compensation that includes commissions] 2.047 5 4 23 2.18 6 4 64 
C16 Compensation that includes bonuses or opportunities for 
profit sharing 2.020 7 8 2.18 7 3 13 
C17 A personal need to achieve or succeed 1.746 16 0 0 1.86 13 2 2 < 
C18 Financial pressures exerted on you to provide security for 
Q. 
family or others 1.585 18 2 4 1.70 17 3 
Z 
• = significantly greater than the FCAS value at the 0.05 level Pearson correlation coefficient: FCAS/FSA = 0.9819 !=> 
[] = wording on the FSA survey form for these statements Spearman correlation coefficient: FCAS/FSA = 0.9044 I\) 
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the factors generally are not viewed as presenting particularly sig-
nificant challenges to large percentages of the respondents. Nearly 
all of the challenges, however, receive a rating of 5.0 (presents a 
very significant challenge) by at least some of the respondents, and 
most are rated 3.0, 4.0, or 5.0 by at least 25 percent of respondents. 
This suggests that these challenges, while not viewed as widespread 
problems, are sufficiently pervasive that they should not be ignored 
by management. Managers and supervisors need to be alert to identify 
and handle (on an individual basis) those situations where reason-
ably significant challenges are encountered by members of their staffs 
in attempting to respond appropriately to ethical dilemmas at work. 
The five challenges ranked as the most problematic in the 
respondents' personal efforts to act ethically are (from most to least): 
a) Intense competition in the insurance industry that forces owners, 
managers, and others to focus on the bottom line and not on busi-
ness ethics. 
b) Competition encountered in business activities. 
c) Conflict between duty to the employer or clients and duty to regu-
lators or the public. 
d) Conflict between duty to the employer and duty to the clients. 
e) Pressure from others compensated by commissions. 
The two challenges rated the highest deal primarily with com-
petitive pressures. The importance of these pressures as a challenge 
to behaving ethically is found in previous studies of insurance profes-
sionals (e.g., Cooper and Frank 1991a, 1992a). While economic theory 
suggests that competition is good for business and its owners, perhaps 
its impact from an ethical standpoint is not always favorable, espe-
cially when the rights and obligations of other stakeholders (such as 
customers, employees, and the general public) are taken into consid-
eration. 
That actuaries may have difficulties ascertaining and balancing 
the rights and obligations of the various stakeholders is seen in the 
third and fourth highest-rated challenges. Both deal with conflict 
between duty to one's employer and duty to other stakeholders 
(public/regulators and clients). The third highest rated challenge 
(involving conflict between duty to employer and public/regulators) is 
related closely to Issues 8 and 9 on the issues survey, which also 
receive high ratings. 
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3.6 Comparison with FSA Study Findings: Challenges 
The factors cited by FCAS respondents as presenting the greatest 
challenges to their personal efforts to act ethically are similar to 
those cited by the FSAs in the Cooper and Frank (1992a) study. 
Three of the top five FCAS challenges (C1, CS, and C6) are also in 
the top five FSA challenges. One of the remaining two (C4) is not 
included in the FSA survey, and one (CIS) is ranked sixth by the 
FSAs. Both groups of actuaries rate Challenge 6 (intense competition 
forcing a focus on the bottom line) as the most troublesome. As in the 
helps case, the correlation between the FCAS and FSA groups is 
high, 0.9819. 
4 Summary and Conclusions 
The ethics literature recognizes that professionals working in a 
business environment may look to a variety of factors to assist them 
in resolving ethical dilemmas and that the relative importance 
placed on these factors may vary across professional groups. Raelin 
(1989) distinguishes the "cosmopolitan" professional, who "pledges 
loyalty to the profession" and the "local" professional who extends 
loyalty to the business organization. A cosmopolitan professional 
should tend to value professional resources higher than those related 
to the business environment when resolving ethical dilemmas. 
The results of this study indicate that actuaries tend to look first 
to their own personal values, next to certain factors in their business 
environment, and only then to professional factors. That is, actuaries 
tend to be more local than cosmopolitan in their search for solutions 
to ethical problems. This is not to say that professional factors are 
unimportant; rather, they tend to be viewed as less helpful than 
business factors. These results are consistent with prior studies of both 
insurance and accounting professionals.14 
These findings suggest that one way the professional actuarial 
societies could assist their members is to improve the helpfulness of 
the professional factors (e.g., the codes of professional conduct, pub-
lished materials on ethics, professional meetings as a place to discuss 
ethical issues, and the recently established ABCD). A recent paper 
by Feldblum (1993) makes a similar suggestion. After examining the 
ability of the AAA Code of Professional Conduct to distinguish ethi-
cal and unethical behaviors, Feldblum recommends that the Code be 
14 The relative importance of business factors over professional factors has been found 
in studies by Cooper and Frank (1991a and b) and Heaston, Cooper, and Frank (1993). 
23 
Vaughan, Cooper, and Frank Ethical Issues 
supplemented with guidelines, explanations and interpretations, and 
case studies.15 Some actuaries fear, however, that too much speci-
ficity would reduce actuarial work to a cookie cutter approach to 
solving problems. While there are legitimate differences of opinion 
over what form (e.g., guidelines, case studies) supplemental mate-
rials should take and how rigid and enforceable they should be, it 
seems clear that the professional societies can do more to improve 
the helpfulness of professional factors. 
The professional societies should recognize in developing a plan 
for ethical guidance, however, that the business environment tends to 
be among the first places actuaries look for help and that the boss is 
among the first places they go within the business environment. 
Because many actuaries are managers ("bosses"), they have both an 
opportunity and a responsibility to influence the ethical environment 
in which they work. The most effective efforts by the professional 
societies to foster ethical behavior may be those efforts aimed at 
enhancing their members' ability to contribute to an ethical business 
environment. 
There are two directions that could be taken by the professional 
organizations to assist their members in influencing the business envi-
ronment. The first is aimed at changing the internal business environ-
ment; that is, assisting members to contribute to a corporate culture 
that encourages and rewards ethical behavior. This would involve, 
for example, training manager-actuaries to identify and counsel sub-
ordinates facing ethical dilemmas. It could involve assisting man-
ager-actuaries in their efforts to introduce ethical resources in their 
own firms. For example, the professional societies could provide edu-
cation on how to create an effective corporate code of ethics and how 
to implement corporate programs providing assistance to employees in 
resolving ethical dilemmas. 
The second direction is aimed at influencing the external business 
environment by addressing the issues that actuaries find most trouble-
some. For life actuaries, the number one issue is policy illustrations; 
for casualty actuaries, it is pressure to change assumptions in pricing 
and reserving. These issues are within the actuary's realm of exper-
tise, but competitive pressures within the industry make it difficult 
for one individual to act alone. For example, many companies appar-
ently discount loss reserves implicitly on statutory financial state-
15 Feldblum concludes that the Code is merely a first step to the development of a 
guide for ethical behavior. "To be universally applicable, the Code must be general: it 
prohibits that which is clearly wrong, but it Ieaves the ambiguous untouched. In prac -
tice, ethical dilemmas come In shades of gray, for which noole precepts provide Insuf-
ficient guidance." 
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ments, in spite of statutory prohibitions against discounting,16 To the 
extent this is an industry-wide phenomenon and individual companies 
are targeted for supervision by the degree to which their financial 
results vary from the norm, it would be difficult for a single company 
to behave differently. Professional associations could influence this 
situation by aggressively pursuing realistic statutory accounting stan-
dards. On the life side, the associations could pursue clearly defined 
guidelines for policy illustrations,17 
Both life and casualty actuaries also give high rankings to issues 
focusing on relations with consumers and providing quality products 
and services that meet consumer needs. These issues rest on the heart 
of the major problem facing the industry-the public's lack of trust 
and the need to rebuild that trust. This is a problem not easily 
addressed, but one that has received significant attention in recent 
years. Actuaries should play a major role in rebuilding that trust, 
both individually (by encouraging an emphasis on ethical and sound 
business practices) and as a group (by developing industry-wide 
responses to the problem). 
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Managing the Relative Volumes of Participating and 
Nonparticipating Business in a Mutual Life Company 
Robert G. Chadburn* 
Abstract** 
Management decisions of a mutual life company involving the amounts and rela-
tive proportions of participating (with profits) and nonparticipating (without profits) 
business and the level of expenses are examined in relation to their effect on partici-
pating policyholders' returns. A particular expense ratio is defined that plays a key 
role in a framework for making such decisions. The sensitivity of participating policy 
returns to changes in each factor are analyzed. Companies with expense ratios (as 
defined) of less than 2 are shown to prefer a different strategy from companies with 
higher ratios. There is an incomplete tendency for the ratio to stabilize either at unity 
or to tend to infinity. The practical implications and limitations of the approach are 
considered. 
Key words: decision making; expenses; new business 
1 Introduction 
This paper concerns certain management decisions relating to 
mutual life companies (offices); the position regarding stock 
(proprietary) companies is different and is only briefly discussed. 
A United Kingdom (U.K.) environment is assumed, although the 
circumstances are general enough to make the conclusions appropriate 
to other countries, including the United States. Some of the comments 
made and procedures adopted in the paper, however, reflect pecu-
liarities of the U.K. (including methods of dividend distribution, 
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product design, and statutory regulation). Brief descriptions of these 
features will be given to assist non-U.K. readers. 
In the U.K., participating (with profits) policyholders' divi-
dends are paid in two forms, referred to as reversionary and terminal 
bonuses. Reversionary bonuses are additions to the contractual policy 
benefit; they usually are made annually, at the discretion of the 
company's actuary, to reflect a proportion of the surplus earned dur-
ing the previous year. Terminal bonuses are added at the claim date 
of the policy, again at the discretion of the actuary, so that the 
total policy benefit on maturity of a policy will be equal to the poli-
cy's asset share plus an element of smoothing. In a mutual company 
the return to the participating policyholder also will include a share 
in the company's profits or losses from other sources, such as those 
generated by nonparticipating business, plus any contribution made to 
or from the estate. 
The nature of the statutory regulations regarding the valuation of 
assets and liabilities combined with the particular features of the 
participating business described above result in different patterns of 
emergence of statutory surplus. Nonparticipating (without profit) 
business generally produces large initial surplus strains, followed by 
small regular profits emerging in subsequent years. The large strains, 
however, can be reduced by modern product designs. Participating 
business, for which reserves only are required for the contractual ben-
efit plus declared bonuses, lead to reduced or even nonzero initial 
strains, followed by relatively large contributions to statutory surplus 
for a considerable period of the policy's duration. A large strain then 
is produced at the claim date when the terminal bonus becomes 
payable. As a result, the issue of new participating business will tend 
to improve the statutory surplus position, while the issue of nonpar-
ticipating business will tend to have the opposite effect. This is a 
factor that will bear on later discussion. 
In the U.K., traditional nonparticipating business such as term 
and whole life insurances do not constitute much of a mutual com-
pany's portfolio. A considerable and possibly increasing volume of 
business consists of unit-linked contracts.1 Later in the paper situa-
tions are hypothesized in which 35 percent or more of a mutual com-
pany's portfolio consists of nonparticipating business. While such a 
proportion may have been unlikely historically, more recently this 
would not be an incredible figure for some firms. 
1 In a unit-linked insurance contract, premiums (after deductions for expense and claim 
charges) are allocated to units, the value of which directly reflect the returns 
obtained from a specific pool of assets. The charges represent the nonparticipating 
premium to the company for these contracts 
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The decisions considered in this paper are those that ultimately 
have an effect upon the volumes of new participating and nonpartici-
pating business issued by a mutual company and in the management of 
expense levels. 
According to a basic principle of economics, the more units of 
product that are sold at the same price for a fixed level of expense, 
the greater will be the profit per unit sold. Furthermore, an increase 
in expense levels if accompanied by a greater proportionate increase 
in units sold will increase unit-profit. This is referred to as economies 
of scale. 
In the life insurance business, units of product (policies) are sold, 
at least partly, with the aim of making a profit and with the 
knowledge that the activities of selling and managing the business 
involve expenses that offset profit. A stock company issuing nonpar-
ticipating policies will conform ultimately to the basic economic 
principles stated above, as will a nonparticipating portfolio within a 
mutual company. 
A mutual company, which must have a significant portfolio of 
participating policyholders on its books, is in an unusual position. As 
a mutual, all profits earned by both the participating and nonpartic-
ipating portfolios must be distributed (ultimately) to the participat-
ing policyholders. This means that while increasing the number of 
participating units sold for a given level of expense will reduce the 
average cost for each unit sold (thereby increasing unit profit), it also 
will reduce each unit's share of the profits earned by the nonpartici-
pating portfolio (thereby decreasing unit profit). The position of the 
mutual company is therefore more complex than the position of a 
nonparticipating stock company case. The overall profitability of a 
mutual company depends on the relative levels of profit from the 
nonparticipating portfolio compared with the level of expenses. It is 
this position that will be explored in section 3 of this paper. 
Profit is not the only consideration of importance to management 
when arriving at decisions that may affect business volume. For 
example, the mutual company at all times must maintain a sufficient 
statutory surplus both to satisfy the regulators and to make invest-
ments that are in the best long-term interests of the policyholders, 
including investment in the issue of new nonparticipating contracts. 
This surplus is provided by the existence of a participating portfolio, 
as well as from profits retained from earlier generations of policy-
holders. A certain relative level of participating business is neces-
sary; without it, a mutual company could not exist. 
There are also factors at work in the market that may affect 
business volume irrespective of any other ambitions the management 
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may have. For example, sales of nonparticipating contracts may be 
affected by premium rate, while sales of participating policies may 
be influenced by historical and current profitability. Customer prefer-
ences for products may change over time, and changes to tax legisla-
tion (e.g., removal of tax reliefs on insurance premiums) dramatically 
can influence sales volume. These factors must be borne in mind when 
considering the implications of the results described in this paper. 
The present analysis will need to distinguish between two types 
of expenses: proportionate and nonproportionate expenses:2 
a) Proportionate expenses are variable expenses associated with par-
ticipating and nonparticipating portfolios, and these expenses are 
proportionate to the volumes of business sold. 
b) Nonproportionate expenses are the remaining expenses, consisting of 
other variable expenses and fixed expenses. Nonproportionate 
expenses can be considered as expenses that colfechvely vary 
with the decision made, but not necessarily in proportion to any 
change in volume of business resulting from the decision. 
For example, a particular management decision may lead to an 
increase in nonproportionate expenses of X percent, coupled with an 
increase in nonparticipating sales of Y percent; X and Yare not linked 
to each other in any way other than that they are both dependent 
upon the decision made. A mutual company attempting to expand its 
operations to produce economies of scale may be faced with such a 
decision set. As will be seen in section 3 below, it is always best to 
choose the decision that produces the greatest increase in sales for 
the smallest increase in nonproportionate expenses, everything else 
being equal. 
2 Construction of Total Profit 
All references to present values refer to a time ongm (time 0) 
unless otherwise stated. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed 
that the discount rate used to calculate present values is equal to the 
rate of investment return earned over the lifetime of the portfolio. 
Further, without loss of generality, it is assumed that the mutual 
2 Chalke (1991) considers expenses at any decision point to be "nonmarginal" if they 
are invariable by any of the possible decisions made. Expenses that vary according to 
the decision made are described as "marginal expenses." Ramsay (1991), in his com-
ment on Chalke's paper, points out that these expenses more appropriately are 
described as "fixed' and "variable" respectively, in accordance with more traditional 
parlance. Chalke notes that fixed expenses at one decision point may become the 
variable expenses of the next decision point. 
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company's business consists of one tranche3 of nonparticipating busi-
ness and one tranche of participating business, all issued at time 0.4 
The policies within each tranche are assumed to be identical. The 
company is assumed to incur three distinct types of expenses: 
a) Proportionate expenses of the nonparticipating business; 
b) Proportionate expenses of the participating business; 
c) Nonproportionate expenses. 
The management also has ultimate control of business volume, sepa-
rately for each tranche. 
Three types of profit, Pn , Plo' and P~, need to be defined. 
Pn = Actuarial present value of future marginal profits (net of pro-
portionate expenses) earned by a single nonparticipating pol-
ICY issued at time 0; 
Plo Actuarial present value of future marginal profits (net of pro-
portionate expenses) earned by a single participating policy 
Issued at time 0; and 
P~ = Actuarial present value of the marginal profits earned by a 
single participating policy including the value of the benefit 
payments. 
Appendix 1 contains a detailed description of the method used to cal-
culate Pn and Pw. 
While in reality individual policies, even of the same size and 
type, earn different profits (e.g., due to different dates of claim), it is 
assumed that each policy earns the same average (or expected) 
profit. The effect of changes in business volume on profit variability 
is not considered in this paper. 
It is assumed that marginal profits are fixed and independent of 
sales volume. In practice this is not entirely true: cheaper products 
are easier to sell, but will have lower marginal profit. In the present 
context it is helpful to think of the nonparticipating business as a 
body of unit-linked policies with premium rates that are effectively 
the charges deducted from the policy benefits. In these cases, policy 
sales depend more on expected investment returns obtained from the 
policyholder's unit-holding than upon the rates of charge levied to 
3 Here tranche refers to business issued within a specific and limited time period. 
4 Similar conclusions could be drawn assuming the company is in a stationary position, 
in real terms, issuing constant volumes of new business each year. A single tranche 
model, however, is much easier to visualize. 
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cover expenses and other costs, at least up to a point. Hence, an 
assumption of invariant marginal profit per policy can be justified for 
the purpose of illustrating the point of interest in this paper. The 
effect of introducing a price/volume relationship for the nonpartici-
pating business in the model is an aspect worthy of further investiga-
tion. 
Let 
N n = Number of nonparticipating policies issued at time 0; 
N w Number of participating policies issued at time 0; 
E(n) Actuarial present value of all future nonproportionate 
expenses (with respect to these two tranches of business). 
The present value of the company's future retained profits from the 
two tranches, TP, then is given by: 
Because, over the lifetime of the business, all the profits earned by 
the two tranches are paid to the participating policyholders in pol-
icy benefits,S it follows that TP = O. 
Let c be the present value of future benefits paid to a single par-
ticipating policy (assumed to be the same for all participating poli-
cies), then P~ is given by 
P~ = Pw + c. 
P~ can be considered as the value of future premiums, less 
proportionate expenses, plus the policy's returns on investment. 
Hence: 
or 
c = P~ + (1) 
5 This may not always be the case. Smoothing participating policy returns may result 
in more or less than asset shares being paid, while there may be a strategy to expand 
or contract the estate for good management reasons. Because policy benefits are 
designed to follow asset shares and the estate is ultimately a policyholder asset, then 
it seems appropriate to assume that, on average, TP = O. 
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In other words, the present value of the benefits under a single par-
ticipating policy is equal to the value of its premiums, including 
investment income and net of proportionate expenses, plus that pol-
icy's share of the profits from the tranche of nonparticipating poli-
cies, less that policy's share of the nonproportionate expenses of the 
company. 
From equation (1) it easily can be seen that increasing the volume 
of nonparticipating business Nn , or reducing the amount of nonpropor-
tionate expenses E(n), will increase the return to the individual par-
ticipating policyholder c. Increasing the volume of participating 
business only will increase returns, however, if (NI1 PI1 - E(l1)) is nega-
tive. That is, the ratio E(l1) I(N n Pn) is greater than unity. This ratio 
will be referred as R, or as the expense ratio, 
E(I1) 
R= N P n n 
and it represents the extent to which the non proportionate expenses 
of the portfolio are covered by the nonparticipating business. 
The rest of this paper is concerned with identifying the relative 
effects of varying N n , NWI and E(I1) on participating policy returns for 
different values of R. In addition, the paper establishes a framework 
for the construction of management decisions for companies with par-
ticular expense ratios subject to different business prospects. 
3 Controlling the Variables to Maintain or Improve 
Per Policy Profit 
3.1 The Variables 
It will be assumed that at time 0 management can make decisions 
that affect N n' N w , E(n), or any combination of these quantities. 
Equation (2) below represents the value of the participating per pol-
icy returns (subsequently referred to as per policy returns) after changes 
in each of these variables, 
(2) 
-1 ::; a~n), lXn < 00 and aw > -1, 
where an' aw , a~n), and ac are parameters indicating the proportional 
changes in the number of nonparticipating policies, number of 
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participating policies, nonparticipating expenses, and per policy 
returns respectively. 
3.2 Maintaining Returns 
Whenever conditions change, it is reasonable to assume that the 
aim of management will be to ensure that per policy returns do not 
fall, (i.e., to ensure that ac is never negative). Subtracting equation 
(1) from equation (2) yields: 
which implies: 
(3) 
It is instructive to examine the behavior of ac with respect to the 
other parameters. From equation (3), 
(4) 
because the constants c and N w are positive and N n and Pn are non-
negative. Notice that the right side of equation (4) is independent of 
an, a~n), and R. Thus, returns increase at a constant rate for any 
change in these quantities. 
Similarly, 
(5) 
and 
(6) 
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From equation (5), returns (as a function of aw) either are decreasing, 
zero, or increasing if R < 1, R = 1, or R > 1, respectively. Finally, from 
equation (6) we see that for a given aw, returns decrease at a constant 
rate regardless of the level of a~n). 
Let us now investigate the behavior of a/u a w, and a~n) when 
there is no change in the level of returns; that is, when ac = O. First, 
setting ac = 0 in equation (3) yields : 
(7) 
That is, to maintain returns, the proportional change in the number of 
nonparticipating policies (an) must be a weighted average of the 
proportional change in the number of participating policies (aw) and 
the change in nonproportional expenses (aJn). Here the weights can 
be negative (if R > 1). When 0 < R < 1, in order for returns to be 
maintained, nonparticipating business has to be increased in response 
to increases in both expenses and participating business. Decreases in 
E(n) and N w would allow nonparticipating volume to fall while 
maintaining returns. 
Consider the following pairs of parameters: (a/uaw), (an' a~n), 
and (aw,a~n) in equation (7), subject to the third parameter being set 
equal to zero. Define fx/y as: 
ax 
fx/y = a 
y 
(8) 
where (ax,ay) is one of the pairs of parameters listed above and sub-
ject to the constraints of equation (7). In other words, ax is the change 
in the factor identified by x which is exactly sufficient to maintain 
returns (i.e., ac = 0) following a change of ay in the factor identified 
by y and no change in the third factor in equation (7). 
Definition 1 
When / f / < 1, the response is termed efficient; when / f / ;? 1, the 
response is termed inefficient. 
Definition 2 
If I fx/z / < / fy/z I, then a change in z is compensated for more efficiently 
(or less inefficiently) by changing x rather than y. 
Consider the pair (an,aw). By setting a~n) = 0 in equation (7), we 
have an = (l-R)aw which implies that: 
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an - = In/w = (1-R) aw 
Similarly, setting a w = 0 gives an = Ra~n) and 
an 
a~n) = In/e = R 
while setting an = 0 gives (1-R)aw + Ra~n) = 0 and 
a,V R 
a~n) = Jw/e = R - 1 . 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
The following results are derived easily from Definition 1: 
In/w = (l-R) 
In/e = R 
R 
Jw/e = R-l 
Efficient Region 
0<R<2 
0< R < 1 
0< R < 1/2 
Inefficient Region 
R ~ 2 
R ~ 1 
R ~ 1/2. 
Tables 1 through 3 display summary information on the effects of con-
trolling various parameters to maintain per policy returns. 
TABLE 1 
Summary of the Nonparticipating Business Response With Respect to Changes in 
Expenses and Volume of Participating Business in Order to Maintain per Policy Returns 
R 
(0,1/2) 
(1/2, 1) 
(1,2) 
(2,00) 
INC = Increase 
DEC = Decrease 
E = Efficient 
I = Inefficient 
Nonparticipating 
Response 
INC 
INC 
INC 
INC 
Due to 
Nonparticipating: 
INC 
INC 
DEC 
DEC 
36 
E 
E 
E 
I 
Due to 
Expenses: 
INC 
INC 
INC 
INC 
E 
E 
I 
I 
Notes 
'nlw> 'nle 
'nle> 'n/w 
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TABLE 2 
Summary of the Participating Business Response 
With Respect to Changes in Expenses 
R 
(0,1/2) 
(1/2, 1) 
(1,2) 
(2,00) 
and Volume of Nonparticipating Business 
in Order to Maintain Per Policy Returns 
Participating Due to Due to 
Response Nonparticipating: Expenses: 
DEC DEC I INC E 
DEC DEC I INC I 
INC DEC I INC I 
INC DEC E INC I 
For key, see bottom of Table 1 
TABLE 3 
Notes 
No solution where 
R(1+ ae) > (1+ an) 
Summary of the Expenses Response With Respect to 
Changes in the Volumes of Nonparticipating and Participating Business 
in Order to Maintain Per Policy Returns 
Expenses Due to Due to 
R Response Participating: Nonparticipating: Notes 
(0,1/2) DEC INC I DEC I No solution where 
(1/2,1) DEC INC E DEC I an < aw- R(1+ aw) 
~1, 2) DEC DEC E DEC E 
2,00) DEC DEC E DEC E 
For key, see bottom of Table 1 
4 Sensitivity Analysis 
The extent to which changes in the three factors affect the per 
policy returns now will be analyzed using a hypothetical model com-
pany. 
The model company is composed entirely of 10 year annual pre-
mium pure endowments, with one tranche in unit-linked 
(nonparticipating) form, the other as participating. The methodology 
used to calculate P n , P~, and E(n) are described fully in Appendix 1. 
The assumptions used to calculate Pn and Pz~ are given in Appendix 2. 
These assumptions lead to Pn = £255.69; P~ = £3517.45 
The present value of future nonproportionate expenses E(n) is cal-
culated such that Pn less one policy's share of these expenses is equal 
to 50 percent of the initial commission (IC), i.e., 
E(n) 
0.5 x Ie = P n - N + N . 
n w 
This implies that: 
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E(n) = (Nn + Nw) (Pn - 0.5 x Ie) 
(according to these assumptions). 
The present value of the participating maturity benefit c is calcu-
lated according to equation (1). The participating policy is assumed 
to have a sum assured S such that a compound reversionary bonus of 5 
percent per annum (with no terminal bonus) will lead to the implied 
maturity value of c x (1.1)10, i.e., 
(
1.1 )10 
S = c x 1.05 . 
The analysis involves calculating c(l + (Xc) using equation (2), pro-
duced for values of (Xc of +0.5 and -0.5, for each of the three factors in 
turn for R = 0.5, 0.75, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 3.0. Note that (Xc can be expressed 
in terms of the implied revised reversionary bonus rate (r), which 
satisfies: 
The results are given in Table 4, and the changed values of R which 
correspond to these revised bonus rates are given in Table 5. 
TABLE 4 
Implied Reversionary Bonus Yields Percent for 50 Percent Variations in Fixed Expenses 
and in the Volumes of Nonparticipating and PartiCipating Business According to the 
Model Described in Section 4 and Appendix 1 
Nw = 1000 throughout (A value of 5 percent indicates no change in yield) 
R Nn an = aw= af.n) -e -
0.5 -0.5 0.5 -0.5 0.5 -0.5 
0.50 4771.00 6.46 3.33 4.47 6.46 4.20 5.75 
0.75 1228.00 5.45 4.53 4.92 5.23 4.65 5.34 
1.00 704.62 5.27 4.73 5.00 5.00 4.73 5.27 
1.50 380.40 5.15 4.85 5.05 4.85 4.78 5.22 
2.00 260.50 5.10 4.90 5.07 4.60 4.80 5.20 
3.00 159.80 5.06 4.94 5.08 4.75 4.81 5.19 
38 
Journal of Actuarial Practice Vol. 1, No.2, 1993 
TABLES 
Changes to the Expense Ratio RAfter 50 Percent Variations in Fixed Expenses and in 
the Volumes 
of Nonparticipating and Participating Business, 
Where These Values Correspond to the Same Changed Situations That Produce the 
Yields Shown in Table 4 at any Given Value of R 
an= aw= 
0.5 -D.S 0.5 -0.5 
0.67A 2R R R 1.SR O.SR 
5 Discussion 
5.1 Interpretation of the Results 
In this section reference will be made particularly to Tables 1 to 4 
and to equations (9) to (11). 
Consider first Table 4. Sensitivity to changes varies both accord-
ing to the company' expense ratio, R, and according to the factor 
involved. Returns become extremely sensitive at expense ratios below 
0.5. But as these values imply high nonparticipating volumes coupled 
with low expenses, ratios in this region are unlikely in mutual life 
companies, which need a substantial volume of participating business 
to be viable. 
As a general observation, yield becomes less sensitive to changes 
the higher is the expense ratio. At values of R above about 1.5 the 
improvements in yield due to increasing the volume of either types of 
business are barely appreciable. For these values of R, the greatest 
improvements are achieved by reducing nonproportionate expense 
levels. 
At values of R above about 2, the most significant adverse effect 
is due to a decrease in the volume of participating business; hence, 
maintaining the volume of this business should be of most concern to a 
company with such a ratio. From Definition 2, Ife/w I < Ifn/w I indi-
cates that an unavoidable fall in participating volume is much more 
efficiently dealt with by decreasing expenses than by increasing non-
participating volume. This difference in efficiency becomes more 
marked for increasingly large values of R. Similarly, an increase in 
expenses is compensated for more efficiently by increasing participat-
ing rather than nonparticipating volume ( Ifw!e I < 1;;1!e I ). 
Offices with ratios between 1 and 2 should become more concerned 
with falls in nonparticipating volume and increases in expense levels. 
Reducing expense levels is a much more efficient way of compensating 
for a fall in nonparticipating volume than increasing participating 
volume ( I fe/n I < I fw/n I ). At ratios close to unity, varying the partic-
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ipating volume will have almost no effect on yield. There is no effi-
cient way to deal with increasing expenses at these ratios; hence, 
this would appear to be the most significant problem. If increasing 
expenses is unavoidable, then increasing the nonparticipating volume 
is the least inefficient way of compensating ( I fn/e I < I fw/e I). The 
greatest improvements at these ratios can be achieved by increasing 
nonparticipating volume or by decreasing the nonproportionate 
expenses. 
At ratios below unity a rather peculiar and apparently unstable 
situation exists, as per policy returns increase with a fall in partici-
pating volume, reflecting the increased share of the (positive) value 
of (N n Pn - E(n») per participating policy. Returns become increasingly 
sensitive to changes in all factors, but particularly to changes in the 
nonparticipating volume. There is no efficient way of compensating 
for a fall in nonparticipating volume at these levels-it is of particu-
lar concern to management to maintain nonparticipating volume here. 
Between ratios of 0.5 and I, I fe/n I < I fw/n I , i.e., it is less inefficient 
to compensate for falling nonparticipating business by reducing 
expenses than by decreasing participating sales; however, the oppo-
site is the case for the (rather unlikely) situation where the expense 
ratio is below 0.5. 
At ratios below unity, I fn/e I < I, so that an increase in expenses 
can be compensated for efficiently by increasing nonparticipating vol-
ume. Reducing the participating business is also an efficient way of 
dealing with increased expenses at ratios below 0.5, although the 
nonparticipating route is always the most efficient method. 
5.2 Consequences of Management Decisions 
A company with an expense ratio exceeding 2 would be most con-
cerned with maintaining and increasing participating sales and con-
trolling expenses. Economies of scale are easier to achieve using par-
ticipating sales the larger the value of the expense ratio. But in all 
cases, a greater proportionate increase in sales than in expenses is 
needed to secure these economies. These actions would tend to increase 
the expense ratio, making it proportionately easier to achieve fur-
ther economies of scale. The high ratio position persists and tends to 
become increasingly stable as R ~ 00. 
At expense ratios in the region 1 < R < 2, it becomes increasingly 
easier (in proportionate terms) to maintain or to improve returns by 
increasing nonparticipating business or by reducing expenses. 
Economies of scale best would be achieved by increasing nonpartici-
pating sales, although the proportionate increase in sales has to be 
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larger than that of the expenses. All these actions would result in 
yet lower expense ratios, making economies of scale easier to achieve 
and hence continuing the reduction in expense ratio to unity. Any 
attempt to obtain economies of scale by increasing the participating 
portfolio becomes increasingly difficult and inefficient, the closer the 
expense ratio is to 1 from 2. If successful, though, such an action 
would tend to increase the ratio. 
At expense ratios below unity, economies of scale can be achieved 
efficiently by increasing the nonparticipating business (i.e., if the 
result of the decision is for 1 > an > In/e X akn). This action (i.e., 
efficiently producing economies of scale) would tend to increase the 
expense ratio toward unity. Even greater returns could be achieved if 
an > I, in which case the ratio will reduce. Participating sales, 
however, cannot be increased without lowering per policy profit (or 
at least without increasing the nonparticipating portfolio sufficiently 
to compensate for the losses). On the other hand, a company in such a 
position may be providing higher returns than its market 
competitors, other things being equal. Such returns would make the 
company attractive to new participating policyholders, who would 
accept a fall in per policy profit just to obtain a share of some of it; 
alternatively, the company could be a potential candidate for 
demutualization. Hence, market forces could act to increase the 
participating portfolio-if this ultimately leads to increases in non-
proportionate expenses, then this also will increase the expense 
ratio. Another alternative is for the company to reduce its nonpartic-
ipating premium rates (or charges), which would tend to increase the 
expense ratio as Pn would be reduced. This effectively transfers some 
of the superprofits to the nonparticipating policyholders, an action 
that might be required on the grounds of equity. The need to maintain 
the participating portfolio in order to provide an adequate statutory 
surplus also should be borne in mind. 
If the only consideration of management is to increase per policy 
returns, then once R < 1 the optimum decision would be to reduce the 
participating portfolio down to one policy. Market forces, coupled 
with the company's need to provide capital, would tend to reverse 
the trend. The ultimate position (Le., value of R) at which a com-
pany would tend to maintain itself would be largely dependent upon 
the market level of per policy profits expected from participating 
policies, although there is a partially stable point at R = 1 caused 
by attempts to produce economies of scale through efficient increases 
to the nonparticipating portfolio. 
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There are two distinct strategies that a company can adopt to 
maintain a required level of profit, associated respectively with low 
and high expense ratios. 
a) Low Ratio Strategy-A company with an expense ratio in the 
region of unity would be in a highly manageable position. With 
all nonproportionate expenses covered by nonparticipating busi-
ness, participating volume can be increased or decreased with no 
change to returns, provided the statutory solvency position is not 
compromised by any decrease in volume. Control of per policy 
profit would rest entirely with controlling the volume of nonpar-
ticipating business and level of nonproportionate expenses (and in 
controlling the expense ratio). Market demand for profit levels 
would tend to dIctate where the ratio ultimately would lie, 
although pursuit of economies of scale introduces a partial opti-
mum expense ratio at unity itself. 
b) High Ratio Strategy-A company with a high expense ratio 
implies that nonparticipating business is essentially an insignifi-
cant proportion of the portfolio. Control of per policy profit 
would rest almost entirely with controlling the volume of partic-
ipating business and the level of nonproportionate expenses, 
while pursuit of economies of scale would tend to increase the 
expense ratio still further. 
5.3 Practical Implications 
The main implications from the above are for mutual life compa-
nies that maintain significant volumes of nonparticipating (including 
unit-linked) business, implying low expense ratios and hence requiring 
a low ratio strategy. The lower the ratio, the more sensitive per pol-
icy profits are to changes in the constituents of the expense ratio. At 
ratios less than unity, the fact that increasing participating business 
reduces profit should be borne in mind. At ratios near unity, manage-
ment should bear in mind that no increase (or decrease) in the partic-
ipating portfolio will affect returns; a policy of expansion involving 
increasing expenses matched by increasing the sales of participating 
contracts would have only adverse effects on returns. Such companies 
also need to consider the need to meet statutory solvency levels, 
always an important consideration where significant levels of non-
participating business are involved. 
The actual value of the ratio for any particular company will 
determine the required response to adopt for any particular situation: 
for example, when pursuing economies of scale, in determining the 
minimum increase required to the nonparticipating portfolio to cover 
an increase in expense levels. Other management decisions that can 
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be assisted by the response relationships described in this paper 
include: 
a) How can market share be increased most efficiently in order to 
make minimum losses/maximum profits for the participating pol-
icyholders? 
b) When business is falling, to what extent should expenses be 
reduced and which type of business is it most important to retain? 
6 Summary 
The ratio of nonproportionate expenses to total marginal profits 
from nonparticipating business (the expense ratio) is a key factor in 
determining management policy regarding business volume and 
expenses. 
Relationships presented in this paper can be used to determine 
minimum responses required to compensate for changes in any of the 
factors in order to maintain per policy returns and also to assist man-
agement in choosing appropriate strategies for achieving such aims 
as economies of scale, increasing market share, or cost-cutting. 
Decision choices should vary depending on whether the company 
has a low expense ratio (less than 2) or a high expense ratio (greater 
than 2). There are two partially optimum ratios, at R = 1 and R ~ 00, 
both resulting from companies choosing the most efficient methods to 
produce economies of scale at R < 2 and R > 2, respectively. 
It is not sufficient to assume that increasing sales of participating 
contracts will improve per policy returns, as the greater coverage of 
expenses is offset to a greater or lesser extent by the dilution of prof-
its from the nonparticipating portfolio. 
Particularly at low expense ratios, decision choices identified by 
the relationships described in this paper will be constrained by the 
need to meet statutory solvency levels and to maintain adequate 
investment flexibility. Other factors, such as market forces, also can 
affect levels of business. All relevant factors should be considered 
together. 
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Appendix 1 
Let 
Wqx 
nqx = 
wPx 
npx = 
Probability of a participating policyholder at age x dying 
before age x + 1; 
Probability of a nonparticipating policyholder at age x 
dying before age x + 1; 
1- Wqx; 
1- nqx' 
Assume that all participating policies are t year pure endowments 
issued to a life age x. If a participating policyholder dies before the 
policy matures at age x + t, there is a return of the accumulated fund 
at the end of the year of death. The fund is set equal to the partici-
pating policy's asset share on death (including its share of nonpartic-
ipating policy profits and its share of nonproportionate expenses). 
Premiums are level and are paid for t years. 
Define Fk to be the expected fund at time k immediately before 
the payment of the death benefit: 
(A.l) 
where wFk, n Fb and eFk are defined below. 
(A.2) 
k-l W n ( ) 
nh = N n L k-l-r PX+r X rPx X (Hr - n EjP )(1 + i)k-r 
r=O 
(A.3) 
where: 
(A.4) 
(1 +i)-1; 
= Annual gross premium; 
= Per policy proportionate expenses for a single 
participating policy paid at time r; 
Per policy proportionate expenses for a single non-
participating policy paid at time r; 
= Charges paid at time r per nonparticipating policy; and 
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E~n} Total nonproportional expenses at time r. 
Note that the payment (n H r - n EfI}) at time r depends on the 
survival of nonparticipating policyholders to time r. What remains 
of these payments by time k - 1 depends on how many participating 
policyholders survive to time k - 1. Clearly wFb n Fb and eFk are 
actuarial "accumulated" values up to time k - 1 (including both 
interest and mortality) and from time k - 1 to time k using interest 
only. 
The expected actuarial present value of future claims per partici-
pant policy is c where 
t-1 t:o vk+1 x WqX+k X Fk+1 + vt x wpx+t_1 X Ft 
c = Nw (A.S) 
Next, define P~, P n , and E(n} as follows: 
P~ 
t-1 
+ ~Px r (G - wE)p}) vr 
r=O 
(A.6) 
t-1 k W n 
= )' WqX+k r k-rPx+r x rPx X (Hr - n E)p}) v r bO r=O 
(A.7) 
and 
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From the definition of c in equation (A.S), 
t W [WFt N n n Ft _ eFt] 
+ V X Px+t-l N w + Nw X N n N w 
(A.9) 
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Appendix 2-Model Office Assumptions 
Annual premium = £600 
Proportionate Expenses 
Initial commission 
Renewal commission 
Other initial expenses 
Investment expenses 
Other renewal expenses 
Charges for Unit-Linked Policy 
Initial 
Renewal for commission 
Renewal for fund management charge 
Renewal for other 
Other Assumptions 
Asset accumulation rate 
Rates of mortality and withdrawal 
Tax rates 
Discount rate for calculating present values 
= 50 percent of annual 
premium 
2.5 percent of annual 
premium 
= £60 
= 0.25 percent of accu-
mulated asset share 
at end of each year 
= £6 per annum, inflat-
ing at 7.5 percent per 
annum 
£500 
= 2.5 percent of annual 
premium 
0.5 percent of unit 
fund at end of each 
year 
= £15 inflating at 7.5 
percent per annum 
= 10 percent per annum 
= nil 
= nil 
= 10 percent per annum 
KG. Chadburn 
Department of Actuarial Science & Statistics 
The City University 
Northampton Square 
London ECl V OHB 
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A Critique of Defined Contribution Plans Using a 
Simulation Approach 
David M. Knox* 
Abstract** 
During the 1980s there was a trend in many countries away from defined benefit 
plans toward defined contribution plans. This development means that the individual 
member bears the full investment risk in the preretirement period and the annuity rate 
risk at retirement, as no pension benefit (expressed as a percentage of salary) is pro-
vided. 
This paper, through the use of a stochastic model for both inflation and a range 
of investment returns, analyses the distribution of retirement incomes that will be pro-
duced from a defined contribution plan. The impacts of changing entry and exit ages, 
different investment strategies, alternative career paths, and different economic 
assumptions also are assessed. The uncertainty of the resulting income benefits is high-
lighted, and the question is raised as to whether the individual member is aware of 
these results. 
Key words: funding, pensions, risk 
1 Introduction 
The provision of retirement income for employees traditionally 
has been initiated by employers through a defined benefit scheme 
providing pension benefits. During the last decade, however, there 
has been a significant shift in many countries toward the provision of 
retirement benefits through defined contribution plans (or money pur-
chase arrangements). The reasons for this trend vary between coun-
tries, but include: 
* David Knox is the Foundation Professor at the University of Melbourne and director 
of the Centre for Actuarial Studies. He previously has taught at Macquarie University 
and at the University of Waterloo. His recent research interests have concentrated on 
some of the broader taxation and social policy issues in the superannuation and pen-
sions area. 
** I wish to give my sincere thanks to Ms. Ying Teoh who prepared the program 
necessary to undertake these simulations. She worKed with much enthusiasm and did a 
great job, especially as the number of variables continued to grow! In addition, my 
thanks to the anonymous referees for their comments that improved this paper. 
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a) The desire by some employers to reduce their risk present within 
a defined benefit scheme. 
b) Increasing legislation, which often has made defined benefit 
plans more complex and costly to administer. 
c) The presence of surplus in many defined benefit plans and the 
related issues of overfunding, which may have been encouraged 
by conservative actuarial assumptions. 
d) The high rates of return in the 1980s which made defined contri-
bution plans more attractive to members. 
e) The trend toward individual responsibility and the desire by 
many governments for employees to accept greater responsibility 
in providing their retirement benefits (for example, with reduc-
tions in social security benefits in many countries). 
f) The increasing levels of vesting and preservation required by 
many governments often have been expressed in terms of members' 
accumulated contributions. 
g) Changing taxation structures that permitted and encouraged 
defined contribution arrangements. 
The extent of this trend varies between countries, but it is present in 
sufficient countries to suggest a significant and long-term direction. 
For example, within the United States the number of defined 
benefit plans decreased 16.7 percent in the five years to 1988 while 
the number of defined contribution plans increased 36.5 percent 
(Turner and Beller, 1992). In the same period, the level of contribu-
tions to defined benefit private pension plans decreased 43.2 percent 
to $26.3 billion in 1988 while the level of contributions to defined 
contribution plans increased 79.7 percent to $64.9 billion in 1988. 
Turner and Beller (1992, p. 9) note "the gradual but steady replace-
ment of defined benefit plans by defined contribution plans as the 
primary vehicle for providing pension benefits." In many, but not all, 
of these cases the defined contribution benefit represents a benefit in 
addition to a pension from a defined benefit scheme. 
Within the United Kingdom, the trend toward defined contribu-
tions plans has not been as strong. The introduction of personal 
portable pensions in 1988 with the associated legislation, however, 
has meant that many individuals have been encouraged to contribute 
to a money purchase (or defined contribution) arrangement. 
The recent Australian experience also reflects the move toward 
defined contribution plans. In 1987 a national industrial agreement 
was handed down that granted most workers an employer contribu-
tion equal to 3 percent of earnings. In July 1992 this approach was 
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extended so that all employees now receive a minimum employer con-
tribution of either 3 percent or 5 percent of earnings (depending on the 
size of the company). This minimum employer contribution will 
increase to 9 percent of earnings by 2002. Although defined benefit 
plans are permitted and remain with many larger employers, the 
legislation expresses the minimum contributions in terms of current 
earnings which represents a defined contribution approach. 
This trend toward an increased reliance on defined contribution 
funds to provide employees' retirement benefits needs to be assessed 
in terms of the ultimate benefit provided to the member. Actuaries 
are aware that within a defined benefit pension scheme, the 
employer bears the investment risk, the salary inflation risk, and 
the longevity risk (if an annuity is not purchased by the fund). 
Within a defined contribution plan (where the employer contribution 
is set as a fixed percentage of the employee's earnings and the final 
benefit represents the accumulation of these contributions), however, 
the employer bears none of these risks. Indeed, all risks have been 
passed to the employee. If employees increasingly are bearing these 
risks, it is essential that policy makers, individual members, and the 
pension industry fully understand these risks. With this objective in 
mind, this research analyses the defined contribution arrangements 
from the member's perspective. 
The paper will consider the benefits that arise from a contribu-
tion rate (fixed as a percentage of salary) allowing for stochastic 
investment and inflation rates and changes in a number of parame-
ters, including contrasting investment strategies, different entry and 
retirement ages, fractional and full-time employment patterns, and 
the impact of different annuity rates available at retirement. A 
fixed 12 percent contribution rate has been chosen, as it provides an 
adequate retirement pension, on average, for a person who is a mem-
ber for about 40 years if there are no social security contributions and 
benefits. For countries with compulsory social security, a lower level 
of fixed contributions would be appropriate and the benefits can be 
reduced proportionately. In Australia, where there exists no univer-
sal social security benefits, the government has a long-term objective 
of a total contribution rate equal to 12 percent of earnings. 
2 The Model 
2. 1 Accumulation of Contributions and the Benefits Arising 
During an individual's preretirement years, it is assumed that 
contributions (expressed as a percentage of annual earnings) will be 
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paid mid-way through each year and that investment income will be 
generated until retirement age. Allowance also can made for any tax 
payments on contributions and investment income. In many countries 
(for example, the United States, Canada, and most European coun-
tries) contributions and investment income are tax exempt, so the rel-
evant tax variables (T AXe and TAXI) can be set to zero without 
affecting the model. A country where these rates are not zero is 
Australia where both employer contributions and investment income 
are taxed at a rate of 15 percent, although the investment tax rate 
normally is reduced to a net rate between 5 percent and 10 percent due 
to the availability of various credits. 
Equation (1) represents the accumulated contributions available 
at retirement age for the provision of retirement income. Let ACR be 
an employee's accumulated contributions after R years in the plan; 
then: 
R-l 
ACR = K (1-TAXe) L, Ft SALt (1 + INVt [1 -TAXI})1/2 
t=O 
where: 
K 
TAXe 
TAXI = 
Ft = 
SALt = 
INVt = 
R 
(1) 
R-l 
x IT (1+INVu [I-TAXI}) 
u=t+l 
Rate of contributions as a percentage of earnings; 
Rate of tax on the contributions, paid at the time of pay-
ment; 
Net rate of tax on investment earnings; 
Fraction of full time employment in year t (to allow for 
part timers); 
Annual salary in year t; 
Gross rate of investment return earned in year t; 
Number of years in the plan before retirement. 
For the purposes of this paper, it will be assumed that this accumu-
lated amount will purchase an indexed annuity (or pension) payable 
for life from the age of retirement. The value of the pension pur-
chased can be expressed as follows: 
ACR = PEN% x SALR-l x a(x) (2) 
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where: 
PEN% 
SALR-l 
a(x) 
Pension received as a percent of the individual's final 
salary; 
= Salary received in the final year prior to retirement; 
Inflation-linked lifetime annuity factor for the retiree 
age x (Le., at retirement). 
Equations (1) and (2) must equal each other, as the accumulated 
amount at retirement provides the funds required to purchase a pen-
sion at a rate related to the person's age and sex. In any individual 
case, however, there are two parameters: namely K (the rate of con-
tribution) and PEN% (the pension received in terms of final salary). 
Within a defined contribution fund, K is defined and the pension can 
be calculated based on the accumulated funds at retirement. In con-
trast, within a defined benefit pension fund, the pension percentage is 
defined (normally ignoring any tax on the pension) so that a recom-
mended rate of K can be calculated using actuarial principles. 
The above equations do not make any allowances for taxes on ben-
efits (which vary by country, individual income, and benefit form) or 
expenses which may be in respect of initial expenses, regular admin-
istration or investment costs, or the costs associated with the pur-
chase of an annuity. The important impact of expenses and the 
varied form in which they are paid will be considered in a subse-
quent study. 
The provision of retirement income from savings in the preretire-
ment years requires funds to be accumulated over many years; several 
long-term assumptions are therefore necessary. One approach is to use 
a deterministic approach and set pre-determined levels of inflation 
and investment return for each year. Such an approach, however, 
does not allow analysis of the risk facing the individual member. To 
provide greater reality in this model, simple stochastic models for 
inflation and the investment return will be used. 
2.2 Inflation and Salary Assumptions 
The stochastic model used for inflation allows for a one year lag 
as expressed in equation (3). 
INFL t = k x INFLt-l + (1-k) x (/1 + (J' 2t) (3) 
where: 
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Zt 
INFL t 
k 
/1 
(J 
:= Standard normal variable for year t, i.e., Z - N(O,l); 
Rate of inflation in year t; 
A number between 0 and 1; 
:= Mean of the normal distribution representing inflation; 
Standard deviation of the normal distribution represent-
ing inflation. 
The appropriate levels for k, /1, and (J2 can be debated. After some 
empirical investigation into the inflation levels over the last 40 
years in Australia, the following values provided a distribution of 
inflation values that is similar to the previous 40 years' experience: 
k := 0.5 (that is, 50 percent of last year's inflation is carried into 
this year); 
/1 0.07; 
(J 0.07 (that is, the standard deviation). 
The period of 40 years was chosen to cover the post-World War 
period. In addition, beyond 40 years there is a problem with the 
availability of reliable and consistent data. 
Statistical tests show a significant effect for a one year lag, but 
no significance for a longer lagged effect. The value of k also was 
tested for all values between zero and one-a value of 0.5 provides a 
slightly better result than other values in the range of 0.25 to 0.75 
and much better results than values outside this range. 
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that the history of inflation 
does not necessarily indicate future levels. In particular, most OECD 
(Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development) nations 
have moved into a lower inflation environment. With this in mind, 
the results will concentrate on /1 := 0.04 and (J := 0.04. The effects of 
higher inflation rates, however, will be considered also. 
As indicated above, the model requires an assumption in respect 
to a person's salary in each of his or her preretirement years (that is, 
the pattern of the person's salary from entry into the work force until 
retirement age). This paper's approach is to consider that the annual 
change in a person's salary comprises the following three components: 
a) An increase related to inflation levels, which can be estimated 
from the inflation equation outlined above. 
b) An increase as a result of general productivity improvements 
within the economy, which may be expressed as a percentage 
rate per annum. 
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c) A promotional increase that also will be expressed as a percent-
age rate per annum. 
2.3 Investment Returns 
The assumption of a single investment rate of return for a period 
of 20, 30, or 40 years to estimate the accumulated value of a person's 
retirement benefit is a bold and heroic assumption and is almost cer-
tain to be wrong! To provide greater understanding of the range of 
possible results, each simulation assumes that each year's rate of 
investment return is selected randomly from a distribution that repre-
sents the assumed experience, thereby allowing investment returns to 
vary on a year to year basis. 
It is assumed that the investment return is achieved by a fund 
invested in a range of marketable assets with no promise of a guaran-
teed return. For the purposes of this study, it is assumed that the 
fund will invest in portfolios of bonds (both domestic and overseas), 
equities (both domestic and overseas), direct property, and short-term 
investments. That is, the fund will have a balanced investment 
strategy spread over several sectors. Naturally, the actual propor-
tions in each sector will vary with the investment strategy adopted. 
It also will be assumed that the real rate of investment return in 
year t is independent from the rate of inflation in that year. 
Although this result may appear surprising, a diversified portfolio 
with several sectors represented is more likely to achieve this inde-
pendence than a portfolio concentrated in one asset form. For instance, 
if inflation rises, the prices of domestic bonds will decrease and equi-
ties and property may fall in value. Short-term and overseas invest-
ments may increase in value. Carter (1991), in the development of an 
Australian stochastic investment model, suggests that inflation 
affects short-term rates positively but dividend yields and property 
returns negatively and that share prices best are forecast as a sepa-
rate white noise process independent from inflation. 
Hence, in view of the assumed diversified nature of the invest-
ment portfolio and the lack of a clear relationship between the 
returns on equities and inflation, a real rate of return independent 
from the rate of inflation is considered reasonable. It is acknowl-
edged that this investment model is a simplified one, but it is suffi-
ciently realistic to enable this paper to concentrate on the benefits 
arising from defined contribution funds and thereby to draw appro-
priate conclusions. Models that concentrate on interest rates (for 
example, Becker (1991) and Tilley (1992)) have not been used due to 
the assumed diversified portfolio of the fund. 
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It also is recognized that pension and superannuation funds may 
adopt a range of investment strategies. With this in mind, the results 
allow for the following three investment strategies, each of which is 
represented by a normal distribution. 
a) Strategy A: N (J1 = 0.05 and (J = 0.08). 
b) Strategy B: N (J1 = 0.03 and (J = 0.05). 
c) Strategy C: N (J1 = 0.01 and (J = 0.02). 
It should be noted that these three investment strategies represent, in 
broad terms, the following three investment options: 
a) Strategy A represents a managed or balanced fund with signifi-
cant investments in equities and properties. 
b) Strategy B represents a capital stable fund with significant fixed 
interest investments and some equity investments. 
c) Strategy C represents a fund invested predominantly in cash and 
short-term stocks. 
The appropriateness of the assumed figures is confirmed by 
Humphreys and Newman (1993) who allow for an investment mix of 
cash, bonds (Australian and overseas), equities (Australian and over-
seas), property, and currency each with its own sector statistics and 
show a mean return (in excess of inflation) of 5.1 percent per annum 
with a standard deviation of 8.2 percent for a fund with a balanced 
asset mix and a mean of 3.9 percent per annum real and a standard 
deviation of 4.8 percent for a fund with a stable asset mix. Further, 
the Towers Perrin Superannuation Pooled Funds Survey (1993) of 
Australian fund managers shows for the three years to June 3D, 1993 
standard deviations of 5.8 percent, 7.6 percent, and 8.9 percent per 
annum for the benchmarks for funds that have below average, aver-
age or above average volatility for their investment returns. 
Within the model, the rate of return each year is calculated so 
that 1 plus the nominal rate of return in year t is the product of 1 
plus the inflation rate for year t and 1 plus the real rate of return for 
year t, for the given investment strategy. It is possible for the nomi-
nal rate of return in a particular year to be negative due to a nega-
tive real rate of return for that year. 
As will be shown later, this model also permits individuals to 
change their investment strategies during their preretirement years, 
which is similar to the concept of age phasing discussed in Kingston, 
Piggot, and Bateman (1992). This possibility raises the question as to 
56 
Journal of Actuarial Practice Vol. 1, No.2, 1993 
who directs the investment policy: the employer, the member, or the 
trustees of the fund. A discussion of the advantages of each alterna-
tive is beyond the scope of this paper but is worthy of further 
research. 
3 Results 
As indicated above, the model can assume a defined contribution 
or a defined benefit approach. This paper initially will consider the 
retirement income benefits that arise for a single male in his retire-
ment from a defined contribution of 12 percent of salary throughout 
his career. It is assumed that the full accumulated benefit at retire-
ment is converted into an inflation-linked lifetime annuity. 
Table 1 presents the results based on the following assumptions, 
except where an alternative assumption is noted. 
Basic Assumptions 
Entry age: ........................................................................................ 20 
Exit age: .......................................................................................... 65 
Participation: ...................................................... full time throughout 
Inflation rate-mean: ............................................. 4 percent per annum 
Inflation rate-standard deviation ........................ 4 percent per annum 
Investment strategy A-mean .......................... 5 percent per annum real 
Investment strategy A-standard deviation ........... 8 percent per annum 
Investment rate after retirement.. .................. 1 percent per annum real 
Salary growth-productivity ................................. 1 percent per annum 
Salary growth-promotion ..................................... 1 percent per annum 
Mortality after retirement ................ Australian Life Tables 1985-1987 
The investment rate of return after retirement has been assumed to be 
5 percent per annum (i.e., 1 percent in excess of the mean long-term 
inflation rate), as it is assumed that the institution offering the 
indexed lifetime annuity will adopt a more conservative investment 
strategy than in the preretirement period. 
Table 1 indicates the spread of results that arise from 1,000 simu-
lations undertaken for each set of assumptions by showing the mean, 
standard deviation, the 5th percentile, and the 95th percentile for 
the 1,000 results produced under each scenario. One thousand simula-
tions is sufficient to produce a stable set of results. 
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TABLE 1 
The Indexed Retirement Income That can be Purchased 
With a 12 Percent Contribution Rate 
Retirement Income Expressed as a Percentage of Final Salary 
Standard 5th 95th 
Assumption Mean Deviation Percentile Percentile 
Base assumptions 84.66 30.28 46.17 142.71 
Female 67.81 24.42 36.82 114.15 
Married male with spouse 62.12 22.44 33.74 104.60 
(2/3rds reversionary pension) 
Changes in entry or exit ages 
Retirement age 60 56.98 19.12 31.78 93.11 
Retirement age 55 38.22 11.90 22.11 61.12 
Ages of 25 and 60 45.52 14.05 27.16 71.76 
Retirement age 60 ~female) 46.52 15.74 25.56 76.17 
Retirement age 55 female) 31.91 10.03 18.43 51.37 
Ages of 25 and 60 (female) 37.17 11.58 21.97 58.51 
Changes in investment 
assumption or strategy 
Strategy A with (J = 6% 84.69 22.78 54.09 126.84 
Strategy B 52.74 11.17 36.93 73.01 
StrategyC 34.53 3.64 29.10 41.25 
A for 35 years, then B 71.12 21.57 43.38 111.15 
A for 35 years, then C 59.64 15.91 38.33 88.34 
A for 25 years, then B for 10 51.81 11.10 36.29 71.44 
years, then C 
Changes in participation rates (part time is considered 40% of full time) 
fit to age 30, then pit to age 40, 
then fit 
71.58 24.89 39.72 117.71 
fit to age 25, then zero to age 48.24 14.89 28.69 75.12 
35, then pit to age 45, then fit 
fit to age 30, then pit to age 40, 57.33 20.08 31.90 94.14 
then fit (female) 
fit to age 25, then zero to age 
35, pit to age 45, then fit 
38.63 12.03 22.92 60.69 
(female) 
Changes in inflation and annuity assumptions 
Inflation N(4%,6%) 84.81 31.46 45.63 143.62 
Inflation N(7%,7%) with annu- 85.35 31.31 45.72 143.80 
ity at 8% per annum 
Annuity at inflation +0% 77.80 27.69 42.13 130.36 
Annuity at inflation +1% 83.38 29.64 45.20 139.80 
Annuity at inflation +2% 89.16 31.65 48.36 149.58 
Career average-indexed 119.75 42.90 64.92 199.00 
The most important result shown in Table 1 is the significant 
spread of the level of retirement income received by individuals who 
have contributed the same percentage of salary for the same number 
of years. For instance, using the base assumptions the average retire-
ment income arising from a contribution of 12 percent of salary for 45 
years is an indexed lifetime annuity equivalent to 84.66 percent of 
the person's final salary. Due to the uncertain investment returns 
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achieved each year, however, there exists a considerable spread of 
results. The level of retirement income is equally likely to be 46 per-
cent or 143 percent of final salary, and these are not the extreme val-
ues! Figure 1 shows the distribution of these results. 
Figure 1 
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The model also allows for taxation on contributions and/or 
investment earnings. Table 2 shows the results assuming a 15 percent 
tax on contributions (which is the tax rate payable in Australia on 
employer contributions) and a 7.5 percent tax on investment income. 
This represents a typical investment income tax rate paid by funds in 
Australia after allowing for dividend imputation and other credits. 
The tax on the resulting benefits also is reduced, but this is not shown 
as these tax rates vary by income and benefit size. 
The major message coming from the results in Tables 1 and 2 and 
Figure 1 is that a considerable variation occurs in the ultimate level 
of retirement income received by individuals, even if a level contribu-
tion rate is assumed to be paid for 40 or 45 years. In essence, a system 
that defines a set level of contributions cannot define the level of 
benefits received. With the trend toward defined contribution plans, 
it is critical that fund members, employers, and policy makers appre-
ciate that the prescribed level of contributions will not provide suffi-
cient retirement income for many retirees, even if, on average, it is 
satisfactory under certain circumstances. It is worth stressing that 
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TABLE 2 
Indexed Retirement Income That can be Purchased With a 12 Percent 
Contribution Rate After A"owing 
for a 15 Percent Contributions Tax and a 7.5 Percent Investment Tax 
Retirement Income Expressed as a Percentage of Final Salary 
Standard 5th 95th 
Assumption Mean Deviation Percentile Percentile 
Base assumptions 
Female 
Married male with spouse 
Changes in entry or exit ages 
Retirement age 60 
Retirement age 55 
Ages of 25 and 60 
Retirement age 60 (female) 
Retirement age 55 (female) 
Ages of 25 and 60 (female) 
61.10 
48.94 
44.84 
41.97 
28.74 
34.24 
34.27 
24.00 
27.96 
Changes in Investment assumptions or strategy 
19.83 
16.02 
14.73 
12.87 
8.24 
9.70 
10.61 
6.96 
8.01 
Strategy A with 0' = 6% 61.12 15.04 
Strategy B 39.95 7.81 
Strategy C 27.29 2.73 
A for 35 years, then B 52.05 14.28 
A for 35 years, then C 44.28 10.65 
A for 25 years, then B for 10 39.01 7.55 
years, then C 
35.08 
28.10 
25.69 
24.44 
17.61 
21.54 
19.76 
14.66 
17.36 
40.39 
28.73 
23.08 
33.34 
29.90 
28.56 
Changes in participation rates (part time is considered 40% of full time) 
fit to age 30, then pit to age 40, 51.87 16.29 30.32 
then fit 
fit to age 25, then zero to age 
35, then pit to age 45, then fit 
fit to age 30, then pit to age 40, 
then fit (female) 
fit to age 25, then zero to age 
35, pit to age 45, then fit 
(female) 
35.68 
41.55 
28.58 
Changes in inflation and annuity assumptions 
Inflation N(4%,6%) 61.29 
Inflation N(7%,7%) with annu- 58.89 
ity at 8% per annum 
Annuity at inflation +0% 
Annuity at inflation +1% 
Annuity at inflation +2% 
56.15 
60.18 
64.35 
9.89 
13.16 
8.01 
20.84 
19.79 
18.13 
19.40 
20.72 
22.40 
24.25 
17.83 
34.56 
33.46 
32.18 
34.53 
33.96 
98.12 
79.28 
72.77 
66.44 
44.80 
52.05 
54.27 
37.42 
42.49 
89.17 
54.36 
32.19 
78.54 
64.27 
52.39 
81.08 
53.92 
65.67 
43.73 
99.87 
97.11 
90.13 
96.58 
103.09 
this inadequacy most likely will occur for a particular generation or 
cohort of retirees and not for retirees from a particular plan. For 
example, if the economy is depressed for a number of years (causing 
reduced investment returns), then all members of defined contributions 
plans will be affected. The effects could be particularly adverse for 
those approaching retirement who may find that the real value of 
their accumulated retirement benefits is declining. Such a result could 
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lead to a cohort of retirees with lower living standards for their 
retirement. 
This result is not surprising when one recalls that within the 
operation of a defined contribution plan the rate credited to the 
member's account each year normally is linked to the fund's actual 
investment performance. Although funds in some countries may choose 
to smooth this rate, there is no doubt that the final benefit received 
by the individual largely is determined by the investment perfor-
mance of the fund during the individual's working career. The 
investment risk that is borne by members of defined contribution plans 
translates into a risk that affects postretirement living standards. 
This is in contrast to a defined benefit fund where the retirement 
benefit is defined in terms of final (or final average) salary and the 
employer's contribution rate normally is adjusted to reflect changes in 
the investment return. 
One method to reduce the variability in the level of retirement 
income received by the individual is the adoption of an investment 
strategy with less volatility, as assumed for Strategies B or C. 
While such an approach reduces the variability in the ultimate 
level of income, as shown in Table I, a reduction in the level of 
retirement income also occurs. It is worth noting that, based on the 
model used, the 95th percentile for the low risk Strategy C represents 
a lower income than the 5th percentile for the higher risk Strategy 
A option. Similar results would be expected if other investment mod-
els were used. 
A commonly suggested alternative is for individuals to reduce 
their level of investment risk as they approach retirement. Tables 1 
and 2 show that while such a move reduces the variability in the 
level of retirement income received, it also reduces the expected 
income to be received. The expected income for the strategy involving 
the three investment options is below the 5th percentile for Strategy 
A. This result does not mean that a policy to reduce the volatility of 
investment return is inappropriate as individuals approach retire-
ment. It does mean that the likely impact of such a move on the 
resulting income must be recognized. 
The results also highlight the importance of realistic assump-
tions in any modeling, including variations in the rate of return. It is 
interesting to note that if the variations in inflation and investment 
returns are removed, the level of retirement income is 84.97 percent of 
final earnings (close to the mean). Such a single figure provides no 
indication of the variability in the likely results, however. 
Table 1 also confirms the following results: 
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a) Early retirement causes a significant reduction in the level of 
retirement income due to the shorter accumulation period and the 
extended period of retirement. A retirement age of 60 causes a 
32.7 percent reduction for males and a 31.4 percent reduction for 
females. These significant reductions in the level of retirement 
income need to be appreciated, particularly with recent world-
wide trends toward earlier retirement. 
b) Later entry into the work force, as is occurring with higher levels 
of youth unemployment and increasing years of education, also 
results in a lower level of retirement income due to the shorter 
period of accumulation. This reduction can be offset if the 
Increased period of education raises the level of lifetime earn-
ings. 
c) These two trends, of later entry and earlier retirement, can have 
a devastating effect on the ultimate level of benefit. For instance, 
the expected retirement income with an entry age of 25 and a 
retirement age of 60 is 54 percent for males and 55 percent for 
females of the income received by a person who enters at age 20 
and retires at age 65. 
d) Changes in the investment strategy have the expected result 
with higher variability if the risk (as measured by the standard 
deviation) is increased and a reduced mean and variability if 
more conservative investment options are chosen. If Strategy C is 
chosen, the mean retirement income is reduced 59 percent while 
the standard deviation is reduced 88 percent. 
e) If the standard deviation for Strategy A is reduced (which may 
occur within a prolonged low inflation environment and/or with 
greater smoothing of the investment returns), the expected value 
is almost unchanged, whereas the standard deviation and the 
range between the 5th and 95th percentiles are both reduced 25 
percent. 
£) Female life expectancy is considerably higher than males. Based 
on the Australian Life Tables 1985-1987, a 65 year old female is 
expected to live 18.56 years (or 27.1 percent longer than a male). 
When the retirement benefit is expressed in terms of a lifetime 
annuity, females receive a smaller level of income for the same 
level of contributions. Using the base assumptions, the expected 
level of income for a 65 year old female retiree is 20.0 percent 
below her male counterparts. (Within the Australian context, 
gender-based annuity rates are permitted.) 
g) The previous discussion relates only to full-time workers. As 
expected, those who experience some periods of part-time work or 
wno temporarily leave the work force have reduced retirement 
incomes. For instance, working in a part-time capacity for ten 
years from age 30 reduces the expected retirement income 15.5 
percent for both males and females. Naturally, larger reductions 
in the expected retirement income occur if the person spends more 
time out of the work force. 
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h) Changes to the assumed mean of the inflation level do not cause 
a significant change to the results, as the investment returns and 
salary increases are adjusted automatically. As expected, an 
increase in the standard deviation of the inflation distribution 
leads to an increased variability in the level of retirement 
income. 
i) Table 2 highlights the impact of a 15 percent tax on contributions 
and a 7.5 percent tax on investment income. The expected level of 
benefits is reduced 27.8 percent for both males and females under 
the base conditions. Even if there is a reduction in the taxation of 
the retirement income (as occurs in Australia, with a 15 percent 
tax rebate on pensions), it is likely that the introduction of taxa-
tion during the preretirement period (which has been considered 
in other countries) will result in a reduction in the actual level of 
retirement income received by the retiree. 
j) The annuity rates offered at retirement to convert the accumu-
lated benefit to a lifetime annuity can have a significant impact 
on the ultimate level of retirement income. If the underlying 
interest rate used to determine the indexed annuity rate increases 
from 1 percent above the inflation figure in the year preceding 
retirement to 2 percent above this inflation rate, the expected 
level of the annUIty increases 6.9 percent. 
This last result is -important for members of defined contribution 
plans, as the actual level of any lifetime annuity will depend on the 
annuity rates available at the date of conversion. This represents a 
one-off conversion. The annuity rate used becomes critical in determin-
ing the actual level of retirement income received if the lump sum 
benefit is to be converted into an annuity stream at the date of 
retirement. In reality, such a system represents a random event, 
within certain bounds, where the level of retirement income can vary 
significantly due to the actual date of retirement even when all 
other factors are identical. Most members of defined contribution 
plans are not aware of this annuity rate risk that they bear when-
ever their retirement benefit is not expressed as a defined pension in 
terms of final (or final average) salary and they are required to con-
vert their accumulated benefit into an income form. One approach to 
overcome this problem is to provide retirees with a fixed period 
(say, five years) during which they must convert their benefit into an 
annuity. Such an approach removes the one-off option while main-
taining the requirement to convert their accumulation into an income 
stream. 
The above results highlight the risks associated with variable 
investment returns and the provision of retirement benefits through a 
defined contribution approach. These risks cannot be removed without 
adopting a conservative investment strategy. Naturally, such a deci-
63 
David M. Knox A Critique of Defined Contribution Plans 
sion will result in lower benefits or higher long-term contribution 
rates. Neither of these results are optimal. An important but often 
forgotten question that needs to be addressed on a regular basis is: 
Who should bear the investment risk associated with the accumula-
tion of contributions over the long term for the provision of retirement 
income? Should it be the employer, the individual, the government, 
or a combination of these parties? 
This question has been answered in a variety of ways over time 
and in different countries. In some instances, the government (and 
hence the taxpayers) has removed the investment risk with the 
development of a generous social security system. This approach 
introduces other risks, including demographic and political risk. 
Elsewhere, defined pension schemes are common and the sponsoring 
employer has accepted the investment risk during the preretirement 
period. Even in these instances, certain risks remain. The trend 
toward defined contribution plans means that a higher proportion of 
the risks associated with the provision of retirement income is being 
accepted by the individual member. It may be claimed that with 
greater individual responsibility and a relative decline in the impor-
tance of the welfare state, this represents an appropriate response. It 
is also important, however, that individuals are aware of the conse-
quences of the investment risk associated with defined contribution 
plans. 
4 Summary and Conclusions 
In recent years, there has been a shift from defined pension 
schemes to defined contribution schemes in several countries for a 
variety of reasons. This trend has placed a greater level of responsi-
bility for retirement income on the individual member. Within this 
changed environment, individual members need to ask questions such 
as: 
a) yvhat. is an appropriate level of contribution to provide security 
In rehrement1 
b) What are the major risks involved and who bears them? 
The results in this paper, based on a simulation model using stochas-
tic estimates for investment returns and the level of inflation, assist 
in preparing a response to these questions. 
The results in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that a total superannuation 
contribution rate of 9 percent to 10 percent of salary (assuming no tax-
ation in the preretirement period) or 12 percent of salary (with taxa-
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tion at the Australian levels) provides, on average, a reasonable 
retirement income in terms of final salary for a single male, assuming 
that the contributions have been paid for at least 40 years. It is 
important to stress that these figures ignore any social security bene-
fits. Therefore, the contribution levels should be reduced where a 
social security pension also is received. The results also represent 
average results; it is likely that at some time in the future, a partic-
ular cohort of retirees who have saved for 40 or 45 years will receive 
an inadequate retirement income due to the variability of the 
investment returns during the preretirement period. 
Even if we concentrate on the average result (which does not rep-
resent the total story), a 9 percent to 10 percent contribution rate 
(assuming the tax exempt scenario) is not sufficient for many individ-
uals. Some of the circumstances where a higher contribution rate is 
needed include: 
a) Females who have longer life expectancies. 
b) Members with dependent spouses. 
c) Individuals who choose or are forced to take early retirement; 
d) Individuals who enter the work force later due to early periods 
of unemployment or increased education. 
e) Individuals who do not work full time throughout their career. 
In many cases, an individual may be subject to a number of these fac-
tors (e.g., a female with some part-time work experience who retires 
at age 60) which would result in the need for a high contribution rate 
if a reasonable retirement income benefit is to be provided. 
When one considers the small proportion of the work force who 
will be employed full time for 40 or 45 years and the variability in 
the investment returns over the long term, it is reasonable to conclude 
that a contribution rate equal to 9 percent of earnings will not pro-
vide an adequate level of retirement income for most retirees. This 
conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the above figures exclude 
any allowance for expenses. 
Due to the enormous variety of individual circumstances, it is 
impossible to select a long-term contribution rate that will be satis-
factory to everyone. In view of the current results, a total contribution 
rate for retirement income in the order of 12 percent of earnings (in a 
tax exempt environment) may be a reasonable long-term objective for 
many individuals. A higher contribution rate would be required if 
the fund were subject to taxation during the preretirement accumula-
tion period. 
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Discussion of David Knox's "A Critique of Defined 
Contribution Plans Using a Simulation Approach" 
Michael Sze* 
Professor David Knox is to be congratulated for this timely 
paper, which discusses a topic of major social and economic impor-
tance in many countries. Although the author's principal interest is 
Australia, the general trend of conversion from defined benefit plans 
to defined contribution plans has been the topic of many research 
projects in the United States and in Canada. Depending upon the 
emphasis of the research performed, different surveys have arrived 
at different conclusions. Participation in both types of plans has been 
relatively stable after 1984 according to Trends in Pensions 1992 
(published by the U.S. Department of Labor, Pension and Welfare 
Benefit Administration 1992). 
The stochastic approach toward analyzing the benefits provided 
by defined contribution plans is useful. Additional research may be 
done, however, to extend the methodology to include simulating 
inflation, salary increases, and each asset class separately. Statistics 
in the U.S. indicate that inflation is correlated negatively with 
many asset classes, and the impact of inflation of on different assets 
classes are different (d. Sze, 1993, p. 43). 
Another area worthy of further research is the impact of chang-
ing investment policy during the active career of the employee. A 
concept that has received wide acceptance in the U.S.A. is life cycle 
investment. The underlying principle of life cycle investment is 
straight forward. It promotes the discipline of matching the time 
horizon of investments to that of the retirement needs of the 
employee. Let us use the three most common asset classes-stocks, 
bonds. and cash-to illustrate the principle. Of these asset classes, 
statistics show that stocks have the highest expected return and the 
highest volatility. Cash is the most stable and has the lowest 
* Michael Sze is a Fellow of both the Society of Actuaries and the Canadian Institute 
of Actuaries. He received his Ph.D. degree in mathematics from the Ohio State 
University and currently is a partner of Hewitt Associates. He is the chair of the 
Society of Actuaries Retirement Systems Research Committee, as well as a member of 
the Canadian Institute of Actuaries Investment Practice Committee. 
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expected return. The behavior of bonds lies between stocks and cash. 
For a young employee, the period to retirement is long. Thus, the 
investment portfolio should include more stocks. As the employee 
ages, retirement needs become more imminent and risk tolerance 
decreases. There should be a gradual shift toward fixed income 
investments. It would be instructive to examine the advantage of such 
an adaptable investment policy. 
The paper mentions the risk of changing annuity purchase rate on 
conversion of the defined contribution balance to a stream of defined 
benefits upon retirement. Such a risk is genuine. One way that one 
may reduce such a conversion risk is to match the duration of assets 
to the duration of the expected benefit payment stream. Most insur-
ance companies are heavily invested in fixed income assets. Thus, 
annuity purchase rates typically reflect the investment atmosphere 
of fixed income assets. If a life cycle investment policy is adopted, 
most of the investment in years preceding retirement should be in 
fixed income investments. Matching asset and benefit cash flow is not 
a difficult process. If such an exercise is performed and continually 
updated, the annuity purchase risk is reduced greatly. An area for 
further defined contribution research is to assess the impact of 
asset/benefit matching before retirement. 
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Author's Reply to Discussion 
Michael Sze 
Hewitt Associates 
4110 Yonge Street 
North York, ON M2P 2B7 
Canada 
Michael Sze has raised a number of issues worthy of furth~r 
research: in particular, the effect of a more sophisticated inflation 
and/ or investment model, changing investment policy during the life 
cycle and the possible matching of assets to pension liabilities. to 
reduce the annuity rate risk. 
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I agree that each of these areas is suitable for further work. It 
must be realized, however, that as one becomes more particular with 
respect to life cycle decisions or investment models or policy, the 
results can be applied only to a proportion of pension fund members. 
Of course, this does not reduce the value of such research, but it does 
make the work more specific. 
The purpose of this paper is to quantify, at least to some extent, 
the risks borne by members in defined contribution arrangements. 
Actuaries always have been aware of the different risk-takers in 
defined benefit and defined contribution plans. Many plan members 
and industry commentators, however, have no idea of the possible 
implications of belonging to defined contribution plans over the longer 
term. The results in this paper represent one way of illustrating these 
inherent risks to nonactuaries. 
69 

JOURNAL OF ACTUARIAL PRACTICE VOL. 1, NO.2, 1993 
The Definition of Insurance: Implications for a Health 
Insurance Demand Model 
Mark J. 8rowne* 
Abstract 
This paper uses data from the 1977-78 National Medical Care Expenditures Survey to 
evaluate five different measures of insurance: a family's expected out-of-pocket pay-
ment for medical care, the expected value of the indemnity (fee-for-service) benefits 
from an insurance policy for a family, the percentage of the expected loss that the 
insured pays, the policy premium, and the policy limit of coverage. 
The study provides information that can help us understand whose insurance cov-
erage will change significantly as a result of health care reform. For example, it 
shows that those with low income (such as minorities, families headed by females, 
and unmarried individuals) on average purchase low amounts of health insurance. 
These groups would benefit considerably if health care reform institutes universal cov-
erage. Conversely, whites, families headed by males, married individuals, and those 
with high incomes on average have considerable health insurance coverage. 
Key words: measures oj insurance, out-oj-pocket expenses, indemnity beneJits 
1 Introduction 
Several different measures of insurance have been used by 
researchers to quantify a family'S level of insurance coverage. This 
paper compares five different measures of insurance coverage using 
group insurance data from the 1977-78 National Medical Care 
Expenditure Survey.1 The measures that are used in this study were 
chosen because they have been used by other researchers to develop 
• Mark J. Browne is an assistant professor of risk management and insurance at the 
University of Wisconsin-Madison. He received his Ph.D. from the Wharton School of 
the University of Pennsylvania in 1989. He currently is a member of the American Risk 
and Insurance Association, the American Economics Association, the Western Risk and 
Insurance Association, and the Risk Theory Seminar. 
1 The National Medical Care Expenditures Survey was conducted during 1977 and 1978. 
Data were collected from approximately 14,000 randomly chosen households through-
out the United States. The richness of this data set allows the construction of the five 
measures of insurance used in this study. Although this data set is now 16 years old, it 
is the most current public data set available containing all of the necessary data for 
this study. 
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equations to predict (forecast) the demand for medical insurance. 
Researchers have found that medical insurance demand equations 
(estimated using the different measures of insurance as the dependent 
variable) differ significantly in terms of the amount of variation 
explained. In addition, the statistical significance of the explanatory 
variables used in the models differs across models. Further, the esti-
mated income elasticities2 of the models vary widely. 
Since the data for this study were collected, the health insurance 
industry has undergone dramatic change. Health maintenance organi-
zations (HMOs) have captured a significant portion of the insurance 
market. Similarly, preferred provider organizations (PPOs) have 
grown rapidly in number and size. Managed care has become an 
increasingly important means of controlling health care costs. Insurers 
have moved from merely providing health care financing to an inte-
gral involvement in health care delivery. Insurers now regularly 
review the appropriateness of medical care prior to agreeing to pay 
for it.3 
More profound changes are expected in the future as leaders in 
both political parties push for reform in health care financing and 
health care delivery. Among the measures currently being discussed 
is a prohibition on most types of underwriting and a requirement that 
employers purchase health insurance for all employees, including 
those who work only part time. Mandatory purchase of health insur-
ance coupled with community rating would alter the consumption of 
health insurance greatly. The health insurance market today pro-
vides a myriad of different products that reflect individual and 
group preferences. Depending on the form of health care reform 
enacted, if any, individual choice in the market may be reduced sig-
nificantly. 
The current study provides extensive information on the types of 
health insurance persons demand in the absence of a government 
mandate that everyone has insurance. The study focuses on tradi-
tional indemnity (fee-for-service) insurance. A major advantage of 
indemnity insurance is that it does not restrict the insured's choice of 
provider. President Clinton's proposal calls for the formation of 
health alliances and for each health alliance to offer a choice of at 
2 Income elasticity is the ratio of the proportionate change in consumption of a good 
relative to a proportionate change in income, with prices held constant. 
3 The data used for this study preclude an analysis of policies that incorporate man-
aged care. Managed care may increase or decrease the value of an insurance contract to 
an insured. Managed care programs that limit an insured's ability to collect indemnifi-
cation benefits will reduce the policy's value to the insured. Programs that contribute 
to the insured receiving the best possible care provide enhanced value. 
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least one indemnity insurance policy and one HMO policy. While 
HMOs and PPOs have grown considerably during the last 20 years, 
indemnity insurance continues to dominate the market. 
The different ways to measure health insurance discussed in this 
study provide insights into what it means to have health insurance 
coverage. Depending on the definition one uses to assess health insur-
ance coverage, a particular policy may be perceived to provide either 
sufficient or insufficient coverage. The demand analysis provides sig-
nificant insight into the perceived value of health insurance to vari-
ous demographic groups. The findings in this study provide valuable 
information for policy/decision makers and for health insurance 
industry professionals. 
2 The Measures of Insurance 
There are two factors that make insurance particularly difficult 
to quantify. First, insurance is purchased through an aleatory con-
tract, which means that the payoff from the policy is uncertain and 
subject to events in the future that mayor may not occur. Second, the 
probability that an insurance contract actually will pay an indem-
nity benefit to an insured will depend upon the risk characteristics of 
the insured as well as the provisions of the insurance contract. 
Suppose an insurer sells identical policies (for the same price) to two 
individuals whom it believes to be similar risks. It follows that the 
insured who in fact is a greater risk will realize greater expected 
benefit from the insurance. This occurs because the insurer assumes 
more risk from the individual who is a higher risk than from the 
individual who is a lower risk. 
Before introducing the definitions of the various measures of 
insurance, it is important to give an example of one model of an 
insurance policy. Let Lij be the actual medical expenses incurred by 
insured i for medical service j and Bij be the actual indemnity benefit 
paid by the insurer out of the Lij expense. Then individual i's actual 
out-of-pocket expense for service j is 
OOPij = Lij - Bij. (1) 
The actual form of Bij depends on the specifics of the insurance 
policy. For example, if there is a deductible of dij' a coinsurance per-
centage4 of 100aij% (0 ::;; aij ::;; 1), and an amount Mij beyond which the 
insurance company pays for the entire excess loss, then Bij is given as: 
4 The coinsurance percentage of 100 ai/fo is paid by the insured. Thus if aij is equal to 
0.2, then the coinsurance percentage is 20 percent (100 x 0.2%). 
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{
o if Lij :::; dij 
Bij = (1-aij)(Lij-d ij) if dij < Lij :::; Mij 
(1-aij)(Mij-dij) + (Lij-Mij) if Lij > Mij. 
For many health plans, the deductibles and coinsurance payments 
are applied to the insured's total annual expenses. So, let N be the 
number of different types of medical services provided, and let Li and 
Bi be the aggregate medical expenses and indemnity benefits, respec-
tively. These aggregates are given by: 
o 
where di, 100atio (0 ::;; aij ::;; I), and M i are insured i's annual 
deductible, coinsurance percentage, and the amount beyond which the 
insurance company pays for all excess losses. 
Some plans may have an upper limit on the annual losses that 
will be paid, while others may have lifetime limits on the family's 
medical expenses. Some plans offer deductibles that must apply to 
each family member, in addition to an entire family deductible. 
They also may have deductibles and co-payments that vary with the 
medical provider utilized. For example, a certain group of physicians 
may have negotiated with the plan to supply services under this 
plan at an agreed set of charges. If an insured uses one of these 
physicians, the deductibles and coinsurance payments are usually 
lower, and the upper limit M may be lower. Regardless of the type 
of plan, one easily can obtain accurate estimates of an individual's 
expected losses. Given the myriad of different health insurance 
plans, however, it is not possible to give one equation for Bij or Bi. In 
addition, for all but the very simplest of plans, the mathematical 
form of the expected value of Bi or Bij will be complicated. 
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Note: The approach used in this paper to yield expected out-of-
pocket expenses and expected indemnity benefits is to apply the 
plan's benefit formula to the expected losses. This is equivalent to 
using the approximation E[g(X)] ~ g(E[X]) where g is a continuous 
function and X is a real-valued random variable. This approximation 
is exact if and only if g is a linear function of X. 
It must be pointed out that the medical services used in this 
study include outpatient physician costs, inpatient surgeon fees, hos-
pital room and board changes, fees for diagnostic tests, prescription 
medicine expense, and inpatient physician visits charges. Examples 
of medical expenses not included in the study include home health 
services, treatment in an extended care facility, and hospice care. 
The premium and claim data were collected over an 18 month period 
during 1977 and 1978. 
Sections 2.1 through 2.5 contain a description of the five mea-
sures. 
2.1 Expected Out-of-Pocket Payments For Medical Care 
(/1) 
The measure I1i is defined as: 
where N is the number of different medical services included in the 
definition and E[OOPijl is the expected out-of-pocket expense for the 
jlh medical service for insured i, as defined in equation (1). 
Several authors have used this measure. For example, Farley 
(1985) used it in her study of underinsurance in the United States, 
while Francis (1984) also used it in his evaluation of health 
insurance policies made available to federal government employees. 
As I1 is defined as the expected out-of-pocket expense for medical 
care for a family, low values of the measure suggest extensive health 
insurance coverage and high values indicate little coverage. Zero cor-
responds to full insurance coverage. For a given insurance policy, I1 
increases as the family's predicted loss increases.4 Similarly, for a 
given expected loss, I1 decreases as the individual's policy provides 
4 If the policy has a stop-loss, an increase in loss above the stop-loss will not change 
this measure of insurance coverage. 
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greater coverage of the 10ss.5 A policy may provide greater coverage 
of a loss through a variety of policy provisions such as a lower 
deductible, less coinsurance, higher limits, or a broader definition of 
covered losses. 
2.2 Expected Indemnity Benefits From Insurance (/2) 
This measure of insurance, 12, is used by Browne (1989) in his 
study of adverse selection in the individual health insurance market. 
Following Browne, this measure is defined as: 
that is, 12i is the expected indemnity benefit from the insurance pol-
icy owned by insured i. The size of the expected benefit depends on 
the expected medical expense of insured i and the provisions of the 
insurance policy owned by insured i. 
12 is similar to the pure (or net) premium of a single insurance 
policy. The pure premium is the portion of the insurance premium 
charged on behalf of the insured to cover the anticipated cost of 
claims. 12 is the expected value of benefits for an insured with a par-
ticular insurance policy and a particular set of risk characteristics. It 
must be pointed out that 12 differs from the pure premium of the 
insured's insurance policy both to the extent that the loss prediction 
algorithm used in this paper differs from that used by insurance com-
pany actuaries and to the extent that the data in this study differ 
from that used by insurers in establishing rates. 
12 will increase as expected losses increase for any given individ-
ual or family insurance policy. Likewise, the value of 12 will 
increase with the depth of coverage for an expected loss of a given 
amount. Because this measure takes into account the risk characteris-
tics of the insured as well as the insurance policy provisions, it incor-
porates more information than simply the limits of coverage. It is a 
more appealing measure of insurance than Il, as it represents how 
much insurance the policy provides rather than how little. 
5 For instance, suppose a family's expected medical expense is $250. This family will 
have more insurance by measure 11 if the policy has a $100 deductible than if the pol-
icy has a $200 deductible. Applying the plan's benefit formula to the family's 
expected medical expense yields 11 = $100 if the policy has a $100 deductible. I1 = 
$200 if the policy has a $200 deductible. 
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2.3 Expected Out-ot-Pocket Payments/Expected Losses 
(/3) 
The third measure of insurance, 13, is the ratio of the insured's 
expected out-of-pocket payments for medical services to the total cost 
of the medical services, that is, for insured i, 
Clearly 13i ranges in value from zero to one. Zero corresponds to full 
insurance and one to no insurance. 
This measure of insurance differs from the coinsurance percentages 
that are stated in insurance policies. Stipulated policy coinsurance 
percentages apply to actual losses and may vary by the type of loss. 
For instance, the policy may stipulate one coinsurance percentage for 
prescription drugs and another for ambulatory surgery. 
Because measure 13 is the fraction of the expected loss retained 
by the insured, it is similar to an aggregate coinsurance percentage. 
Here the aggregate coinsurance percentage is defined as the portion 
of total medical expenses that will be paid by the insured rather 
than by the insurer. 
One factor that makes 13 an ambiguous measure in certain situa-
tions is that it does not increase monotonically with the size of the 
expected loss. An example illustrates the problem. Consider the fol-
lowing situation. An insured has an insurance policy with the follow-
ing provisions: 
Deductible 
Coinsurance -
Limit 
$1,000 
Insurer pays 80 percent of loss amount above 
$1,000 and below $5,000. The insurer pays 100 per-
cent of loss amounts between $5,000 and $10,000. 
There is no insurance coverage for loss amounts in 
excess of $10,000. 
Let L be the actual loss incurred and B be the actual indemnity 
benefit; then: 
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o if L .$" 1,000 
0.8 (L - 1,000) if 1,000 .$" L .$" 5,000 
3,200 + (L - 5,000) if 5,000 .$" L .$" 10,000 
8,200 if L ~ 10,000. 
The aggregate coinsurance percentage, a(agg), is given by 
i.e., 
L-B B 
a(agg) = -L- = 1-[ 
a(agg) = 
1 if 0 .$" L .$" 1,000 
800 
0.2 + T if 1,000 .$" L .$" 5,000 
1,800 
L if 5,000 .$" L .$" 10,000 
1 - 8,~00 if L ~ 10,000. 
In this case, 13 is of the same form as a(agg), but with L replaced by 
E[L]. The graph below shows how measure 13 varies as the expected 
loss increases. Note that insurance coverage ends at $10,000. Beyond 
$10,000, 13 increases asymptotically to 1.00. 
Suppose two persons have the individual policy described above, 
but they have different expected losses. Individual A has an 
expected loss of LA = $2,667 while individual B has an expected loss 
of LB = $16,400 such that they have the same value of 13 (0.5). Does 
this mean that they have the same level of insurance? 13 cannot dis-
tinguish these two cases. Further, if another individual, C, also pur-
chases the same policy but has expected losses of Lc = $6,000 such 
that the value of 13 is 0.3. This implies that C had less coverage 
than A, which is not true. 
13, however, does not suffer this problem if the policy provides 
unlimited coverage or if expected losses do not exceed the limits of 
the policy. 
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2.4 The Insurance Premium (/4) 
The fourth measure of insurance, 14, is the premium paid for 
insurance coverage by or on behalf of the insured. This measure of 
insurance has been used widely by insurance researchers (for example 
Farley and Wilensky (1983) and Beenstalk et al. (1988)). An advan-
tage of this measure is that it is relatively easy to obtain and does 
not require as much information to calculate as the prior three mea-
sures. 
In a competitive insurance market the premium not only includes 
expected losses, but also includes a loading for the company's 
expenses, profits, and investment income. In a market that is not com-
petitive, insurers may earn excess profits that would be included in 
the premium. Because the level of company expenses, interest earn-
ings, and any excess profits do not change the amount of insurance a 
policy is contractually obligated to provide, but do affect the size of 
the premium, this is not a perfect measure of insurance. For instance, 
if a company is able to exercise monopoly power in one state but not 
another, it may charge more for an identical policy in the state 
where it exercises monopoly power than for the policy in the state 
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where it does not exercise monopoly power.6 The company is not pro-
viding any more protection in the state where it charges more than in 
the state where it charges less. In addition, an insurance policy pre-
mium may be an inaccurate measure of coverage if market premium 
rates lag changes in underlying medical expenses. 
2.5 Limit of Coverage (/5) 
The fifth measure of insurance, IS, is the limit of coverage speci-
fied in the insurance policy agreement. This measure of insurance is 
used by Phelps (1973). The limit of insurance specified in the insur-
ance policy agreement is a characteristic of the insurance agreement 
and does not reflect the risk characteristics of the insured explicitly. 
Insurance policies often have more than one limit. Among the differ-
ent limits that may be used as a measure of the coverage a health 
insurance policy provides are the number of hospital days covered 
and the maximum payment for a surgical procedure. The limit used in 
this paper is the lifetime maximum dollar limit of total benefits 
provided by the insurance policy. 
IS is defined here as the maximum amount of insurance protection 
that a policy will provide. The measure does not account for the dif-
ferences in risk exposure inherent to different insureds. The measure 
also may give an imprecise indication of the amount of insurance a 
policy provides because it focuses exclusively on one policy provision 
to the exclusion of all others. Further, it is unlikely that an insured 
will reach the policy limit. With IS, two insurance policies with the 
same limit but different deductibles would not be distinguishable. 
2.6 A Comparison of the Measures of Insurance 
Table 1 reports the mean, standard deviation, minimum and max-
imum insurance coverage for the 1977-78 sample population used in 
this study, employing the five measures of insurance? 
A procedure developed by Duan et ai. (1983) was modified to pre-
dict medical expenses. Insurance policy provisions of the insureds in 
the sample are applied to the predicted losses to determine the 
value of insurance company indemnity benefits and the amount of the 
loss that is borne by the insured. Predicted expenses and insurance 
6 There is little evidence that health insurers currently exercise monopoly power in the 
U.s. Further, health insurers' profitability is limited in many states by minimum loss 
ratio requirements. 
7 The average medical care cost for an individual for 1994 is roughly $2500. 
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indemnity benefits are summed across family members to determine 
totals for families. Ex ante predicted values for the random variables 
Il,12, and 13 then were constructed. 
In the Duan et al. study, aggregate medical expenses were pre-
dicted. In the current study, losses are predicted for each person in 
the sample for each of six types of medical expenses: outpatient 
physician fees, inpatient surgeon fees, inpatient physician 
(nons urge on) fees, hospital room and board charges, fees for diagnos-
tic tests, and prescription medicine expenses. Health insurance poli-
cies typically have different coverage provisions for different types 
of losses. The number of medical services for which loss amounts were 
predicted was limited by the availability of medical insurance data 
in the National Medical Care Expenditures Survey. The survey provides 
extensive insurance coverage information for the medical services 
used in the study but not for all medical services. 
TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics of the Measures of Insurance 
Based on 1977-78 Data 
Measure 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Mean 
236.94 
417.99 
0.41 
1012.95 
262,967.68 
Standard Deviation 
210.47 
450.58 
0.27 
660.90 
315,505.27 
11: Out-of-pocket payments for medical care 
12. Indemnity benefits from insurance 
13: Out-of-pocket payments/expected losses 
14: Insurance premium 
15: Limit of coverage 
Minimum 
o 
o 
o 
21.0 
1,000.00 
Maximum 
2052.20 
5546.10 
1.00 
5798.20 
5,000,000.00 
A simple example illustrates how the different measures of 
insurance coverage can conflict. Consider two families, one in good 
health, the other in poor health. The two families have almost 
identical insurance policies that cover all medical expenses after a 
deductible. The deductible on the policy held by the healthy family 
is $50. The family that is in poor health has a policy with a $100 
deductible. Expected losses are $75 for the healthy family and 
$1,000 for the less healthy family. Suppose the insurance premium 
charged on behalf of each family is 120 percent of its expected loss. 
The expected loss is assumed to be known by the insurer. Measure I1 
for the healthy family is $50 and $100 for the less healthy family. 
With I1 as the measure of insurance, the healthy family has more 
insurance than the less healthy family because I1 is less. A cursory 
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examination of the policies would lead to the same conclusion, as the 
healthy family's policy is identical in all regards to that of the less 
healthy family except that it has a lower deductible. 
Now consider how these families compare by the other measures 
of insurance. If measure 12 is considered as the appropriate measure 
of insurance, the less healthy family has more insurance than the 
healthy family has. The expected insurance indemnity benefit for 
the healthy family is $25, whereas for the less healthy family the 
expected benefit is $900. By measure 13, the percent of the total 
expected losses covered by insurance, the less healthy family has 
more insurance than the healthy family. The insurer will pay 90 
percent of the less healthy family's medical expenses, but only 33 
percent of the healthy family's losses. With 14 as the measure of 
insurance, the less healthy family has more insurance than the 
healthy family. Recall that premiums are assumed to be 120 percent 
of expected medical expenses for both families and the expected med-
ical expense of the less healthy family is greater than that of the 
healthy family. Finally, with IS as the measure of insurance, both 
families have an equal amount of insurance because both have a pol-
icy that provides unlimited coverage above the deductible. A sum-
mary of the example is provided in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 
An Illustrative Example of the Insurance Measures 
Policy Provisions Healthy Family 
Deductible 
Expected Losses 
Limit of Coverage 
Measures of Coverage 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
11: Out-of-pocket payments for medical care 
12. Indemnity benefits from insurance 
13: Out-of-pocket payments/expected losses 
14: Insurance premium 
15: Limit of coverage 
$50 
$75 
Unlimited 
$50 
$25 
67% 
$90 
Unlimited 
Sickly Family 
$100 
$1,000 
Unlimited 
$100 
$900 
10% 
$1,200 
Unlimited 
3 The Medical Expense Insurance Demand Model 
This section of the paper specifies and estimates medical expense 
insurance demand equations for each of the five measures of insur-
ance. 
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3.1 Specification of the Demand Model 
For any of the measures of insurance (1) defined above, it is 
assumed that the medical expense insurance demand equation can be 
written, for family t, as: 
t = 1,2, ... , N. 
Here Xli is a column vector of explanatory variables pertaining to 
the demographic characteristics of the family believed to affect the 
demand for insurance, and X2t is a vector of explanatory variables 
pertaining to the employment group through which the family 
obtains insurance coverage. Recall that the insurance demand equa-
tions are estimated with group market data. /31 and /32 are vectors of 
estimated coefficients corresponding to Xl and X2, respectively. The 
model's error term, et, is assumed to be normally distributed.8 
The family's demographic variables in the insurance demand 
equation include its perceived health status, age of the head of 
household, sex of the head of household, marital status, level of 
education of the head of household, race of the head of household, 
family income from all sources, family size, and region of the country. 
The group characteristic variables include group size9 and the share 
of the insurance premium paid by the employer. 
The family'S perceived health status is hypothesized to be corre-
lated to the amount of insurance purchased. Theoretical studies of 
the demand for insurance in a market with adverse selection support 
this hypothesis (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; Wilson, 1977). 
Phelps (1973) as well as others have found that age is correlated 
positively with the amount of medical insurance purchased. One pos-
sible explanation for this correlation is that as one ages the variance 
of losses increases, as does the average expected loss size. 
The variable, female, has a value of one if the head of house-
hold is a female and a zero if a male. Prior studies have shown that 
families headed by females typically have less medical insurance 
than families headed by males (Farley and Wilensky, 1983). 
Marital status is believed to be correlated positively with insur-
ance purchases. Because medical expense insurance often is offered as 
an employee benefit extending to other members of the immediate 
8 A log transformation of the insurance measure was used in all but the 13 models. In 
that model the log-odds transformation was used. 
9 Group size is the size of the employment group through which the individual 
acquires insurance coverage. 
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family, the assumption is made that a married individual will be 
more likely to have medical expense insurance coverage. 
Education is hypothesized to be correlated positively with insur-
ance consumption. Grossman's (1972) model of health care consumption 
assumes that consumption of health care services increases one's stock 
of human capital. Therefore, individuals with higher levels of human 
capital will have a greater demand for medical insurance. 
Four indicator variables are used to classify by race: black, 
Hispanic, white, and other. Because these indicator variables must 
sum to one, one must be omitted from the model. White is the omitted 
variable in the model. Studies of medical expense insurance consump-
tion by race have shown that whites are the greatest consumers of 
medical expense insurance. 
Phelps (1973) finds that income is correlated positively with 
insurance purchases. As insurance is not a necessity, the indigent may 
choose not to purchase it. As income increases, insurance becomes rela-
tively more affordable. In addition the tax advantage to purchasing 
group medical expense insurance is related positively to income. This 
encourages a greater demand for insurance at higher income levels. A 
priori, the effect of income on the consumption of insurance is not 
clear, however. This is because those with higher incomes are more 
capable of self-insuring than the poor. For a risk neutral person, self-
insuring may be preferable to purchasing insurance because of the 
expenses associated with writing insurance. Due to the extreme losses 
possible, self insurance usually is not opted for by persons who need to 
protect their assets. 
Nine indicator variables are used to classify insureds by region of 
the country. These regions of the country are classified according to 
the 1970 U.S. census. Eight of the variables are included as depen-
dent variables in the insurance demand equation. The ninth variable 
which represents the Pacific region is the omitted variable. These 
variables are included to account for regional variations in the por-
tion of the population with medical expense insurance. They also 
account for the variation in the supply of medical care by region. 
Five indicator variables are used to represent the area in which 
the insured lives. The first includes the 16 largest standard 
metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs). The second includes all 
SMSAs (with the exception of the largest 16) that have a population 
greater than 500,000. The third area consists of all SMSAs with a 
population less than 500,000. The fourth includes areas that are not 
SMSAs but that are less than 60 percent rural. The fifth includes 
areas that are more than 60 percent rural. The first area variable, 
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TABLE 3 
Means and Standard Deviations For Insurance Demand Equation 
Inde~endent and Omitted Variables 
Independent Variable Definition Mean S.D. 
Educat Years of education 12.26 3.18 
Lfaminc* Log of family income 21,342.21 16,554.88 
Age Age in years 39.93 12.26 
Female 1 if female 0.17 0.37 
Married 1 if married 0.71 0.45 
Area2 1 if SMSA > 500,000 0.25 0.43 
Area3 1 if SMSA < 500,000 0.19 0.39 
Area4 1 if not SMSA but < 60% rural 0.20 0.40 
Area5 1 if not SMSA, rural 0.13 0.33 
Black 1 if Black 0.09 0.29 
Hisp 1 if Hispanic 0.04 0.19 
Other 1 if not black, His~anic, or white 0.02 0.12 
Hunk 1 if occupation un nown 0.10 0.30 
Hmrg 1 if occupation managerial 0.10 0.31 
Hsales 1 if occupational sales 0.05 0.21 
Hclerk 1 if occupational clerk 0.07 0.22 
Hcrafts 1 if occupational crafts 0.16 0.37 
Hoper 1 if occupational operator 0.13 0.34 
Htrans 1 if occupation transportation 0.05 0.23 
Hservv 1 if occupation service 0.09 0.29 
Hlabor 1 if occupation labor 0.05 0.22 
Hfown 1 if occupation farm owner 0.01 0.10 
Hflabor 1 if occupation farm laborer 0.Q1 0.07 
Physgood 1 if perceived health status good 0.39 0.49 
Phsfair 1 if perceived health status fair 0.10 0.30 
Phspoor 1 if perceived health status poor 0.02 0.14 
Limmag 1 if major activity limitation 0.02 0.12 
Limmat 1 if amount activity limitation 0.03 0.17 
Limmin 1 if minor activity limitation 0.02 0.15 
Neweng 1 if in corresponding 1 ~70 census region 0.04 0.20 
Midatl 0.16 0.37 
Encent 0.22 0.42 
Wncent 0.08 0.27 
Ssatl 0.20 0.40 
Seast 0.06 0.23 
Swest 0.07 0.25 
Mnt 0.03 0.18 
Lfamsize Log of family size 3.17 1.67 
Groupszp Group size 20,342.88 71,180.67 
Esharec Employers share of the premium 0.74 0.32 
Omitted Variable Definition Mean S.D. 
Male Male 0.83 0.37 
Area1 Largest 16 SMSAs 0.24 0.42 
White White 0.86 0.35 
Phsexl Perceived health status excellent 0.50 0.50 
Limmon No activity limitation 0.93 0.25 
Pacific Pacific census region 0.14 0.35 
Nmarried 1 if not married 0.29 0.45 
Hprof Occupational professional 0.18 0.38 
Absolute values not log values are reported in this table. The logs of the specified variables are 
used in the regression 
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representing the 16 largest SMSAs, is the omitted variable in the 
model. 
Two firm-specific explanatory variables are used in the model: 
group size and the share of the insurance premium paid on behalf of 
the insured family by the employer. Group size is assumed to be a 
proxy for the price of insurance because group insurance can be pro-
vided more cheaply per person to members of larger groups. Thus, a 
positive correlation is hypothesized between group size and insurance 
purchases. A positive correlation also is hypothesized between the 
employer's share of the premium and the consumption of medical 
expense insurance. For a given insurance premium, the family's out-of-
pocket cost drops as the employer's share of the premium increases. 
Table 3 reports the mean and standard deviation of the indepen-
dent and omitted variables. 
3.2 Estimation of the Demand Model 
Table 4 reports the estimated medical insurance demand equa-
tions using each of the five different measures of insurance. 
Parameter estimates and tests of their significance differ markedly 
across equations. Of the five equations the R2 value is highest for 
the I2 equation, expected insurance indemnity benefits. 
Because the insurance policy premium has been used as the mea-
sure of insurance in most previous studies of insurance demand, the 
demand model estimated with measure I4 serves as a benchmark for 
comparison with other insurance demand models. The R2 value of 0.24 
falls within the range of values of other models using this measure; 
the R 2 value of the Farley and Wilensky model is 0.20, and that of 
the Phelps model is 0.39. The estimated income elasticity of 0.18 
falls within the range of previously estimated income elasticities for 
a medical expense insurance demand model.10 As hypothesized, the 
coefficient estimates for the perceived health status variables are 
correlated highly with the insurance premium, as is family income. 
Families with a female head of household are less well insured in 
general than those with a male head of household. The insurance 
premium is related positively with family size and marital status, 
as hypothesized. 
The age of the head of household is not significant in the 
demand equation. This may be attributable to the sample population 
being limited to individuals under the age of 65. In addition, the 
10 Holmer (1984) provides a discussion of the variation in estimated income elastici-
ties. Phelps estimated an elasticity of 0.18, while Hoy estimated an elasticity of 0.02. 
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TABLE 4 0 c Insurance Demand Equations .... 
:::I 
~ Measures of Insurance (Dependent Variables) ~ 
» 11 (R2=.33) 12(R2=.39) 13*(R2=.06) 14(R2=.24) 15(R2=.07) $l c Independent parameter parameter parameter parameter parameter ~ Variable estimate t-stat estimate t-stat estimate t-stat estimate t-stat estimate t-stat ~ 
"'U Intercept 3.719 13.135 2.409 6.645 2.466 1.614 4.541 20.336 283032.720 2.566 il1 Educat -2.22E-11 -0.330 -0.004 -0.498 -0.004 -0.111 -0.006 -1.063 4633.133 1.769 $l o· LFaminc 0.055 1.961 0.064 1.780 0.061 0.401 0.18 8.283 16883.677 1.545 CD Age 0.014 9.638 0.030 15.540 -0.027 -3.362 0.003 2.405 -639.923 -1.106 Female 0.164 2.659 0.003 0.041 0.222 0.667 -0.205 -4.210 -9618.366 -0.400 Married 0.531 9.664 0.410 5.822 0.376 1.268 0.207 4.755 -12590.869 -0.588 (Xl Area2 -0.111 -2.090 -0.114 -1.678 -0.177 -0.617 -0.023 -0.555 41224.128 1.989 ~ Area3 -0.217 -4.106 0.092 1.362 -0.801 -2.805 0.024 0.584 15951.835 0.773 Area4 -0.253 -4.601 0.034 0.481 -0.812 -2.732 -0.031 -0.709 3269.112 0.152 Area5 -0.177 -2.783 0.018 0.223 -0.504 -1.468 -0.0074 -1.478 -21039.910 -0.847 Black -0.050 -0.788 0.128 1.577 -0.133 -1.468 0.011 0.222 24025.036 0.962 Hisp -0.226 -2.149 -0.306 -2.277 0.264 0.466 0.102 1.228 16399.984 0.401 Other -0.171 -1.184 0.682 3.697 -1.263 -1.625 -0.105 -0.921 82126.742 1.463 Hunk -0.126 -1.765 0.032 0.348 -0.186 -0.486 0.018 0.325 -42520.428 -1.534 Hmgr 0.087 1.344 0.183 2.224 -0.624 -1.798 -0.099 -1.942 16277.970 0.649 Hsales 0.219 2.558 0.006 0.055 -0.111 -0.241 0.046 0.674 -20834.308 -0.624 < 
~ Hclerk 0.103 1.299 0.145 1.429 -0.483 -1.131 0.112 1.794 18116.812 0.588 ...... -Hcrafts -0.022 -0.344 0.248 3.038 -0.767 -2.227 0.056 1.118 -20185.188 -0.812 Z Hoper 0.103 1.493 0.276 3.120 -0.683 -1.835 0.003 0.055 -56753.308 -2.110 s:> Htrans 0.015 0.180 0.122 1.123 -0.525 -1.144 -0.004 -0.055 -12431.312 -0.375 I\) ...... Hserv -0.029 -0.413 -.373 4.135 -0.949 -2.497 0.036 0.651 -5915.009 -0.829 <0 
<0 
c.v 
TABLE 4 (cont.) $: Ql 
Insurance Demand Equations * ~
Measures of Insurance (Dependent Variables) OJ a 
11 (R2=.33) 12(R2=.39) 13*(R2=.06) 14(R2=.24) 15(R2=.07) ::E ::l 
Independent parameter parameter parameter parameter parameter (J) 
Variable estimate t-stat estimate t-stat estimate t-stat estimate t-stat estimate t-stat 
Hlabor 0.063 0.706 0.029 0.253 -0.324 -0.674 0.030 0.434 -25829.668 -0.744 
Hfown -0.377 -1.892 -0.452 -1.769 -0.640 -0.595 0.117 0.746 83648.331 1.076 
Hflabor 0.226 0.977 0.544 1.841 -0.813 -0.654 0.005 0.028 -36384.059 -0.404 
Phsgood 0.292 8.126 0.259 5.636 -0.196 -1.011 -0.060 -2.110 1464.722 0.105 
Phsfair 0.431 7.227 0.683 8.943 -0.762 -2.370 -0.058 -1.231 -16969.680 0.326 
Phspoor 0.810 6.359 1.087 6.666 -0.837 -1.219 -0.044 -0.438 16195.869 0.326 
(X) Limmaj 0.817 5.589 0.832 4.443 1.331 1.688 -0.190 -1.644 -24068.161 -0.422 
(X) Limmamt 0.420 4.259 0.938 7.436 -0.512 -0.963 -0.022 -0.280 2346.205 0.061 
Limmin 0.462 4.274 0.169 1.226 0.231 0.397 -0.014 -0.170 -374.051 -0.009 
Neweng -0.145 -1.638 0.799 7.022 -1.390 -2.899 0.044 0.629 -64783.774 -1.870 
Midatl -0.252 -3.762 0.637 7.431 -1.176 -3.259 -0.055 -1.034 -1 06592.340 -4.088 
Encent -0.270 -4.451 0.558 7.198 -1.227 -3.755 0.055 1.155 -8516.062 -0.361 
Wncent -0.033 -0.456 0.493 5.245 -0.910 -2.297 0.054 0.927 -24259.950 -0.847 
Ssatl -0.018 -0.276 0.267 3.288 -0.209 -0.613 -0.143 -2.853 -5314.145 -2.153 
Seast -0.208 -2.356 0.021 0.188 0.103 0.215 -0.121 -1.735 -78952.442 -2.292 
Swest 0.442 5.755 -0.320 -3.254 1.032 2.488 -0.135 -2.232 -52285.950 -1.746 0 
~ 
Mnt 0.100 0.988 -0.185 -1.427 0.940 1.719 0.049 0.618 10549.781 -0.267 2: 
Lfamsize 0.117 3.102 0.065 1.351 0.154 0.761 0.157 5.294 -33362.649 -2.279 ::l <0 
Groupszp -0.014 -2.193 0.029 3.515 -0.080 -2.261 0.015 3.003 -14907.440 -5.849 ::l 
Esharec -0.154 -2.767 0.145 2.034 -0.586 -1.955 0.050 1.139 -44027.015 -2.034 
en 
c 
til 
*The log-odds transformation was used to normalize the dependent variable 
::l 
() 
(J) 
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effect of age may be diluted because the ages of other individuals in 
the family are not accounted for in the demand equation. 
Both of the group characteristic explanatory variables are signif-
icant and exhibit the hypothesized relationship with the dependent 
variable. A positive relationship between group size and insurance 
consumption was hypothesized and is supported by the data. The 
size of the employer portion of the insurance premium is related posi-
tively to the level of insurance purchase, as hypothesized. 
The demand equations estimated using insurance measures I1 and 
I2 exhibit the highest R2 values of the five models. The measures 
are related to one another by the equation: 
12 = Expected Medical Expenses - I1 
Measure I1 is a measure of the lack of insurance coverage a fam-
ily has, as it measures the family's expected out-of-pocket payments 
for medical care. The interpretation of the coefficients of the demand 
model estimated with I1 are therefore counter to that of the other 
demand models in most instances. 
I1 is correlated positively with the perceived health status of 
the family, as is 12. Those who perceive their health to be worse 
demand more health insurance. The estimated coefficient for age is 
statistically significant in both equations. As the age of the head of 
household increases, the expected out-of-pocket payments for medical 
care increase. In the 12 equation the relationship is positive, indicat-
ing that the expected insurance benefits increase as the age of the 
family head increases. The marital status variable is positive and 
statistically significant in the I1 and 12 equations. 
The group characteristic variables are both negative and both 
significant in the I1 equation. In the 12 equation they are both posi-
tive and both significant. The group characteristic variables of both 
equations provide strong evidence that the depth of insurance cover-
age increases with group size and with the share of the premium 
paid by the employer. 
The remaining two demand equations, 13 and IS, have low R2 
values for medical expense insurance demand equations. These mea-
sures theoretically are not superior to those previously discussed, and 
they do not have superior explanatory power empirically. 
4 Conclusion 
Several different measures of insurance have been used by 
researchers in previous studies of medical insurance demand to quan-
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tify a family's level of insurance coverage. This paper compares five 
different measures of insurance coverage using the National Medical 
Care Expenditure Survey data. 
Insurance demand equations using the different measures of insur-
ance as the dependent variable differ significantly from one another. 
The 12 equation ranks first in terms of variation explained by tradi-
tional medical insurance demand variables. Insurance demand equa-
tions utilizing measures 13 and IS rank lowest. Explanatory variables 
found to be significantly related to insurance consumption in several 
of the equations include age, sex of the head of household, family 
size, income, perceived health status, and marital status.1 1 
The information on health insurance demand provided by this 
research shows that the amount of health insurance persons desire 
varies greatly depending on demographic characteristics such as age, 
sex, and marital status. Income and the health of the family, prox-
ied by predicted medical expenses, are also important determinants 
of the amount of insurance a family purchases. Although the leading 
proposals for health care reform call for community rating and uni-
versal coverage, there will likely be a sizable market for supplemen-
tal insurance after reform. This study provides valuable information 
on those groups that have a high demand for health insurance. In a 
postreform environment, the same groups likely will have the great-
est demand for supplemental health insurance. 
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Discussion of Mark J. Browne's "The Definition of 
Insurance: Implications for a Health Insurance 
Demand Model" 
Charles Fuhrer* 
I would like to thank Professor Mark Browne for this contribution 
to the actuarial literature. To the best of my knowledge, actuaries 
have not written on the subject of his paper. 
I propose alternative measures of the amount of insurance to the 
author's Il, 12, and 13. These are: 
N 
Il = l ~ E[OOPd 
I J=1 J 
N 
12 = l ~ E[Bij] 
I J=1 
13 = 
I1 
where i ranges over all insured for all insurance policies. The author 
selected his definitions of measures of insurance from the literature 
and, of course, is free to define them in any way he desires. I believe 
my measures would be more useful, particularly for the purpose of the 
paper. 
My measures correspond to what would be the normal way of 
ordering policies. For example, suppose two policies A and B were 
identical except that they had $100 and $200 deductibles, respec-
tively. For my measure, A would provide more insurance than B. This 
* Charles S. Fuhrer, FSA (1977) of the Washington National Insurance Co. in 
Lincolnshire, IL has been a group insurance actuary since 1973. He is co-editor of 
Actuarial Research Clearing House and has given numerous presentations at actuarial 
meetings. Mr. Fuhrer has written many papers and has been awarded the 1988 
Practitioner's Prize by the AERF and the 1991 Health Section Research Papers Prize. 
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is the normal result because A often pays more benefits than Band 
never pays less. Under the author's definitions, if A were purchased 
by a healthier insurance than B, then A might have a lower value of 
12. Generally, I would expect that a measure of the coverage level of 
an insurance policy would be independent of the individual that 
chooses to purchase it. 
The author tries to answer whether certain factors influence the 
purchase of different amounts of insurance. Some of these factors are 
correlated directly with the demand for health care. Because his 
measures of the amount of insurance are affected by the demand for 
health care, correlations exist. An interesting question is: "Do indi-
viduals who will have a greater demand for health care services 
recognize this fact and then purchase insurance policies with greater 
reimbursement provisions?" I believe that the author fails to answer 
this question. 
Charles Fuhrer 
Washington National Insurance Co. 
300 Tower Parkway 
Lincolnshire, IL 60069-3665 
Author's Reply to Discussion 
The comments of Mr. Charles S. Fuhrer are greatly appreciated. 
His suggestion of several alternative measures of insurance is valu-
able. A primary aim of my paper was to raise the question of how to 
determine the amount of coverage an insured has. While my paper 
proposes several measures, future researchers may want to consider 
the merits of others as well. 
Fuhrer's measures of an insurance policy are "independent of the 
individual that choose to purchase it." Such measures of insurance 
emphasize the contractual provisions of a policy while failing to 
account precisely for the amou,nt of risk transferred by the policy. 
Little information on the economic value of an insurance policy to an 
individual insured can be gained from such measures. The measures, 
however, may be valuable for an insurer when examining a complete 
book of business. 
The question raised by Mr. Fuhrer, of whether individuals who 
are higher risks purchase insurance policies with greater reimburse-
ment provisions, is beyond the scope of the current study. This ques-
tion has been addressed in three prior studies. Interested readers are 
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referred to Browne (1992), Browne and Doerpinghaus (1993), and 
Browne and Doerpinghaus (1994). 
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On the Equivalence of the Loss Ratio and Pure 
Premium Methods of Determining Property and 
Casualty Rating Relativities 
Robert L. Brown* 
Abstract 
There are two distinct stages in the property and casualty ratemaking process. 
First, there is the portfolio average rate change. Second, there is the adjustment of 
classification relativities. It is well known that the loss ratio and pure premium (also 
called the loss cost) methods are algebraically equivalent in the stage called the port-
folio average rate change. This paper reviews the proof of this equivalence. Further, 
it is proved algebraically that the loss ratio and pure premium methods are also 
equivalent in calculating classification relativities (or differentials) if certain data 
requirements can be met. A short numerical example of this equivalence is included. 
Key words: loss cost, ratemaking, relativities 
1 Introduction 
In property and casualty ratemaking, there are two distinct steps 
in the process: 
a) The portfolio average rate change. 
b) A change in classification relativities. 
One is able to use either a loss ratio approach or a pure premium 
(or loss cost) approach in these two distinct ratemaking stages. This 
paper first reviews the well-documented fact that the loss ratio and 
the pure premium approaches are algebraically equivalent when 
portfolio average rate changes are being calculated. The paper then 
* Robert L. Brown, FCIA, FSA, ACAS, is professor of statistics and actuarial science 
and director of the Institute of Insurance and Pension Research at the University of 
Waterloo. He is a past president of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries and is cur-
rently on the Society of Actuaries' Board of Governors and Executive Committee. He is 
also an elected Councilor in the City of Waterloo. Professor Brown has authored 
several articles and books. 
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proves that these methods are also equivalent when changes in clas-
sification relativities (differentials) are being calculated. 1 For these 
methods to be applied, the data must be in the appropriate form. 
2 The Portfolio Average Rate Change 
The process to be followed in developing the portfolio average 
rate change (also known as the statewide or provincewide rate change) 
is well known (see Brown, 1993, pp. 70-77) and will not be discussed 
directly here. There are two methods that can be used to develop 
rates: the loss ratio method and the pure premium method. It is rela-
tively easy to provide mathematical formulas for these methods and 
to show algebraically that they are mathematically equivalent. The 
proof of their equivalence is well known; see, for example, Stern 
(1965, p. 182) and McClenahan (1990). For convenience, the proof will 
be repeated here. To this end, the following definitions are needed: 
Lijk 
Eijk 
CR"k '1 
i, j, k 
PLR 
ILR 
NAR 
CAR 
= 
= 
Dollars of incurred losses for rate cell (i, j, k); 
Units of earned exposure for rate cell (i, j, k); 
Current manual rate for rate cell (i, j, k); 
Rating variable indicators such as i classes, j territories 
(There can be any number of such variables.); 
Permissible loss ratio = 1 - expense ratio; 
Indicated loss ratio; 
New average rate; 
Current average rate. 
It now will be proven that the new average rate is the same for the 
pure premium method and the loss ratio method. 
2.1 Pure Premium Method 
The new average rate is determined under the pure premium 
method as: 
1: L" "k Ilk 1 
NAR = lE' x PLR' 
"k Ijk 
'1 
1 Throughout this paper, the terms relativities and dIfferentials are used interchangeably. 
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2.2 Loss Ratio Method 
Under the loss ratio method, the new average rate is given by: 
ILR 
NAR = CAR x PLR . 
But the current average rate is determined as 
I; CRijk x Eijk 
CAR = '-J.!.l/k'--___ _ 
I;kEijk lJ 
and the indicated loss ratio is: 
ILR 
Dollars of incurred losses 
= Dollars of earned premium at current rate level 
= 
1:L"k "k lJ II 
1: CRiJ'k x EiJ"k . 
ijk 
Thus, the new average rate is: 
NAR 
-1Lijk 1 = ~x 
I;k Eijk PLR 
lJ 
1:L"k "k lJ II 1 
x PLR 
which is the same as the new average rate derived by the pure pre-
mium method. 
3 Change in Classification Relativities 
Again, there are two methods that can be used to change classifi-
cation relativities: the pure premium (or loss cost) method and the 
loss ratio method. Some confusion exists, however, about which 
method is better and why. Also, the classical ratemaking papers 
found in the Casualty Actuarial Society's associateship syllabus may 
not make clear what data must be used to guarantee a correct analy-
sis. 
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For example, Stern (1965, p. 170) states in the section on classifi-
cation relativities: 
The pure premium indices above measure the relationship of the 
loss cost per car for each class to the base class. Consequently, 
they also indicate how the rate for each class should relate to 
the rate for the base class, if it is accepted that the expense por-
tion of the rate is obtained by a umform expense foading ... 
However, pure premiums obtained from a consolidation of widely 
divergent bodies of experience must be used with great caution 
since they may contain distortions. The above model may contain 
in Class 11 a proportionally larger share of experience coming 
from low loss cost territories than is contained in the experience 
for Class 12. Consequently, a part of the indicated rate aifferen-
tial is purely due to distribution; this distortion due to distribu-
tion would have to be corrected for, prior to accepting pure 
premium indices as true indications of c1assification relativities. 
Stern (1965) continues: 
There are, however, many advantages in favor of using collected 
loss ratios. These loss ratios can be obtained with relative ease 
directly from the experience; unlike pure premiums, they are less 
likely to be distorted by the influence of divergent distributions, 
since the premiums reflect the different rate and loss levels of 
the component territories; and finally, loss ratios based on the 
actual experience have an air of reality, reflecting the over-all 
underwriting record for each class. 
Finger (1990, Chapter 5, p. 259) states: 
When earned premium is used, the method is usually a "loss 
ratio" method; when earned exposures are used, the method is 
usually a "pure premium" approach. The loss ratio method can 
produce equivalent results if "earned premiums at current rates" 
are calculated. 
Finger (1990) adds: 
There are advantages and disadvantages of using the loss ratio 
and pure premium methods. The loss ratio method may be appli-
cable when there is less detailed data available or when tbere 
are many different sets of relativities; earned premiums will 
reflect the various charges made for different classes, territories, 
and coverages. If earnea premiums correspond to historical rate 
levels, however, it may be difficult to make adjustments for 
intervening changes in rate relativities. The pure premium 
approach is usually more accurate, because it requires more infor-
mation. It also has the advantage of producing frequency and 
severity relativities, as well as pure premium relativities; the 
loss ratio method only produces loss ratio and severity relativi-
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ties. Severity relativities, however, will not be meaningful if the 
underl)'ing coverage is not consistent (e.g., there are differing 
deductibles or insured limits). 
Finger then provides an arithmetic illustration of an actual cal-
culation of some classification relativities using both the loss ratio 
and pure premium techniques. In his solved example using the pure 
premium method, Finger does not use just earned exposures for the 
denominator of each respective loss cost. Rather, he calculates and 
uses what he calls base exposures. He explains base exposures (p. 266): 
It should be noted that "base exposures" are used in this exhibit 
in place of earned exposures. "Base exposures" are calculated 
using the current rate relativities for all relevant rating vari-
ables. 
Finger argues that the reason for using base exposures instead of 
actual exposures is to correct for varying exposure levels in the non-
reviewed relativities. For example, Territory A and Territory B may 
differ in the distribution of insureds by class. 
Finger corrects for the distortion caused by the heterogeneity of 
exposure distributions across the variables not now under review, as 
previously alluded to in Stern's paper (e.g., varying exposure levels 
by class in the different territories) and for which Stern suggests cor-
rections must be made. This is illustrated in the example in section 5 
below. 
Finger provides a one line arithmetic illustration of how the base 
exposure adjustment is made. It is difficult to conclude, however, that 
an average reader could reproduce the solution with only the infor-
mation available. 
Some questions remain: Which is superior, the loss ratio method 
or the pure premium method? What does Finger mean when he says 
that "The loss ratio method can produce equivalent results if 'earned 
premiums at current rates' are calculated?" Unfortunately, Finger 
does not elaborate further on this comment. 
To deal with these questions, an algebraic description of this 
aspect of the ratemaking process must be developed. Without loss of 
generality, consideration is limited to cases where there are only two 
classification parameters. Define two vectors of differentials: 
Xi for i = 1, 2, ... , n (e.g., class) 
Yj for j = 1, 2, ... , m (e.g., territory) 
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Assume there is a base cell, B, for any variable, such that for 
that cell: 
XB = YB = 1.000 
The current rate for the base cell will be denoted CRB. Otherwise, 
the notation used is as defined previously. 
Consider a rate manual produced by the base rate CRB and the 
two vectors of relativities Xi and Yj. This produces a matrix of m x n 
rates. Consider (without loss of generality) that the new differential 
for class k, Xk is to be calculated. One can think of class (or territory) 
k as occupying the kth row of our rate manual matrix. 
The calculations that follow assume that the various rate rela-
tivities are calculated independently (as opposed to interactively, as 
in Brown's (1988) minimum bias approach) and applied multiplica-
tively. While the latter assumption is not essential in practice (Le., 
additive differentials are possible), multiplicative differentials are 
the norm. The algebraic proofs that follow assume a multiplicative 
relationship. The proofs also assume that all expenses are expressed 
as a percentage of the gross premium (i.e., there are no flat-loaded 
expenses). This means that the loss relativities and rate relativities 
are the same. 
The papers by Stern and Finger indicate that the calculation of 
multiplicative rating relativities can be expressed algebraically as 
follows: 
3.1 Pure Premium Method 
The loss cost for variable k, LCkt adjusted for heterogeneity under 
the pure premium method is : 
The loss cost for the base cell, B, adjusted for heterogeneity under 
the pure premium method is denoted by LCB where: 
:ELB · . ] 
LCB = ~E . 
. Bj Yj 
J 
Thus, the new differential is: 
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new 
Xk 
3.2 Loss Ratio Method 
The loss ratio for variable k , LRb is determined as: 
The loss ratio for the base cell, B is: 
~LBj 
LRB = L~ . CR .' 
. BJ BJ 
] 
Thus, the adjustment factor for cell k, AFk, is: 
and the new differential is determined as: 
and XB = 1. Therefore 
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Thus it can be seen that when the correct data are used, the pure 
premium method and the loss ratio method are algebraically equiva-
lent. 
4 Comments 
Now that we have proved algebraically the equivalency of the 
loss ratio and the pure premium methods in the entire ratemaking 
process (Le., both the overall rate change and also the change in rel-
ativities) if the appropriate data are used, a number of issues sur-
rounding the calculation of risk classification relativities disappear 
or are resolved. 
First, if the data requirements can be satisfied, then the loss 
ratio method and the pure premium method provide equivalent 
results. Therefore, there should be no need to discuss the advantages 
of one method over the other. They are equivalent given the appro-
priate data are available and used. To the extent that one cannot 
attain the data requirements, then one can see clearly what inade-
quacies will result because of the particular data one often is forced 
to use. 
For example, if in the loss ratio approach one uses collected 
earned premiums (or collected loss ratios, as Stern suggests, because 
they are readily available), this will result in an error to the extent 
that the collected earned premiums are not equal to earned premiums 
at the current rate level. If there have been some sizable changes in 
relativities in recent rate changes, then this will be a problem. If the 
relativities have not changed drastically over the last few rate 
changes, however, then there may not be much of a difference 
between collected earned premiums and earned premiums at current 
rate levels. (Note that overall rate changes are not of any conse-
quence at this stage; only the changes in classification relativities 
matter.) 
Also, this algebraic illustration shows exactly what is meant by 
Finger's base exposures. These are effective exposure units that are 
adjusted because of the heterogeneity of exposure distributions across 
the different rating parameters. The following illustration makes 
this clear. 
104 
Journal of Actuarial Practice Vol. 1, No.2, 1993 
5 Illustration 
Given the following information, and assuming the revised rates 
take effect July 1, 1993 for one year on one year policies, determine 
new rates for each of Class 1 and Class 2 and for each of Territory 1 
and Territory 2. (Class differentials will not change.) Use both the 
loss ratio and pure premium methods. The permissible loss ratio is 
0.600, and all data are fully credible. 
Territory 1 Territory 2 
Present Rates: 
Class 1 (Relativity) 100 (1.00) 200 (2.00) 
Class 2 (Relativity) 300(3.00) 600 (6.00) 
Collected Earned Premium 1,000,000 1,000,000 
Policy Year 1991 Incurred Losses 360,000 240,000 
Expected Effective Period Incurred 
Losses (Trended and Developed) 612,000 408,000 
Earned Exposure Units: 
Class 1 5,000 2,000 
Class 2 1,000 500 
The solution is given below for the loss ratio and pure premium 
methods. For each of the two methods, the rate change involves 
three stages: overall average rate change, change in relativities, and 
balance back. 
5.1 Loss Ratio Method 
5.1.1 Overall Average Rate Change 
For the loss ratio method, the actuary must calculate the earned 
premium at current rates. The accounting entry for collected earned 
premium is not the correct denominator, because it could contain 
earned premiums based on the rates in out-of-date rate manuals. 
The earned premium at current rates is calculated as 
= (100)(5,000) + (300)(1,000) + (200)(2,000) + (600)(500) 
= 1,500,000. 
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This produces an expected effective period loss ratio at current 
rates of: 
1,020,000 
= 1,500,000 = 0.680, 
which, with a permissible loss ratio of 0.600, leads to an indicated 
rate change of 
0.680 
= 0.600 - 1 = + 13.3 percent. 
5.1.2 Change in Relativities 
The given data allow for a territorial relativity change analysis 
but not a class relativity change analysis because loss data by class 
are not given. We are told that class relativities will remain the 
same and are asked to determine the indicated new relativities for 
Territories 1 and 2. 
For Territory 1 the earned premium at current rates equals: 
(100)(5000) + (300)(1000) = 800,000 
For Territory 2 the earned premium at current rates equals: 
(200)(2000) + (600)(500) = 700,000 
Existing Loss Ratio at Indicated 
Territory Differential Current Rates Differential 
1.00 :::=0.4500 1.0000 
2 2.00 240,000 _ 0 3429 700,000 - . g:~ (2.00) = 1.5238 
Note that as presented, the Territory 1 relativity has been left 
at 1.00, whereas the Territory 2 relativity has been reduced from 2.00 
to 1.5238. This suggests that the actuary could define the new rates 
as follows: 
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Class 1 
Class 2 
Territory 1 
113.33 
340.00 
Territory 2 
172.70 
518.09 
Vol. 1, No.2, 1993 
If this were done, however, the resulting rate increase would be less 
than the required +13.3 percent due to the off-balance created by the 
method used to change relativities. This is adjusted in the balance-
back step. 
5.1.3 Balance Back 
The existing average differential is equal to: 
(5,000)(1) + (1,000)(3) + (2,000)(2) + (500)(6) _ 17647 
8,500 -. . 
The proposed average differential is equal to: 
(5,000)(1) + (1,000)(3) + (2,000)(1.5238) + (500)(4.5714) 
8 500 = 1.5686. , 
The balance-back factor is calculated as: 
Existing average differential _ 1.7647 _ 11250 
Proposed average differential - 1.5686 -. , 
leading to the following proposed rates: 
Class 1 
Class 2 
Territory 1 
127.50 
382.50 
Territory 2 
194.28 
582.85 
These proposed rates will result in a 13.3 percent increase in premium 
income, as required. 
5.2 Pure Premium 
5.2.1 Overall Average Rate Change 
We know that the expected effective period incurred losses 
(developed and trended) equal 1,020,000, from which we find the 
indicated loss cost: 
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_ 1,020,000 _ 120 
- 8,500 -
and the average rate: 
120 120 
= PLR = 0.600 = 200.00. 
Loss Ratio and Pure Premium Methods 
Note that this is the indicated average gross rate. It is not the indi-
cated rate for any particular territory or class that will be deter-
mined when we know the new average relativity for the expected 
book of business. 
5.2.2 Change in Relativities 
To set the new territorial relativities, the actuary normally cal-
culates the average loss costs for Territory 1 and Territory 2 and com-
pares them as follows: 
Existing Loss Cost Indicated 
Territory Relativity per Unit Relativity 
1.00 f~=60 tOO 
2 2.00 240,000 _ 96 2,500 - 1.60 
This is not the same answer as we got from the loss ratio method. 
Remember that the pure premium method will be correct only if the 
heterogeneity of distributions of exposure units is accounted for. 
Recall the following earned exposure unit data: 
Class 1 
Class 2 
Territory 1 
5,000 
1,000 
Territory 2 
2,000 
500 
In Territory I, 5/6 of drivers are Class 1 and 1/6 are Class 2. In 
Territory 2, 4/5 of drivers are Class 1 and 1/5 are Class 2. To arrive 
at the correct answer, this heterogeneity of cross-variable distribu-
tions must be reflected. One way to accomplish this is to use exposure 
units that are weighted by their cross-parameter relativities. That 
is, Class 1 will count as an exposure unit with weight 1.00, but Class 
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2 will count as an exposure unit with weight 3.00, because of its class 
relativity of 3.00. This leads to the following results: 
Weighted Loss Cost per 
Territory 
Existing Units of Weighted Unit Indicated 
Relativity Exposure of Exposure Relativity 
1.00 8000 ~~=45.00 1.00, 
2 2.00 3500 2~~=68.57 1.5238 
5.2.3 Balance Back 
Finally, the actuary determines the rate for Territory 1 and Class 
1 that will produce all of the correct manual rates by balancing back 
for the average indicated relativity. That is: 
B 
Average rate 
ase rate = A 1 . . verage re ahvlty 
where the average rate is 200 and the average relativity is 
(5,000)(1) + (1,000)(3) + (2,000)(1.5238) + (500)(4.5714) 
8 500 = 1.5686. , 
This leads to 
200 
Base rate = 1.5686 = 127.50. 
The resulting manual rates are the same as with the loss ratio 
method, as expected. This gives us indicated rates where all calcula-
tions are based on existing relativities in the current rate manual and 
should be treated as a first iteration indicated relativity. These 
indicated relativities will be used in a second iteration (for example, 
to recalculate the premium at current rate levels in the loss ratio 
method) to arrive at a second iteration indication. This process soon 
converges to the final relativities. 
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Funding Methods and Pension Plan Amendments 
Keith P. Sharp* 
Abstract** 
This paper considers the treatment of plan amendments under the individual 
entry age normal and projected unit credit methods. Alternative treatments are consid-
ered, and comments are made about their acceptability. 
Key words: nometroaetive amendment, normal cost, entry age normal, projected unit credit 
1 Introduction 
It is common for a pension plan to be amended to improve benefits 
in respect of service after the date of amendment. This will be 
referred to as a nonretroactive amendment. The application of the 
entry age normal and projected unit credit cost methods to this situa-
tion requires that a decision be made about the way to handle such 
an amendment. This paper considers these two cost methods and their 
application to such an amendment. A retroactive improvement can be 
treated in a more straightforward manner and is not considered in 
this paper. 
The discussion of the entry age normal method is relevant to 
funding calculations under the Pensions Benefits Acts in Canada and 
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 
and Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Regulation Section 1.412 in the 
United States. The discussion of the projected unit credit method is 
relevant to funding calculations and pension expense calculations. 
Before developing the main results of this paper, it is important 
to introduce the notation used in the sequel. As there is no interna-
tionally accepted standard pension notation, we will follow, to a 
large extent, the notation used by Anderson (1992). 
* Keith Sharp is an associate professor in the department of statistics and actuarial 
science at the University of Waterloo. He is a fellow of the Society of Actuaries and 
has a Ph.D. in finance. 
** The author thanks anonymous referees for helpful comments and the Natural 
Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada for financial support. 
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j 
Ncht) 
x/t) 
Yj 
Bj(Yj) 
sj 
SXj 
= 
Label of an individual member of the plan; 
Normal cost for individual j at time t, paid at the begin-
ning of each year and expressed in dollars; 
Age on the first valuation date coinciding with or next 
following the date of participation assuming current par-
ticipation requirements always had been in effect; 
Age from which credited pensionable service is calcu-
lated, i.e., the entry age for individual j that determines 
the start of the period to which the benefit formula 
applies. In some cases the individual may join the plan 
after age Wj and be given retroactive pensionable service; 
Age at time t of individual j; 
Retirement age of individual j; 
Projected annual pension benefit of individual j from 
retirement at age Yj; 
Projected measure of final pay for individual j; and 
Salary scale for individual j at age Xj. 
2 Plan Amendments Under Individual Entry Age Normal 
2.1 Individual Entry Age Normal 
The individual entry age normal pension cost method is used in 
both the United States and Canada. There are two common forms of 
the method (Anderson, 1992, pp. 13-19; Trowbridge and Farr, 1976, pp. 
47-54; and Berin, 1989, p. 14). Under one form, the normal cost is 
expressed as a level dollar annual amount. This method is alterna-
tively known as the projected benefit cost method (with supplemental 
liability, constant amount) (Winklevoss, 1977), the entry age actuarial 
cost method, and the level dollar cost method (entry age, with 
supplemental liability) (McGill and Grubbs, 1989, p. 27). Under another 
form, the normal cost is expressed as a level percentage of salary. 
The latter method also is known as the projected benefit cost method 
(with supplemental liability, constant percentage) (Winklevoss, 1977), 
the entry age actuarial cost method, and the level percentage cost method 
(entry age, with supplemental liability), (McGill and Grubbs, 1989, p. 
327). 
Under the individual entry age normal method, the normal cost 
is found by taking an equation of value. The equation usually is taken 
on the first valuation date coinciding with or next following a mem-
ber's participation date, assuming current participation requirements 
always had been in effect. This age could be that at a date before 
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plan inception. The normal cost under the level dollar method, equa-
tion (I), is given from this equation of value by dividing both sides of 
the equation by the service-based annuity (Anderson, 1992, p. 13): 
. ..(12) ~ 1 
= BJ(Yj) ay 0 x .. -:-:--:l 
J Vj aV( Yj-Vj I 
(1) 
Under the level percentage of salary method (Anderson, 1992, p. 18), 
the annuity in the denominator of equation (1) takes the salary scale 
into account. The dollar normal cost is found by multiplying by the 
ratio of the salary scale factors: 
(2) 
The focus of this paper is the choice of a cost method variant 
that is acceptable and makes sense to a client on a plan amendment; 
this amounts to a discussion about the method of calculating BNy/ 
For simplicity it is assumed that all retirements occur at age Yj and 
that the only benefit is a retirement annuity. 
2.2 Plan Amendment 
We focus attention on BNYj). For the purpose of illustration, we 
will assume that the benefit is a fraction ra (e.g., ra = 0.01 or 0.02) of 
a projected measure Sf of final pay for each year of credited pension-
able service. The measure Sf will depend on the plan document defi-
nition of the pension benefit; Sf may be, for example, the average of 
the earnings in the final three years of service. Thus, prior (subscript 
p) to any possible plan amendments, we have: 
(3) 
From equations (1) and (2) we can see that two persons with the 
same entry age wand the same retirement age Y will have the same 
normal cost as a fraction of the measure of final salary. 
Now consider a situation where at a certain date, the benefit 
fraction ra is changed nonretroactively from ra to rl. Usually rl will 
exceed ra, although the funding methods discussed here apply math-
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ematically, if not in the view of regulators, also to the case where ro 
exceeds rl. One method is to spread the funding of the increase over 
the period from amendment to retirement, with no change in the 
amendment date actuarial liability; this is the individual level 
premium method as described by Anderson (1992, p. 25). Two of the 
possible methods of handling this situation under entry age normal 
are described below. 
2.3 Variant 1: EAN Total Service Spread 
For an individual j with pensionable service credited from age Wj 
and age at plan amendment Xj' one initially might assume that the 
projected benefit should be given by: 
(4) 
w here the subscript A indicates that the situation after the plan 
amendment is being considered and tA is the date of the amendment. 
This indicates that the normal cost for individual j, by equation (1) 
and (2), would increase under this EAN-total service spread method 
in the ratio 
EANNC~l 
EANNd 
P 
[ro(x/lA) - wi) + rl(Yi - X/lA))] 
ro(Y - Wj) 
(5) 
This ratio depends on the values of X/tA) and Wj. For example, for 
two members i and k with the same pensionable service commence-
ment dates (Wi = Wk) but differing ages at amendment (X/tA) :;t: Xk(tA),) 
the normal cost as a fraction of salary no longer will be the same as 
the fraction of the measure of final salary. Also, the increase in the 
normal cost is not the same ratio rl/rO as the increase in the benefit 
accumulation rate. 
It is instructive also to consider the effect on the actuarial liabil-
ity AL. At age x/l) prior to the plan amendment, the actuarial lia-
bility is the difference between the present values of future benefits 
and future normal costs: 
EAN ALj (x-(t)) - PVFBj - EANPVFNd (x·(t)) Pi - P Pi' (6) 
Immediately after the plan amendment at age X/tA) we have (noting 
that the future benefits should be those actually projected to be paid 
for both the constant dollar and constant percentage methods): 
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EANAL~(XPA)) = PVFB~l(XPA)) - EANPVFNC~l(XPA)) 
[rO(xi(tA) - wi) + rl(Yj - X/tA))] 
ro(y - Wj) 
x (PVF~(X/tA)) - EANPVFNC~(xitA))) 
Thus, the plan actuarial liability at the date of the amendment 
increases because of the amendment, although the benefit rate change 
is not retroactive. The proportionate increase in the actuarial liabil-
ity equals the proportionate increase in the projected benefit. This 
aspect may be difficult to explain to a client who is not an actuary. 
The increase in accrued liability results because the normal cost 
increases only by the same proportionate amount as the increase in 
projected benefit. If rl < ro then the accrued liability is reduced, 
which may be unacceptable to regulators. 
2.4 Variant 2: EAN Retroactive NC Mimic 
An alternative method of handling normal costs under a plan 
amendment is described in this section. It is used by some pension con-
sultants and gives results that are more acceptable than those 
described in the previous section. 
Under variant 2 (EAN retroactive NC mimic), the hypothetical 
projected benefit is used in calculating the normal cost under this ver-
sion of the entry age normal cost method. It is that projected benefit 
that would be applicable if the amended benefit rate were applied 
to all service: 
(8) 
Under this variant, the normal cost at any post-amendment time t for 
individual j increases under both the level dollar and level percent-
age methods in the ratio of the benefit rates. 
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NC~2(t) 
NC~(t) = 
r1 (Yj - Wj) _ r1 
ro (Yj - Wj) - ro 
(9) 
Under the individual entry age normal method the normal cost is not 
interpreted as being the cost of the benefit accrual for the year. 
Nonetheless, a proportional increase in normal cost equal to the pro-
portional increase in benefit rates is likely to be intuitively appeal-
ing to the client. 
Let us now consider the actuarial liability under variant 2. 
Immediately after the plan amendment, variant 2 is given for both 
the level dollar and level percentage methods by: 
Because the actual future benefits are the same for variants 1 and 2, 
PVFB~1(XjCtA» =: PVFB'A2(XjCtA». Then we note that PVFB~1(XjCtA» is 
related to PVFB~(X/fA» by the proportionate increase in the projected 
benefit. Also, the future normal cost increases in the ratio rJlro. 
Hence: 
EAN AL~2(X/tA» 
= [ro(X;CtA) - Wj) + r1 (Yj - X/tA» lnVFBj (x.(t » 
ro(Y - Wj) r- P J A 
(11) 
. (r r) . 
= EANAL' (X·(tA» + 1- a x PVFB' (X·(tA» x 
P J ro P , 
(12) 
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Appendix A shows that if rl > ro and if sDz is a decreasing function of 
Z, then: 
(13) 
For rl < ro, the actuarial liability is reduced by the amendment. 
The last term of equation (11) is likely to be small; the actuarial 
liability is changed little by the nonretroactive amendment. This is 
likely to make sense to a client. 
In the United States, IRe Regulation Section 1.412(c)(3)-1(c)(2) 
requires "If each actuarial assumption is exactly realized under a 
reasonable funding method, no experience gains or losses are pro-
d uced." This condition is satisfied by variant 2, as indicated in 
Appendix B. 
2.5 Variant 3: EAN/ILP 
A third method of handling the plan amendment under entry age 
normal is to use the individual level premium (ILP) method. This 
usually is regarded as a cost method in its own right; here it will be 
regarded more as a variant of entry age normal. The terminology 
EANjILP will be used. 
Under variant 3, the nonretroactive benefit increase at tA is 
funded over the period from Xj (t A) to Yj- Hence the normal cost after 
the amendment is given by: 
(14) 
and the actuarial liability at an age x/t), t;::: tA is 
117 
Keith P. Sharp Funding Methods and Pension Plan Amendments 
(15) 
Immediately following the amendment, the actuarial liability is 
found by substituting t = tA in equation (15): 
EANAL~3(XjUA)) = PVFB~(XjCtA)) - PVFNC~(XjCtA)) 
= EAN AL~(XjCtA))' (16) 
Thus, as is arranged by construction of variant 3, the actuarial 
liability at the time of the amendment is unchanged by the amend-
ment. Considering equations (9) and (13), it is evident that the nor-
mal cost under variant 3 must increase at the amendment by more 
than the ratio by which it increases for variant 2 for fl > fa : 
EANNC~3(X/tA)) 
EANNd (X·(tA)) p ] 
(17) 
This behavior compares with the fl/fO proportionate increase in 
normal cost under equation (9) (variant 2, the EAN retroactive NC 
mimic). Which is more acceptable may depend on the perceived rela-
tive importance of the behavior of the normal cost and of the actuar-
ial liability. 
3 Plan Amendments Under Projected Unit Credit 
3.1 Projected Unit Credit 
The projected unit credit method commonly is used, partly because 
the accounting bodies of both Canada and the United States require 
that it be used in calculating the pension expense to be entered in the 
employer's financial statements (CICA,l 1986, Section 3460.28; 
1 CICA refers to the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants. 
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FASB,21990; SFAS3 87, paragraph 40 and SFAS 106). Partly as a 
result, most Canadian and United States pension plans are valued for 
funding purposes using this method. The method is described under 
the names projected unit credit (Anderson, 1992, p. 152; Berin, 1989, p. 
119), prorate accrued benefit (Trowbridge and Farr, 1976, p. 40), accrued 
benefit cost method (constant amount) (Winklevoss, 1977, p. 78), or 
projected accrued benefit cost method (McGill and Grubbs, 1989, p. 291). 
Under the service prorate version of the projected unit credit 
method, the projected retirement age pension is allocated pro rata 
over years of pensionable service. Thus, BNx/t)) is based on pay pro-
jected to retirement and service accrued to age Xj. The normal cost is 
the present value of the current year's benefit allocation. The actuar-
ial liability is the present value of the benefit allocated to the date 
of valuation at which the age is Xj nearest BNxjY. It is assumed that 
the date of valuation corresponds to the beginning of a plan year. 
Hence, the normal cost for the plan year for individual j is given by: 
(18) 
and the actuarial liability by: 
PUCALNt) = Bj(x-(t)) ii~12) DYi . 
] J Dx.(t) 
J 
(19) 
3.2 Plan Amendment 
Prior to the plan amendment at tA but at the attained age X/tA) 
of individual j at the time of the valuation we have: 
(20) 
Again consider a nonretroactive increase at age X/tA) of the benefit 
fraction from ra to rl. Two possible methods of handling this situation 
are described next. 
2 FASB refers to the Financial Accounting Standards Board. 
3 SFAS refers to Statement of Financial Accounting Standards. 
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3.3 Variant 1: PUC Service Weighting 
The plan document gives a definition of accrued benefit that may 
be used in obeying vesting legislation; this accrued benefit may be 
based on the salary at attained age x/t)o 
Under variant 1 with rl > ro, we assume instead that the benefit 
accrued up to age xP) is given by the fractional method: 
The normal cost for the year following age x/t), where t ? tA, would 
increase in the ratio: 
PUCNc!Al(XjCt)) 
PUCN~(x/t)) 
rO(Xj(tA) - Wj) + rl(Yj - Xj(tA)) 
rO(Yj - Wj) 
(22) 
This contrasts with the ratio rl / ro, which is more natural if one 
regards the benefit as accruing at a rate ro, before the effective date 
of the amendment and at a rate rl afterward instead of using the 
fractional method. 
The accrued liability under the fractional method at age X/tA) 
increases, because of the amendment, in the same ratio: 
PUC Ar!Al(XjCt)) 
PUCA~(x/t)) 
rO(Xj(tA) - Wj) + rl(Yj - X/tA)) 
rO(Yj - Wj) 
(23) 
This increase in actuarial liability is somewhat counterintuitive in a 
situation where the benefit accrued up to age Xj(tA) can be regarded as 
being unchanged. 
In the case ro < rl, the normal cost and the actuarial liability are 
both decreased by the amendment. 
3.4 Variant 2: PUC Accruals Weighting 
Under variant 2, the benefit is assumed accrued at a rate ro, for 
service before the amendment and rl for service afterward. It thus 
differs from variant 2 of the entry age method. Thus: 
(24) 
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and the actuarial liability is unchanged: 
(25) 
The normal cost at time t, t etA, increases (or decreases if rO < rl) in 
the expected ratio because the variant 2 accrued benefit increases as: 
Hence 
PUCNc!A2(X/t)) 
PUCN4(x/t)) 
B~2(xi(t) + 1) - B~2(x;Ct)) 
B~(xjU) + 1) - B~(x/t)) 
(27) 
This variant gives results that might be expected by a client. In 
the United States, variant 2 usually is required for calculation of 
pension expense under SFAS 106 and SFAS 87 (Financial Accounting 
Standards Board, 1990, paragraph 40, footnote 8). Paragraph 40 of 
SFAS 87 states that" ... pension benefits ordinarily should be based 
on the plan's benefit formula to the extent that the formula states or 
implies an attribution." Footnote 8 has" ... benefit of 1 percent of 
final pay for each year of service up to 20 years and 1.5 percent of 
final pay for years of service in excess of 20 ... the attribution ... will 
not assign the same amount of pension benefit for each year of ser-
vice." If the plan document defines the benefit accrual on a fractional 
basis, as in equation (21), then variant 1 is acceptable. 
In Canada, the requirements are less clear. The Canadian 
Institute of Chartered Accountants (1986, paragraph 3460.28) states 
"the cost of pension benefits ... should be determined using the pro-
jected benefit method prorated on services." 
The United States IRC Regulation Section 1.412(c)(3)-1(e)(3) dis-
cusses the allocation of projected benefits between past and future 
years. Example (5) of IRC Regulation Section 1.412(c)(3)-1(g) indi-
cates variant 2 (PUC accruals weighting) to be the acceptable 
method for funding purposes when the plan document defines the 
accrued benefit according to equation (26) rather than according to 
the fractional equation (21). This variant also satisfies the zero gain 
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condition of IRe Regulation Section 1.412(c)(3)-1(c)(2), as is shown in 
Appendix C. 
4 Conclusion 
This paper discusses the use of the individual entry age normal 
and projected unit credit pension funding methods in the presence of a 
nonretroactive increase in the benefit accrual rate. In the case of both 
funding methods, it is recommended that the cost method be handled 
in such a way that the normal cost increases in the same proportion 
as the increase in the benefit accrual rate. Alternative methods are 
discussed, however, that may be more acceptable to some actuaries. 
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Appendix A-Entry Age Normal, Variant 2 (EAN 
Retroactive NC Mimic), Proof of Decrease of Actuarial 
Liability at Amendment 
and assume that sN x is a decreasing function of x. Then 
SN sN sN -SN 
ji(x + 1) -ji(x) = x+l - 1{ _ x 1{ y-x-l y-x 
_ (y - X)SNH l - (y - x -1)(SNHl + SOx) - sN1{ 
- (y - x - 1)(y - x) 
SNH l - (y - x -1)sOx - sN1{ 
(y - x -1)(y - x) 
= (SOHl - SOx) + (SOHZ - SO) + ... + ( s01{_l _SOx) 
(y - x - 1)(y - x) 
~o (l.A) 
with equality only if sOx = sOz for x + 1 ~ z ~ y - 1. Because Wj < 
XjCtA), equation (12) gives us 
EANA~Z(XPA)) = EANAL~(XjCtA)) 
(rl - roY PVFBj ( .Ct)) (Yj - XjCtA)) 
+ ro P xl A x sN _ sN 
Wj Yj 
using the decreasing nature of j(x) from equation (1.A) and assuming rl 
> roo 
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Appendix B-Entry Age Normal, Variant 2 (EAN 
Retroactive NC Mimic), Proof of Zero Gain 
The notation used is 
PL 
A 
G(t) 
F(t) 
UALPL(t) 
For the whole plan; 
The set of actives (see Anderson, 1992, p. 9); 
= Gain in year t to t+ 1; 
= Valuation interest rate; 
Fund value at time t; 
Unfunded at time t, UALPL(t) = ALPL(t) - F(t) 
Actual contributions in the year t to t+ 1; CW 
JeW = Interest to time t+1 at the assumed rate i on the con-
tributions C(t). 
For simplicity, assume that the membership consists only of 
actives who will be below retirement age at the end of the year. 
Assume that the only benefit is on retirement. Use the standard for-
mula for the gain (see, e.g., Anderson, 1992, p. 20). Assume, following 
IRe Regulation Section 1.412(c)(3)-1(c)(2), that "each actuarial 
assumption is exactly realized," so that for example 
F(t + 1) - (C(t) + Je(t) - F(t))(l + i) = O. (l.B) 
Then the gain in a year t, after the amendment, t ::? tA, is given by 
G(t) = (EANUAL~~(t) + EANNC~~(t))(1 + i) - (C(t) + J/t) 
( 
PL A PL) . = EANALA2(t) - F(t) + E NNCA2(t) (1 + I) - (C(t) + JeW) 
- (EANAL~~(t +1) - Fa + 1)) 
= F(t + 1) - (C(t) + Je(t)) - F(t)(1 + i) + 
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-1?ANAL~2(XjU + 1)) 
1+1 
- j EAN[pVFB~2(XP+1))-PVF(EANNC~2(X/t+1)))] 
1+1 
= O. (2.B) 
In the above has been used the assumption that decrements, 
which reduce At at time t to At+l at time t+1, give At+l as a propor-
tion 
of At. 
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Appendix C-Projected Unit Credit, Variant 2 (PUC 
Accruals Weighting), Proof of Zero Gain 
Use notation and assumptions as for Appendix B. Then the gain in 
the year starting at time t is given (Anderson, 1992, p. 13) using equa-
tion (1.B) by 
G(t) = (pUCUAL~~(t) + PUCNc&~(t))(1 + i) 
- (C(t) + iC(t)) - PUCUAL~~(t + 1) 
= t-(PUC AriA2(XjU)) - PUCNC~2(XjU)))(1 +0 
1 
- ~ PUCAriA2(XjU + 1)) 
1+1 
=0 
where again the set At reduces after a year to At+l at the assumed 
proportion (1 - qXj(t»). 
Keith P. Sharp 
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Estimating the Effect of Statutory Changes on 
Insured Casualty Losses Using Generalized 
Indicator Variables 
Ruy A. Cardoso* 
Abstract 
Techniques for estimating future insured losses in casualty insurance typically 
assume consistency in the insurance environment over time. Statutory changes, however, 
can create sharp discontinuities in the loss-generating process, complicating the estima-
tion of those losses. Using indicator variables and dummy variables allows for quan-
tification of the effect of such discontinuities. Three examples from private passenger 
automobile insurance are presented to illustrate how these variables can be used. 
Key words and phrases: dummy variables, linear regression, tort threshold, coverage 
stackil1g, coverage trigger, coverage limits 
1 Introduction 
Estimation of future insured losses in casualty insurance often is 
based on an examination of the past patterns of those losses over 
time. Usually a linear or exponential relationship between losses and 
time is postulated as a starting point. Under this traditional actuar-
ial approach, a further implicit assumption is that the insured losses 
are generated by an underlying process that changes smoothly .. 
Statutory changes, however, can create discontinuities in the loss-
generating process that must be accounted for properly in estimating 
future losses. This paper explains and illustrates a simple method of 
accounting for such discontinuities after they have occurred. 
Specifically, the method uses generalized forms of the linear regres-
sion variables known as indicator (or dummy) variables. Section 2 
describes the most common actuarial method of estimating future 
losses in the absence of such discontinuities, while Section 3 provides 
* Ruy Cardoso, FCAS, MAAA, currently is vice president and chief actuary of the 
Automobile Insurers Bureau of Massachusetts where he represents the Massachusetts 
automobile insurance industry in regulatory hearings concerning insurance rates. Mr. 
Cardoso previously has held consulting and insurance company positions whose pri-
mary focus was the analysis of casualty insurance loss reserves. He graduated from the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1983 with an S.B. in management science. 
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some background on indicator variables. Section 4 provides several 
specific examples of the generalized indicator variable approach 
using Massachusetts private passenger automobile insurance data, and 
Section 5 briefly summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of 
this approach. 
2 Traditional Estimation of Future Losses 
For simplicity, the discussion below assumes that the quantity of 
interest in the estimation procedures is the pure premium or the 
average insured loss per unit of insurance exposure. For private pas-
senger automobile insurance, the unit of insurance exposure is gener-
ally a car-year, i.e., a single car insured for one year. The two most 
common models used to estimate future pure premiums assume either a 
linear or an exponential relationship between pure premiums (Y) and 
time (T), as shown in equations (1) and (2): 
Y = a + bT (1) 
(2) 
where a and b are constants (McClenahan, 1990). These two models 
often are based on economic indices rather than time and frequently 
include adjustments for autocorrelation (Cummins and Derrig, 1993). 
For simplicity in explaining the indicator variable approach, the 
remainder of this paper focuses on equation (1). Equation (2) some-
times is called log-linear because it can be transformed into equation 
(1) by taking logs. Once equation (2) is transformed, indicator vari-
ables also can be applied in a manner similar to that in equation (1). 
The interpretation of the quantities discussed below, however, would 
be different in the transformed case. 
In practice, the time variable used in equation (1) is discrete, 
most often the accident year (the year in which the accident generat-
ing the loss occurred) associated with each loss. Further, the tradi-
tional method does not rely on individual losses. It works instead 
with aggregate pure premiums, in this case for each accident year. 
Thus, equation (1) simply says that pure premiums change by a con-
stant dollar amount per year. Future pure premiums are estimated by 
assuming that the estimated annual change will continue into the 
future, although practicing actuaries often will modify the equation's 
results if its underlying assumptions are too strict. 
It is not necessary to attribute the estimated pure premium 
change to specific causes, although blind application of the model 
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may lead to unreasonable results, especially if the random component 
of the loss-generating process is high. Pure premiums are not a direct 
(causal) function of the time variable; time is intended as a proxy for 
the many unspecified factors that determine pure premiums. This 
lack of causal explanation, however, is common to many possible 
methods of estimating future pure premiums. For example, one may 
use a Box-Jenkins1 time series model (an approach widely used in non-
actuarial settings) to relate the pure premium for a given accident 
year to pure premiums for past accident years and/ or to past random 
errors, not to any underlying causal variables. The primary reason for 
using the time proxy is that, in practice, the number of available 
pure premium data points is usually too small to perform meaningful 
analyses of causal relationships (or, for that matter, Box-Jenkins 
analysis). 
Whatever the underlying causal variables are, equation (1) 
implicitly assumes that they will behave smoothly over time. When 
there is a significant underlying change in the smoothness of the loss-
generating process, the model is likely to produce poor estimates, 
making it necessary to deal with such discontinuities in some reason-
able way. While the subjective adjustments frequently used in prac-
tice (for example, adjustment of data before the change to a 
postchange basis) may be appropriate in certain situations, the use of 
generalized indicator variables provides a more objective approach. 
3 Background on Indicator Variables 
An indicator random variable usually is defined with respect to 
the occurrence or non-occurrence of an event. Thus, if A is an event and 
I(A) is the indicator random variable of A, then 
if A occurs 
otherwise. 
In this paper, A is assumed to be an event (a change in the environ-
ment) that affects the pure premium. (See Miller and Wichern (1977) 
for a brief discussion of indicator variables in linear regression analy-
sis.) Incorporation of indicator variables into equation (1) produces 
the model shown in equation (3): 
1 For a detailed description of the Box-Jenkins time series model and analysis, see Box 
and Jenkins (1970). For a brief introductory treatment, however, see Wheelwright and 
Makridakis (1985). 
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111 
Y = a + bT + ~ Ci I/Ai) 
1=1 
(3) 
where m is the number of indicator variables used, Ci, i = 1,2, ... , m 
are constants, and Ii is the indicator variable for the ith change. Table 
1 illustrates the results of such a model when m = 1, a = $100, b = 
$10, c1 = $5, 11 = ° for T:::; 3, and 11 = 1 for T ;:::: 4. Here A is the event 
{T;:::: 4}. 
TABLE 1 
Hypothetical Pure Premium Model 
T y Change in Pure Premium Indicator 
1 $110 $10 0 
2 $120 $10 0 
3 $130 $10 0 
4 $145 $15 1 
5 $155 $10 1 
6 $165 $10 1 
Under equation (3), the indicator variable can be thought of as an 
on-off switch that reflects some change in the environment at and 
beyond T = 4. In a sense, a model using such a variable has one foot in 
the world of causal explanation. 
It is not necessary for an indicator variable to be strictly zero-one, 
however. The terms generalized indicator variables and dummy vari-
ables are used interchangeably in this paper to reflect more general 
forms. Many changes in an environment are more analogous to a dim-
mer switch than to a simple on-off switch. That is, they occur gradu-
ally rather than all at once. McDowall, et al. (1980) describe the use 
of generalized indicator variables (or intervention components in their 
terminology) in Box-Jenkins time series analysis. The applications 
below will illustrate both the zero-one case and more general cases in 
the context of linear regressions against time, using statutory changes 
affecting private passenger automobile insurance as examples. 
4 Specific Applications: Private Passenger Automobile 
Insurance 
Permanent statutory changes in the insurance environment can 
have at least three effects on accident year pure premium data: 
a) Single step, reflecting a change that is completely effective in a 
specified accident year and all subsequent accident years. 
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b) Two step (or, more generally, multiple step), reflecting a change 
that is partially effective in a specified accident year and com-
pletely effective in all subsequent accident years. 
c) Infinite step, reflecting a change that is partially effective in a 
specified accident year and increasingly effective in all subse-
quent accident years, but never completely effective. 
The first effect can be modeled using the simple zero-one indicator 
variable, the second using an indicator variable that takes values 
between zero and one, and the third using an indicator variable that 
takes values greater than one. 
4.1 The Single Step Case 
An example of a single step statutory change in private passenger 
automobile insurance is a change in the tort threshold, the level of 
injuries that must be sustained before a person injured in an automo-
bile accident can sue for pain and suffering damages. Certain states 
have no restrictions on the right to sue (Le., there is no tort thresh-
old), while those states where a no-fault system exists have either a 
qualitative threshold (usually referred to as a verbal threshold) or a 
monetary threshold (usually measured by medical costs). In the state 
of Massachusetts the current tort threshold is a monetary one. That 
is, the medical costs of the injuries sustained in an accident must 
exceed a fixed dollar amount before a suit for pain and suffering can 
be filed. On January I, 1989 this threshold was raised from $500 to 
$2,000 for all accidents occurring on or after January I, 1989. It follows 
that: 
I = {~ if accident year ~ 1989 otherwise. 
Table 2 displays the accident year pure premiums for the bodily 
injury liability (BIL) coverage for the accident years 1984-1992. 
(Losses are limited to basic limits and developed to ultimate values.) 
Figure 1 displays the values in graphical form. 
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TABLE 2 
Ultimate Bil Basic Limits Pure Premiums by Accident Year 
AccYear T Bil Pure Premium Change in Pure Premium Indicator 
1984 1 $71.01 NA 0 
1985 2 $80.28 $9.27 0 
1986 3 $85.70 $5.42 0 
1987 4 $95.35 $9.65 0 
1986 5 $102.00 $6.65 0 
1989 6 $99.01 ($2.99) 1 
1990 7 $110.23 $11.22 1 
1991 8 $125.64 $15.41 1 
1992 9 $140.78 $15.14 1 
Figure 1 
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As both Table 2 and Figure 1 show, pure premiums rose steadily 
over the accident years 1984-1992 except in accident year 1989, the 
year in which the tort threshold was raised. As had been expected, 
raising the threshold reduces the pure premiums for the bodily injury 
liability coverage. An estimate of how much the pure premiums were 
reduced can be obtained using linear regression of the pure premiums 
against both the accident years and an indicator variable that is 
assigned the value of zero in accident years 1984-1988 and the value 
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of one in accident years 1989-1992. The regression results are shown in 
equation (4). 
PP = 57.39 + 9.83 x T - 12.19 x I (4) 
where PP denotes pure premium, T denotes accident year (with 1984 
considered year I), and I denotes the indicator variable. Fitted val-
ues according to this equation also are displayed in Figure 1. The 
interpretation of equation (4) is that pure premiums are rising at 
$9.83 per year and that the change in the tort threshold reduces pure 
premiums by $12.19 from what they otherwise would have been 
(although the t-statistic for the coefficient of the indicator variable 
is not significantly different from zero under the usual significance 
levels). Future pure premiums in the presence of the higher tort 
threshold can be estimated using the above equation and holding the 
indicator variable at its postchange value of one. Naturally, the use 
of fewer data points will result in different estimates. This model's 
residuals indicate serial correlation of the errors, although the serial 
correlation might disappear if the infinite step model described in 
Section 4.3 were used. Analysis of residuals, however, is not a topic 
for this paper. Equation (4) simply serves to show how a zero-one 
indicator variable can be applied. 
4.2 The Two-Step Case 
Because private passenger automobile insurance policies are writ-
ten throughout a given calendar year, the policy that covers an acci-
dent occurring in a particular accident year may have been written in 
that year or in the prior year. A change in the terms of the policy, 
therefore, will not affect all accidents occurring in a given year, only 
those covered by policies written after the change. In other words, a 
policy change will have only a partial effect on the accident year in 
which the change is made. 
At the same time the tort threshold was raised in Massachusetts, 
another pair of statutory changes led to just this effect. A stacking 
provision (which determines whether policy limits from multiple 
policies in the same household can be combined) and a trigger provi-
sion (which determines the conditions under which coverage applies) 
were both modified in a way that was expected to reduce pure pre-
miums. These modifications only applied to uninsured/underinsured 
motorists (UM/UIM) coverages, which pay for injuries in which a 
driver has insufficient bodily injury liability insurance (if any) to 
cover an insurance claim arising from an accident he or she caused. 
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Prior to January I, 1989, households with more than one UM/UIM 
policy, under certain circumstances, could combine (stack) the limits 
of all of those policies to cover a single accident, in effect multiply-
ing the limit on each policy by the number of policies in the house-
hold (if the limits were the same for each policy). This ability to 
combine limits was removed for policies written on or after January I, 
1989, reducing aggregate losses paid from what they otherwise would 
have been. 
The change in the trigger provision works as follows. Losses paid 
under the UM/UIM coverages were unaffected by the limits of an at-
fault driver's bodily injury liability insurance until January I, 1989. 
Policies written on or after that date, however, only pay losses up to 
the difference in limits between the UM/UIM coverage, and the at-
fault driver's bodily injury liability limits. (That is, an additional 
constraint must be satisfied before the coverage is triggered.) 
Because of the effective date of these changes, they were only 
partially effective in accident year 1989 but completely effective in 
all subsequent accident years. Based on the distribution of inception 
dates for policies written in Massachusetts, about 65 percent of the 
accidents occurring in accident year 1989 were covered by the modi-
fied policy.2 Table 3 displays the accident year pure premiums for 
the UM/UIM coverages for the accident years 1984-1992. (Losses are 
limited to basic limits and developed to ultimate values.) Figure 2 
displays the values in graphical form. 
TABLE 3 
Ultimate UM/UIM Basic Limits Pure Premiums by Accident Year 
UM/UIM Change in 
Acc Year T Pure Premium Pure Premium Indicator 
1984 1 $18.91 NA 0 
1985 2 $23.83 $4.92 0 
1986 3 $26.91 $3.08 0 
1987 4 $29.40 $2.49 0 
1988 5 $33.56 $4.16 0 
1989 6 $20.91 ($12.65) 0.65 
1990 7 $17.50 ($3.41) 1 
1991 8 $19.27 $1.77 1 
1992 9 $20.20 $0.93 1 
2 The losses paid under the UMjUIM coverages also should have been affected by the 
chan!;ie in the tort threshold, but to a far lesser degree than they were affected by the 
stacking and trigger changes. 
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Figure 2 
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As both Table 3 and Figure 2 show, pure premiums rose steadily 
over the accident years 1984-1992 except in accident years 1989 and 
1990, the two years over which the modified stacking and trigger 
provisions became effective. As expected, the two changes reduce the 
pure premiums for the UMjUIM coverages. An estimate of how much 
the pure premiums were reduced can be obtained using linear regres-
sion of the pure premiums against both the accident years and a gen-
eralized indicator variable (dummy variable) I that is assigned the 
value of zero in accident years 1984-1988, the value of 0.65 in accident 
year 1989, and the value of one in accident years 1990-1992, i.e., 
{
o if T = I, 2, 3, 4, 5 
I = 0.65 if T = 6 
1 if T ~ 7. 
The regression results are shown in equation (5): 
PP = 17.14 + 3.13 x T - 23.17 x I (5) 
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where PP denotes pure premium, T denotes accident year (with 1984 
considered year I), and I denotes the dummy variable. Fitted values 
according to this equation also are displayed on Figure 2. The inter-
pretation of equation (5) is that pure premiums are rising at $3.13 per 
year and that the stacking and trigger modifications reduce pure 
premiums by $23.17 from what they otherwise would have been. As 
the indicator variable for accident year 1989 is 0.65, the reduction in 
that year was not the full value of $23.17, however; it was instead a 
partial value of (0.65 x $23.17) or $15.06. Future pure premiums 
under the modified stacking and trigger provisions can be estimated 
using the above equation and holding I=1. Again, the use of fewer 
data points will result in different estimates. Despite the two step 
nature of the discontinuity in this case, the functional form of the 
equation is the same as that of equation (4). Both are simply special 
cases of the general equation (3). 
It is important to note, however, that the two step case described 
above also could be modeled using two zero-one indicator variables, 
the first changing to one in 1989 and the second changing to one in 
1990. While the results of such a model would be similar to the 
results produced by equation (5) (due to the close fit), they would 
. come at the cost of a degree of freedom and a less apparent model 
structure. It is easy to grasp the concept of a partial effect by seeing a 
generalized indicator variable with a value of 0.65, and it is clear in 
this instance that the 0.65 value has an objective basis rather than 
one that only pretends not to steal a degree of freedom. 
4.3 The Infinite-Step Case 
Certain changes in the insurance environment not only shift the 
relationship between pure premiums and time but also change the 
slope of the relationship. This type of effect can be modeled using 
two generalized indicator variables, the first the usual zero-one type 
and the second comprising a series of infinitely increasing values. The 
particular change in Massachusetts that can be modeled this way 
occurred at the same time as the change in the tort threshold and 
was effective for all accidents occurring in accident year 1989 and sub-
sequent years (despite contrary policy language). Specifically, the 
coverage limit of the personal injury protection (PIP) coverage 
increased from $2,000 to $8,000 on January I, 1989. This coverage pays 
for injuries regardless of fault and therefore also is known as no-fault 
coverage. 
Because many of the claims paid under the PIP coverage reached 
the $2,000 limit in the years before the limit was increased, claim 
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cost inflation only could affect a subset of all claims. Increasing the 
limit to $8,000, however, allows those claims previously constrained 
by the limit to reflect the effects of claim cost inflation, in turn 
allowing the aggregate pure premiums for the PIP coverage to reflect 
inflation more completely and thus increase more quickly (i.e., with 
a greater slope). While it is possible that increasing the tort thresh-
old also may have a slope-changing effect on BIL coverage (see 
Section 4.1), the PIP limit change serves as a much clearer illustra-
tion. 
If we denote the slope of the pure premium line under the $2,000 
limit as b, the size of the discontinuity created by the statutory 
change as Cl, and the slope of the pure premium line under the $8,000 
limit as C2 (where c2 is expected to be greater than b), then pure pre-
miums over time can be modeled as follows: 
{
a + bT for T :::; 5 
pp = a + bT + Cl for T = 6 
a + 6b + cl + c2(T-6) for T ~ 7. 
(6A) 
While this is a natural way to model the PIP pure premiums over 
time, equation (6A) does not fit into the general equation (3). In order 
to transform equation (6A) into a specific instance of equation (3), it 
is necessary to redefine c2 as the difference between the post-1989 
slope and the pre-1989 slope (where the difference is expected to be 
positive) and adopt the following pair of generalized indicator vari-
ables: 
if T:::; 5 
if T ~ 6 
and 
{
o 
12 = 
(T-6) 
if T :::; 6 
if T ~ 7. 
Equation (6A) can be recast as: 
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{
a + bT for T ::; 5 
pp = a + bT + Cl for T = 6 
a + bT + cl + c2(T-6) for T :2 7, 
(6B) 
with equation (6B) being a specific instance of equation (3): 
(6C) 
Table 4 below displays the accident year pure premiums for the 
PIP coverage for the accident years 1984 to 1992 (again developed to 
ultimate values); Figure 3 displays the values in graphical form. 
TABLE 4 
Ultimate PIP Pure Premiums by Accident Year 
Acc PIP Pure Change in Indicator Indicator 
Year T Premium Pure Premium #1 #2 
1984 1 $12.98 NA 0 0 
1985 2 $14.97 $1.99 0 0 
1986 3 $15.92 $0.95 0 0 
1987 4 $17.61 $1.69 0 0 
1988 5 $19.63 $2.02 0 0 
1989 6 $36.03 $16.40 1 0 
1990 7 $39.81 $3.78 1 1 
1991 8 $43.39 $3.58 1 2 
1992 9 $48.33 $4.94 1 3 
As both Table 4 and Figure 3 show, pure premiums rose steadily over 
accident years 1984 through 1988, jumped sharply at accident year 
1989, and rose more steeply over accident years 1990 though 1992 (as 
expected). An estimate of how much the pure premium line was 
shifted and steepened because of the change in limit can be obtained 
using linear regression of the pure premiums against both the accident 
years and the two indicator variables displayed in Table 4 above. 
The regression results are shown in equation (7). 
PP = 11.44 + 1.59 x T + 14.S1 X II + 2.45 X I2 (7) 
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where PP again denotes pure premium, T denotes accident year, and II 
and 12 denote the indicator variables. Fitted values according to this 
equation are displayed on Figure 3. The interpretation of equation (7) 
is that pure premiums were rising at $1.59 per year, increased $14.81 
as a result of the change in the PIP coverage limit (because 11=1 in 
1989), and now are rising at $4.04 per year, where $4.04 equals the 
Figure 3 
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prechange slope of $1.59 plus the postchange increment of $2.45 (the 
coefficient of 12)' Future pure premiums under the $8,000 PIP coverage 
limit can be estimated by using the above equation, holding II 
constant at its value of one and moving 12 up one for each year beyond 
accident year 1989. 
Relative to the single step and two step cases, this case has cost 
another degree of freedom. But in this situation an additional quan-
tity is being estimated, specifically the postchange slope, making 
the cost an appropriate one to pay. Further, the model structure is 
reasonably apparent. While other approaches could be used to model 
the infinite step case, the one used here strikes the best balance 
between clarity and degrees of freedom. 
5 Summary of the Approach 
As illustrated above, generalized indicator variables can be used 
to model a variety of different time series discontinuities in private 
passenger automobile insurance. While the examples above have 
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been restricted to permanent statutory changes, the approach can be 
extended easily to temporary changes as well as to other lines of 
insurance. This flexibility is a key advantage of the approach, as is 
its ability to let the data speak for themselves. Alternative 
approaches, such as adjusting all data to a postdiscontinuity basis, 
can work in the single step case above, but such an alternative is 
likely to be more subjective than the generalized indicator variable 
approach. 
On the other hand, a too-complicated set of indicator variables 
could be used to mask the occasional tendency to force a preordained 
conclusion. Further, the use of multiple indicator variables easily 
could lead to overfitting, especially in the common situation where 
only a small number of data points is available. Such pitfalls should 
not blind the actuary to the usefulness of the generalized indicator 
variable approach. As with any model-building exercise, the value 
of indicator variables as a tool will rise with the care taken in using 
them. 
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Life Insurance Applications of Recursive Formulas 
L. Timothy Giles· 
AbstracF 
This paper discusses several practical applications of recursive formulas: 
a) Traditional whole life-As an introduction, the well-known relationship between 
successive terminal reserves is reviewed. Recursive formulas are developed to cal-
culate the reserves and the premiums; 
b) Universal life-Recursive formulas are used both for the calculation of target 
premiums and reserves. Consideration is given to the TEFRA corridor; 
c) Paid-up rider-A participating single premium rider that provides a level death 
benefit can be devised using an inherent one year term benefit. Recursive functions 
are used to determine the premium that precisely matures the rider. 
Because the APL programming language is particularly amenable to recursive for-
mulas, a few sample APL programs are provided. 
Key words: APL, TEFRA corridor, universal life, paid-up rider 
1 Introduction 
A recursive formula is one where the current result is generated 
from previous results once the starting values are given. Essentially, 
a recursive formula is a difference equation with known starting val-
ues. Some formulas are special linear difference equations that, when 
added, condense to the first and last values of the recursion. Thus, if 
the starting value is known (usually zero), the ending value (usually 
the maturity amount) and all the intermediate values can be derived 
easily. 
* 1. Timothy Giles, FSA, MAAA is an actuary at Farm Family Life Insurance 
Company, Albany, New York. He began his actuarial career as a summer student at 
New York Life Insurance Company while majoring in mathematics at Holy Cross 
College. He has worked at six other life insurance companies during his thirty year 
career. 
1 This paper is an extension of the author's paper entitled "The Practical Use of 
Recursive Functions" that appeared in ARCH, 1993.3. 
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Actuaries are familiar with such formulas, especially in the area 
of reserve and asset share calculations; see, for example, Jordan 
(1991) and Bowers et al. (1986). Shiu (1987) and Seah and Shiu (1987) 
elegantly present recursive formulas in their discussions of papers by 
Berin and Lofgren (1987) and Eckley (1987), respectively. 
My interest in recursive formulas began in 1985 with the problem 
of finding the target premium for universal life policies. What level 
deposit (along with credited interest and mortality and expense 
charges) would mature the policy exactly? At that time I used trial 
and error to obtain the target premiums. A much better method, how-
ever, later was published by Eckley (1987).2 What these pioneers 
discovered is that by defining a transformed mortality rate Q'=Q/(Q 
+ I), the traditional commutation functions could be used (with Q' 
replacing Q) to calculate premiums and account values directly. These 
modified commutation functions are called transformation functions. 
When the accumulation formula changes due to the TEFRA3 cor-
ridor (if the cash value becomes too high in relation to the death 
benefit, a higher minimum death benefit is invoked), however, a dif-
ferent formula for Q' must be used. One, theoretically, could switch 
functions at the duration of change. I believe, however, that recur-
sive formulas offer a better solution. Recursive formulas also can be 
used to perform the intricate calculation of paid-up riders that fund a 
benefit with a combination of one year term and paid-up insurance. 
2 Introduction to the Method 
Following Shiu (1987), define a first order linear recursive 
(difference) equation as 
k = 0, I, 2, ... (1) 
where xo, {akJ, and {bkJ are known. Let 
(2) 
with So = 1. 
Dividing both sides of equation (1) by Sk+l yields 
2 I am also familiar with a similar (though unpublished) work by Wesley C. Green. 
Mr. Green currently is director of Actuarial Systems and MIS at Phoenix Home Life 
Mutual Insurance Company in Hartford, CT. 
3 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (1982). 
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i.e., 
L1 (::) = (3) 
Summing equation (3) from k=D to k=n-1 yields 
(4) 
Thus, once the starting value Xo is determined, the nth term can be 
obtained directly without explicitly computing the intermediate 
terms. 
3 Traditional Whole Life 
Here is the procedure for deriving a recursive formula for a tradi-
tional whole life reserve with a death benefit of 1: 
a) Establish the succession rule. 
You must know precisely the mathematical relationship between 
the reserve at t and that at t + 1. For example, for traditional 
whole life with face value t, it is well known (see, for example, 
Bowers et al., Chapter 7, Section 8) that the succession rule for 
the reserves is: 
(5) 
where P is the net level premium, tV is the net premium terminal 
reserve at time t, Qt is the valuation mortality rate at age x+t (x 
is the issue age), and i is the valuation interest rate. 
b) Cast the succession rule into linear form. 
Put equation (5) in linear form (as in equation (I)), 
(6) 
c) Compute the compounding element from issue to maturity. 
The compounding element Fk, as in equation (2), gives 
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k[(l+Oj 
Fk+1 =}l (1-Qj) . 
Notice that l/Fk is a discount factor, i.e., 
d) Divide both sides of the succession rule by Ft+l and place the 
result in finite difference form as in equation (3). 
p Qt/(1-Qt) 
Ft Ft+1 
e) Sum both sides from issue to maturity. 
Let m be the number of years from issue to maturity. Note that 
mV = 1 and oV = O. 
(7) 
f) Solve for P. 
From equation (7), 
m-1 1 1 m-1 vQt 
P x L -= -+ L-
t=O Ft Fm t=O Ft 
(8) 
where v = (1 + 0-1. Note that equation (8) can be rearranged as 
follows 
mV oV _ P 
Fm - Fo -
m-1 1 m-1 vQt 
x )' - )'-
t"';;b Ft - t1J Ft 
which essentially states that 
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Maturity value - Issue value = Premiums - Claims, 
with all terms discounted to issue. 
g) Generate the intermediate values from the succession rule and 
the premium. 
From equation (4), it follows that 
t-l P - VQk 
tV = Ft x)' F . 
(;:0 k 
Notice that we have discounted all terms to issue, then accumu-
lated. 
4 Universal Life 
This demonstration assumes a level death benefit of 1. The actu-
arial starting point for universal life mathematics is equation (5), 
the formula connecting successive terminal reserves for conventional 
whole life insurance: 
Here 1 - t+l V is called the net amount at risk, and Qt x (1 - t+l V) is 
called the mortality charge. 
Three sources of difficulties have to be overcome: 
a) The mortality charge,. being an expense, is payable at the begin-
ning of the perioG, whereas the whole life reserve formula 
assumes deatli.s occur at the end of the year. 
b) The net amount at risk is defined contractually. The traditional 
definition cannot be used because the end of the year reserve (or 
cash value) is not known at the time the mortality charge is due, 
which is at the beginning of the time period. A common approxi-
mation4 is to use 
(9) 
4 An alternative approximation is to include the mortality charge in the approxima-
tion, i.e., 
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Discounting the approximate mortality charge at interest results 
in Qt x (v - (tV + P)) being the current mortality charge. Note 
that i is the guaranteed rate because the current rate is unstable. 
c) The crediting and charging is done monthly, not annually as in 
the whole life reserve. 
Monthly interest and mortality charges can be used directly or an 
algorithmic adjustment to annual processing can shorten the computa-
tion time slightly. Eckley explains this, noting that the mortality 
charge and the interest credit are constant for all 12 months of a pol-
icy year, at least in sales illustrations. The interested reader is 
referred to Eckley's paper for the formulas. The recursive formulas 
will work if monthly mortality is used, although the vector will be 
12 times as large. A monthly interest rate is installed easily. 
An accurate target premium also must include expense charges. 
The succession rule must be based upon the actual administrative pro-
cessing (typically done by a mainframe computer). If that processing 
is in place, the actuary has to try to mimic the routines used on the 
mainframe instead of establishing theory.5 
There is, of course, a different succession rule when the TEFRA 
corridor is in effect. To qualify as a life insurance product in the 
United States and receive the attendant tax benefits, there must be a 
minimum relationship between the death benefit and the cash sur-
render value. This is called the cash value (or TEFRA) corridor and 
is 250 percent for attained ages 40 and under and gradually reduces to 
100 percent at age 95. There is no sound actuarial basis for these 
ratios; they are simply products of the U.S. Congress. 
The most common industry response to this requirement is to 
include a contractual benefit setting the death benefit equal to the 
minimum of the face amount or the TEFRA corridor multiplied by the 
cash surrender value. This response in turn generates a complex 
NAIC6 reserve mandate that in effect requires the immediate funding 
of any projected triggering of the corridor. If the cash surrender value 
at the valuation date is such that its accumulation along with future 
guaranteed maturity premiums will cause the death benefit to exceed 
5 An actuary, at an earlier time, may have established the processing rule. There are 
details (particularly when the minimum death benefit is in effect) such as the defini-
tion of the net amount of risk that are subject to choice. The practicing actuary then 
has to mimic the succession rule that is in place. 
6 The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) is an association c0n-
sisting of state insurance commissioners. The NAIC drafts model laws and recommends 
their adoption by state legislatures. The NAIC has no legal authority to force states 
to enact its recommendations. 
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the face amount, the present value of the excess is added to the 
reserve. In some cases the calculation has to jump between the two 
rules, but usually not more than once. 
The succession rule for universal life (using the approximation to 
t+1 V given in equation (9» is 
For the TEFRA corridor, the death benefit is the cash value times (1 
+ B t), where B t ~ O. The cash value at the end of period t+1, where 
death is assumed to occur, is t+1CV, where t+1CV = (tV + P) x (1 + 0. 
Thus, the net amount at risk at that time is 
(l+B)(tV + P) (1 + i) - (tV +P)(1 + i) = B t x (tV + P)(1 + i). 
The annual mortality charge is paid at the beginning of the year. 
Hence: 
5 Paid-Up Insurance Rider 
The conventional paid-up addition is a single premium partici-
pating product. Each dividend then buys another portion of paid-up 
insurance, which is itself participating. The effect is an increasing 
amount of paid-up insurance. 
A variation of this effect is a level death benefit participating 
single premium whole life policy. The facilitating device is to 
divide the death benefit into a one year term portion and a paid-up 
portion. The dividend first pays for the next year's term insurance 
with the same death benefit; any remaining dividend buys a paid-up 
participating whole life benefit. If the dividend is not sufficient to 
pay for the term portion, some of the paid-up could be surrendered 
and the face value of the term increased. If reduced dividends contin-
ued, there will be a time when the death benefit would have to be 
decreased. The initial premium rate is designed to pay for both the 
term portion and the paid-up portion, thus avoiding paying for the 
term in arrears. 
Let P = the single premium. It buys a combination of paid-up, PU, 
and a one year term insurance determined from: 
PU X Ax+ (1 - PW x ex = P 
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i.e., 
The result is the exact premium that will mature the policy if 
dividends are paid as projected; a daunting task by trial and 
error. 
There are constraints that should be noted. If the paid-up amount 
were to exceed I, future premiums would not be accepted. Also, nega-
tive paid-up amounts are not admissible. 
6 Recursion Formulas in APL 
APL programming language is well-suited to recursive formulas, 
as partial products are generated easily. A good APL technique for 
accumulating nonlevel payments is to discount all of the payments to 
the present, then accumulate this lump sum. The same process is used 
with recursive formulas. 
Refer to the first practical example of traditional whole life; 
In APL, 
The nonlevel payment accumulation technique described above 
can be used for intermediate values of the traditional whole life 
reserve: 
7 Conclusion 
For the past several decades, commutation functions have served 
actuaries well. The more complex products of today, however, call for 
new techniques. Recursive formulas may be the answer. They serve 
best where the calculation involves a trajectory to a target. Even 
whole life can be viewed as finding a premium to mature the policy. 
The intermediate values, the reserves, follow easily. The tradition 
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of valuations made with a table of stored reserve factors can be 
improved. The reserves can be calculated on an as needed basis 
(which is the way universal life reserves must be calculated). 
Commutation functions also could be used to calculate reserves as 
needed. Recursive formulas provide a second way. I hope future actu-
aries are as comfortable with recursive formulas as present actuaries 
are with commutation functions. 
References 
Eckley, D.A. "Life Insurance Transformations." Transactions of the Society of Actuaries 
XXXIX (1987): 19-36. 
Jordan, CW., Jr. Life Contingencies, second edition. (Ithasca, IL: Society of Actuaries, 
1991). 
Shiu, E.s.W. "Discussion of 'Life Insurance Transformations' by Douglas A. Eckley" 
Transactions of the Society of Actuaries XXXIX (1987): 17-18. 
Shiu, E.S.W. and Seah, E. "Discussion of 'Financial Accounting Standards No. 87: 
Recursion Formulas and other Related Matters' by Barnet N. Berin and Eric P. 
Lofgren." Transactions of the Society of Actuaries XXXIX (1987): 37-40. 
Bowers, N.L., Jr., Gerber, H.U., Hickman, J.C, Jones, D.A. and Nesbitt, CJ. Actuarial 
Mathematics. (Ithasca, IL: Society of Actuaries, 1986). 
L. Timothy Giles 
Farm Family Life Insurance Company 
P.O. Box 656 
Albany, New York 12210 
151 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
